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International relations (IR) theory on alliances traditionally focuses on how and 
why states balance (resist) or bandwagon with (appease) external threats.  But most threats 
faced by states today are not from other states. Rather, they come from within the states 
themselves in the form of civil war, rebellions, insurgencies and coups. Faced with threats 
emanating from within weak polities, great powers and the regimes ruling such peripheral 
states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military 
alliances to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. The weak state’s leaders 
are motivated to make sure they remain in power, while the great power seeks to safeguard 
its interests associated therewith. These “internal threat alliances” differ fundamentally 
from those in which states align to balance a threat external to their borders (what I refer 
to as “external threat alliances”) but have not been adequately examined in the literature. 
To help fill this gap in IR theory, this dissertation explains four of these core 
differences and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened state (regime) and its 
prospective alliance partner. In so doing, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-
range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more 
common type of alliance today. These core differences are the following. First, rather than 
balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard state security and territorial integrity, 
the great power/regime align in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the 
regime’s survival and great power interests associated therewith. Second, instead of 
comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors 
(the military, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the great power aligns 





to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the national interest. Third, rather 
than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning in traditional 
alliances, some regime agencies balance the target threat while others simultaneously 
collude with the same set of actors. And fourth and finally, when deciding how to respond 
to threats the regime largely does not do what is best for their countries’ national interest—
as is the case with traditional military alliances—but, instead, takes those actions that 
would preserve their political and personal power.  
The dissertation establishes this argument by employing a qualitative case study 
research methodology to examine two such internal threat alliances: the U.S. and Colombia 
(1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). This included fieldwork and 
interviews in Colombia and Afghanistan. The dissertation is important in illustrating how 
the nature of alliance making has changed and for guiding policy given that great powers 
will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with 
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INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES:  
GREAT POWERS, FRAGMENTED ALLIES, AND ALLIANCE-MAKING IN THE POST-COLD 
WAR ERA 
 
International relations (IR) theory on alliances traditionally focuses on how and 
why states balance (resist) or bandwagon with (appease) external threats.1 But most threats 
faced by states today are not from other states. Rather, they come from within the states 
themselves in the form of civil war, rebellions, insurgencies and coups. It is to be expected 
that regimes2 ruling peripheral states that seek to survive will pursue protection from these 
internal threats. Since many of these regimes lack the ability to defend themselves from 
such menaces, they seek alliances with countries, in particular great powers,3 which can 
help them do so. Examples of these “internal threat alliances” include those between the 
U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). In each case, 
the great power and regime brought their security policies into close cooperation (and 
thereby aggregated capabilities4) to balance a threat internal to the weaker regime’s borders 
yet with implications for the national security of (and thus common to) both states. For 
each case, the threat was associated with political violence and internal conflict within the 
weaker state.  
These internal threat alliances differ fundamentally from those in which states align 
to balance a threat external to their borders (what I refer to as “external threat alliances”) 
but have not been adequately examined in the literature.  To help fill this gap in IR theory, 
I will explain these differences and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened 
state and its prospective alliance partner. The four differences I examine are: (1) the nature 





(2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies 
“bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. In detailing 
these four core differences, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent 
theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of 
alliance today. 
My dissertation is important in illustrating how the nature of alliance making has 
changed and for guiding policy given that great powers will be called upon to make this 
form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with them today. The dissertation 
follows prior work by scholars on the dynamics of alliances formed to balance external 
enemies—both “peacetime” alliances (Snyder 1997) and “wartime” alliances (Weitsman 
2004)—and makes a distinct contribution to IR theory by helping understand the dynamics 
of internal threat alliances. 
THEORETICAL AND POLICY RELEVANCE  
The changing nature of threats within the international system makes this 
dissertation increasingly relevant, as states are confronted by and act to balance new types 
of menaces to their security. Through the end of the Cold War, conflict with other states 
represented the core threat to sovereign polities. In response to such threats and in order to 
ensure their national interests defined in terms of power and territorial survival, states 
brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances 
(external threat alliances) to defeat or deter attacks from adversaries outside of their 
borders.5 International Relations scholars responded in kind and espoused theories 
regarding the formation of these military alliances as well as why some of them remained 





In particular after the Berlin Wall’s collapse, however, the form and character of 
the principal threat to states across the globe has changed—political violence and intra-
state conflict (in particular within weaker polities in the “periphery”) have eclipsed their 
inter-state counterpart as the principal form of mass organized violence in the international 
system.6 In tandem with the “long peace” and decline in battlefield deaths at the hands of 
conflicts between states, fatalities resulting from violence and wars within states have been 
on the rise and taken more than 25 million lives.7 Depending on the threshold for battlefield 
deaths used, such internal violence has afflicted from one third to one half of nations across 
the globe. Nearly 97 percent of conflicts were intra- and not inter-state in nature from 1995 
to 2010 and at the time of this writing 21 civil wars are ongoing.8 While 61 intra-state wars 
occurred from 1990 to 2007, only eight incidents of inter-state conflict transpired in the 
same period.9 In addition to enduring longer on average than inter-state war, internal 
conflicts are unusually persistent: 20 percent of civil wars since 1960 have lasted for ten or 
more years.10  
Though distinct in context and characteristics from inter-state conflict, political 
violence and internal war nonetheless pose genuine and severe threats to states across the 
globe. This new principal form of mass organized violence threatens the survival of 
peripheral regimes within whose borders conflict occurs and creates consequences that 
imperil great power interests in various ways including by: challenging the survival of 
allies; creating instability that terrorist organizations can take advantage of to plan and 
launch attacks; endangering access to vital natural resource reserves; and causing mass 
migration of refugees, among others. Faced with threats emanating from within weak 





their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances (internal threat 
alliances) to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. Although many IR 
scholars have paid close attention to external threat alliances, few have analyzed internal 
threat alliances. 
Just as Weitsman (2004) contended that theory on peacetime alliance dynamics (the 
lion’s share of literature) could not be directly applied, due to their unique characteristics, 
to make predictions regarding those of wartime alliances, and thus developed a new 
framework to do so, the distinct nature of internal threat alliances requires a similar effort. 
In explaining the core differences between traditional and internal threat alliances, this is 
where I seek to make my scholarly contribution. 
The importance of this dissertation is further amplified by the likelihood that 
internal war and political violence will continue well into the future, as the principal causes 
at the root of such conflict show no signs of abating.11 Consequently, political violence 
including to the degree of internal war and associated threats posed to great powers and 
peripheral regimes are likely to endure—and therefore so too will internal threat alliances 
continue to be a central aspect of international relations as states seek ways in which to 
secure their interests in the face of such dangers. As we continue into an age where the 
principal threat to states will likely be political violence and consequences emanating from 
within polities, as opposed to state-on-state violence in the territories or sea lanes of the 
international system, this dissertation will provide theorists a mechanism via which to make 
predictions regarding and understand the dynamics of state responses to these threats.  
THE ARGUMENT AND OUTLINE OF CHAPTER  
I address this gap in the literature by revising alliance theory to demonstrate how 





different. Though the characteristics of these alliances are distinct in several ways, these 
differences can be distilled into a single distinguishing factor: where traditional military 
alliances deal with securing the state and national interest, internal threat alliances deal 
with ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated 
with it. Just as this core characteristic of the alliance changes, so too will their dynamics. 
Therefore, I argue that internal threat alliances are distinct from their external counterparts 
in four ways. Collectively, these four elements represent the framework of mid-range, 
contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common 
type of alliance today. 
First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat domestic in origin that imperils a 
regime. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is external in origin 
(another state or group of states) and imperils the state as a whole. Accordingly, the 
motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak 
regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns 
because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as 
thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests 
linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where 
states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.  
Second, while external threat alliances are formed by countries that have some 
internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for 
internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will 
generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one 





state with major internal fragmentation. Due to this fragmentation, there are a large number 
of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance dynamics and therefore need 
to be accounted for in theory. Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing 
with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national 
interest. Instead, the U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various 
actors. Each of these actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these 
characteristics of states in internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances 
where allies are essentially cohesive actors with political orders structured in a hierarchical 
fashion and central governments that control all component parts. Combined with the 
nature and location of the threat, this requires expanding the relevant levels of analysis 
from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and subnational. 
Third, because of this fragmentation, “bandwagoning” (appeasing a threat) in 
internal threat alliances is distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in 
traditional military alliances. The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime 
is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, balancing (resisting a threat) 
and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with the great 
power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its police, 
military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors 
fomenting violence. This contrasts with traditional alliances, where states either balance 
or bandwagon when faced with an external enemy. And the clientelistic relationships 
inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) 





threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one 
ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon while the allies are together.  
In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with 
external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance 
strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional 
alliances) the great power will manage relationships between cooperative central regimes 
and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power 
may need to bypass a bandwagoning central regime and work with other regime elements 
to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found 
in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either 
do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
Fourth and finally, when determining what to do in response to the target threat 
leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on their own 
political survival rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving the 
territorial integrity and security of the state.  
After forming an external threat alliance, states work together to decide what to do 
in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, and 
associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more “cohesive” 
the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, the more 
“effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance cohesion and 





cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the states are able to 
pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace (increase 
effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor motivating 
allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial survival.  
Like traditional alliances, internal threat alliances can only be strong when the 
peripheral and core states are willing to work together to defeat the shared enemy. The 
successfulness of the alliance depends on the severity of the threat and the quantity of 
resources needed to counter the threat. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s 
decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the national interest but 
rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the 
regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to threats requires asking not what 
is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that 
country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats 
to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make 
decisions and actions that advance their interests.  
To demonstrate these four differences between traditional and internal threat 
alliances the chapter unfolds in three core sections. The first section describes four 
elements of military alliances driven by external threats. The second section presents my 
argument. It demonstrates how internal threat alliances are distinct from their external 
threat counterpart in these four areas and outlines how I modify alliance theory to account 
for these differences. Subsequent chapters evidence these four differences through close 
case analysis of two such alliances. The third section provides conclusions and an outline 





I. EXTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES:   
CHARACTERISTICS & ASSOCIATED DYNAMICS 
 
Military alliances have been a fundamental aspect of international relations since 
the time of Thucydides. Spurred by “common perceptions of threat and overlapping 
strategic interests,” states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and 
combined military and economic resources in order to defeat or deter attacks from common 
external enemies or offensively seek revisions to the status quo.12 Reflecting the prevalence 
of alliances as a form of statecraft, the IR literature on military alliances is vast and has 
enriched our theoretical understanding of why and under what conditions states, mainly 
great powers, form alliances in order to achieve their mutual security goals. Drawing on 
literature reviewed in greater detail in the next chapter, this section provides a stylized 
summary of four of the main elements of alliances formed to cope with external threats.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the four elements examined are: (1) the nature of 
the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align 
(formation), (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when 
allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it.  The 
purpose of the section is to be able to later in the chapter juxtapose these elements to those 
of internal threat alliances. 
1. NATURE OF THREAT AND WHY STATES ALIGN: EXTERNAL ENEMIES AND TO 
SAFEGUARD THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
States form military alliances in response to a threat external to their borders as 
represented by a state or groups of states. For example, beginning in 1891 France and 
Russia aligned to balance an external threat as represented by the Triple Alliance 





France and Poland (joined later by the U.S.) aligned in response to the external threat 
comprised of a resurgent Germany and its Axis power allies (Italy and Japan).14  
Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to form external 
threat alliances is their need to preserve security and the national interest—defined in terms 
of power and territorial survival—and amass those capabilities perceived as necessary to 
do so. As an automatic response (in structural IR accounts) or due to a “perceived” increase 
in threat (in neoclassical realist IR treatments) states A and B align because they view threat 
T (external to their borders) as imperiling their security and realize that alone they lack the 
capabilities (military, economic, territorial control, or other) sufficient to defeat (or deter) 
that threat.15 In turn, they agree to bring their security policies into close cooperation and 
collaborate militarily in order to pool resources perceived as sufficient to defeat (or deter) 
that threat and preserve their security. In World War II, for example, the Allied powers 
aligned in order to balance the Axis Powers in order to preserve their national security.  
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIES: COHESIVE ACTORS, SLIGHT INTERNAL 
FRAGMENTATION 
In examining the dynamics of alliances forged to cope with such external threats, 
most of IR theory focuses on those formed by Western states (mainly great powers) of 
comparable degrees of development and internal cohesiveness. While external threat 
alliances involve countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially 
between two cohesive actors. Accordingly, associated theoretical frameworks largely 
assume that states comprising the alliance are “like units” that serve the same list of 
functions yet differ according to their capabilities. Internally, their political order is 
structured in a hierarchical fashion and as a result they act in a “rational” manner: 





associated territorial survival trump other concerns.16 Due to their internally cohesive 
manner, the actors considered relevant to alliance dynamics and thus examined in IR theory 
are core national-level security-policy decision-makers (in some cases referred to as the 
“Foreign Policy Executive”) who communicate and decide to align (formation) as well as 
work together to devise goals and strategies in order to deter aggression from or defeat this 
threat (cohesion). Other actors within the allies—their militaries, for example—are 
assumed to be under the control of central decision-makers and to rationally execute 
alliance strategy including use of pooled resources (effectiveness).17  
A. Relevant Levels of Analysis: International 
Due to the nature of the external threat and the internally cohesive composition of 
the allies, to examine why states formed an alliance and were (or were not) able to deter or 
defeat their common threat, the relevant level of analysis and therefore that which IR theory 
focuses on is predominantly international. The threat’s location and profile mean that allies 
confront it principally in the sea lanes and foreign territories of the international system. 
The core decision-makers of states A and B based in their respective capitals coordinate 
policies to balance their common threat (T).18 In the event of escalation and ensuing 
conflict, A and B apply the capabilities they have collectively amassed to combat T, 
generally outside of their respective borders.19 In 1866, for example, Prussia and Italy 
aligned and then combatted the naval forces of their external threat, the Austrian Empire, 
in the Adriatic Sea.20 More than 100 years later and in response to Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. and other states invaded Iraq so as to preclude Hussein’s 
further advance into Saudi Arabia.21 The national or subnational levels of analysis have 
largely not been considered relevant to examining external threat alliance dynamics (in 





3. WHY AND WHEN STATES BANDWAGON: SECURITY AND “SPOILS” TO ADVANCE THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST AND TERRITORIAL SURVIVAL 
Whereas balancing is defined as “allying with others against the prevailing threat,” 
states can also “bandwagon,” defined as “alignment with the source of danger.” 
Bandwagoning with the source of threat can take two forms as distinguished by motivation 
or purpose.22 “Offensive” bandwagoning represents a state’s decision to align with the 
dominant state in order to share in that state’s “spoils of victory.” And “defensive” 
bandwagoning is a “form of appeasement” – a state aligns with an aggressor in order to 
avoid attack and survive (Walt 1987).23 Others take issue with this treatment of 
bandwagoning and argue that states will bandwagon even in the absence of a threat—states 
enter a conflict on the side they perceive to be stronger (and thus more likely to win) with 
the aim of securing material benefit in the event that side wins. That is, states “bandwagon 
for profit” (Schweller 1994). 24 
In analyses centered on cohesion, bandwagoning is one factor IR scholars hold may 
lead to the “dissolution” of external threat alliances: after aligning and facing an escalating 
threat, an ally may decide that the alliance is no longer able to advance its national interest. 
The state defects from the alliance and aligns (bandwagons) with the “source of danger”. 
States of lower power status are particularly prone to bandwagoning; lacking capabilities 
necessary to affect the outcome of a given conflict, they must select the “winning side” in 
order to survive. During World War II, for example, after initially aligning with the Axis 
Powers to fight on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces, Romania defected and 
bandwagoned with the empowered Soviet Union to ensure its survival. 25  
In sum, due to the nature of the threat an ally may bandwagon to “survive” or “for 





security and territorial survival. Further, bandwagoning and balancing is a binary 
phenomenon—states either bandwagon or balance. As Walt says: “when confronted by a 
significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon.”26 Bandwagoning 
implies departing an alliance, so they cannot do both simultaneously. 
4. PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS: THE NATIONAL INTEREST  
After forming an external threat alliance, core decision-makers based in the allies’ 
capitals work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. They work 
together “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward 
those ends.”27 This is referred to alliance “cohesion.” In so doing, they are working toward 
the shared goal of deterring or defeating a common external menace. And whether they 
achieve this goal is referred to as the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.” Essentially, these 
two terms boil down to the alliance’s target threat and what the allies agree to do about it. 
Specific variables can cause variation in cohesion and effectiveness. In working together 
on these issues, however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the 
national interest and ensuring territorial survival. To be sure, the leaders of states in 
traditional alliances make decisions that benefit their own interests yet do not necessarily 
help the country as a whole. However, in response to external threats they generally pursue 
the course that will ensure the national interest and their country’s territorial survival. 
A. Cohesion: Desire to Secure National Interest Pushes Allies Together in Face 
of Escalating Threat 
IR scholars cite various factors that can affect cohesion including but not limited to 
“strains” between partners linked to alliance “decision-making structure,” “capabilities of 
partners” as it affects bargaining power within the alliance, “military dependence,” and the 
“scope of the alliance” and extent to which interests overlap.28 The single most plausible 





“intensity” of the external threat (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Boulding 1962; Calvocoressi 
1966; Wolfers 1966; Stevens 1961; Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan 1973; Walt 1997; 
Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). Two facets of traditional military alliance cohesion are: 
allies working together to combine resources and remain together (preclude defection by 
allies). These dynamics then inform whether allies are able to deter or defeat their common 
foe (effectiveness). 
Motivated by their core desire to preserve state security, allies are more likely to 
agree on goals and strategy (work together) and stay in the alliance should the external 
threat be high and adversely affect all partners. In the face of an escalating threat, the allies 
stay together and work together because doing so is necessary to ensure territorial survival. 
Should the threat decrease or adversely affect one ally more than another, collaboration 
between allies should decline.  
B. Effectiveness: To Secure National Interest, Allies Apply Capabilities 
Against their Common Enemy 
Some alliances succeed, while others fail, and IR scholars have attempted to 
understand this variation in this effectiveness or efficacy (Liska 1962).29 To determine 
whether a given alliance has been effective its “goal” must be clarified. As outlined above, 
traditional military alliances form in response to an external threat and largely have one of 
two objectives—to deter an attack (“defensive” or “peacetime” alliances) or to defeat a 
common enemy (“offensive” or “wartime” alliances). The bulk of IR scholarship focuses 
on the former and conceptualizes effectiveness largely as commensurate with cohesion—
if allies pool resources and remain together, then the alliance deters the common adversary 
(efficacy is therefore presented as degree of alliance “cohesiveness” or “durability”). A 





condition effectiveness but their insights are chiefly not formulated as generalizable 
arguments.30  
Given that the goal of offensive/wartime alliances is most like that of internal threat 
alliances—to weaken or defeat a common enemy, rather than deter an attack from it—it is 
most appropriate to hone in on arguments within this strain of literature. However, few IR 
scholars theorize explicitly regarding why some such alliances derived to defeat a common 
enemy are more effective than others; those few works that do generally agree that cohesion 
is prerequisite for effectiveness—working together leads allies to pool military 
capabilities, which they then apply against the external threat (Holsti 1970; Rosen 1970; 
Weitsman 2004). Due to the characteristics of allies as unitary states with internal political 
orders structured in a hierarchical manner that yield rational behavior, these frameworks 
largely assume that allies will act to advance the national interest, according to agreed 
alliance policy, and apply their resources against a common foe. 31  
Of these, Weitsman’s (2004) is one of the only frameworks that offers generalizable 
insights and therefore is employed as representative of shared assumptions in alliance 
theory. She argues that the level and “symmetry, clarity, and commonalty” of external 
threat as perceived by allies will determine the three aspects of cohesion with “direct 
implications on the prosecution of a war.” These are the ability of states to: “coordinate 
their war-fighting strategy”; “agree on war aims”; and “prevent a separate peace” (avoid 
an ally from defecting/bandwagoning). The more allies are able to agree on these elements, 
the more likely they will be able to aggregate capabilities and then defeat their common 
foe.32 The Triple Entente, according to Weitsman, was more effective than the Central 





was the principal source of threat. This shared threat perception made them more able to 
agree on strategy and war aims as well as prevent an ally from defecting/bandwagoning. 
By contrast, the Central Powers perceived different levels of threat and disagreed on the 
primary enemy, which “severely diminished the effectiveness of the alliance.”33  
Traditional Military Alliances: a Synopsis 
In sum, the four elements of external threat alliances examined are as follows. First, 
states form traditional alliances in response to a threat external to allies’ borders that 
consists of a state or group of states (counter-alliance). Given the nature of this threat, the 
core factor motivating alliance formation is to secure their national interest—preserving 
the territorial integrity and security of the state—and obtain those capabilities needed to do 
so. 
Second, while external threat alliances are with countries that have some 
fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors that are of comparable 
levels of development and have political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion. 
Therefore, the central government controls all its component parts, which act to advance 
the national interest and ensure territorial survival. Combined with the nature of the 
external threat, the required level of analysis is predominantly international.  
Third, states in traditional alliances can either balance (resist threats) or bandwagon 
(appease threats) and do so to survive or to secure a share in the spoils of victory. These 
decisions are driven by the state’s core motivation to preserve national security and 
territorial survival. 
Fourth and finally, after aligning the allies work together to balance a common 
target. In working together to devise strategy and pool resources, decisions and actions are 





III. THE ARGUMENT:  
 
CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES AND TRADITIONAL 
MILITARY ALLIANCES 
 
This section presents the dissertation’s core argument and demonstrates the four 
ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from traditional military 
alliances. It demonstrates how external and internal threat alliances are distinct in each 
area, describes how theory needs to be updated to account for these differences, and 
outlines how my dissertation does so. In detailing these four core differences, the 
dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for 
understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. 
1. NATURE OF THREAT AND WHY STATES ALIGN: INTERNAL TO THE WEAK STATE, TO 
SAVE THE REGIME 
With internal threat alliances, the location and profile of the threat is distinct from 
traditional military alliances. Internal threat alliances stem from some domestic threat to a 
regime that an outside country cares about. This is different than traditional alliances, 
where the threat is external in origin (another state or group of states) and imperils the state 
as a whole. With internal threat alliances, the allies bring their security policies into close 
cooperation in response to a threat that resides within one of the alliance partners (the 
weaker state). Accordingly, regarding the profile of the threat, it is not comprised of a state 
or group of states (counter-alliance) but, rather, a high level of political violence including 
but not limited to internal war.  
This political violence directly or through its repercussions is perceived as a threat 
by the great power and peripheral regime alike. For example, France and Gabon in the 
1990s aligned their security policies to balance political violence from opposition forces 





aligned in response to instability threatening the Latin American ally from violent drug 
cartels (a conflict that has taken approximately 40,000 lives since 2006).34 Given that the 
location/profile of the threat inherent to internal threat alliances is distinct from those 
involved in external threat alliances, it requires a stand-alone definition and associated 
conceptualization. 
A. NATURE OF THE INTERNAL THREAT: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CONSEQUENCES  
Prior work in IR defines a threat as emanating from systemic or domestic sources 
and including: “other great powers and extra-regional actors, regional powers in the locale, 
or domestic opponents.”35 In keeping with yet slightly expanding this conceptualization, 
the threat in response to which states form an internal threat alliance can be defined as any 
form of political violence occurring within a given state that either directly or through its 
consequences can be perceived by states as imperiling their security and interests more 
broadly. States may perceive the threat as endangering their interests in particular ways; 
however, the defining characteristic of the internal threat alliance is that the threat is 
common to the peripheral regime and the great power, thereby spurring them to form an 
alliance to respond to this threat. On one side, the regime within whose borders the violence 
is occurring perceives the threat as a direct challenge to its existence; the great power, by 
contrast, may perceive instability and other consequences that result from this political 
violence (as linked to the regime’s security) as a threat to its interests.  
This definition and associated conceptualization allow for consideration of a broad 
range of threats generalizable across a range of cases that may motivate great powers and 
peripheral regimes to form alliances including: terrorist organization activity, transnational 
crime, and other illegal armed groups and rebels or insurgents. For the purpose of this 





including but not limited to internal war—both the threat to regime survival (physical and 
political) posed by non-state actors including insurgents mounting campaigns that imperil 
the regime’s existence and the consequences such conflict poses for other actors (namely 
great powers) in the international system.36 The location and profile of the threat driving 
internal threat alliances has implications for the motivations spurring the great 
power/regime to align. 
B. WHY STATES ALIGN: TO PRESERVE THE PERIPHERAL REGIME  
In traditional military alliances, the primary factor motivating alliance formation is 
the need to balance an external threat in order to preserve state security and the national 
interest. This does not hold for internal threat alliances, however, where the nature of the 
threat and factors underlying why states get involved are different. At the core of internal 
threat alliances is the need to preserve the peripheral regime—the weak state’s leaders are 
motivated to make sure they remain in power, while the great power seeks to safeguard its 
interests associated therewith. The regime aligns because it needs capabilities to survive, 
while the great power gets involved because its interests are linked to the regime’s stability. 
To conceptualize why internal political violence is perceived as a threat by both peripheral 
regimes and great powers, and therefore explain why and when they will form alliances to 
balance such a threat, I draw on Steven David’s omni-balancing framework (1991) and 
analysis of the “catastrophic consequences” (2008) that political violence including 
internal war pose to the U.S. (which I take to represent great powers more broadly). 
i. Why the Peripheral Regime Aligns: Threat to its Physical/Political Survival  
Steven David’s omni-balancing framework can be employed to explain why threats 
associated with political violence motivate a peripheral regime to align. Where traditional 





threats from other states, David’s theory focuses on the elites and leaders (drawing on cases 
from the Third World) of states and recognizes that they face domestic threats that could 
end their reign including coup attempts or secessionist movements, among others. External 
threats cannot be ignored but internal threats tend to exert a more powerful influence on 
alignment behavior, which in the Third World is ultimately driven by the “calculation 
of…leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do whatever necessary to keep them 
in power.”37 As a result, leaders will seek external alignments (even with states they 
consider a secondary threat) in order to balance against the “more immediate and 
dangerous” threat to their survival.38 Regimes, like states, seek to survive and will therefore 
act in ways (including forming alliances with secondary threats) to keep themselves in 
power. When confronted with rebellions, potential coups, or other non-state actors 
fomenting political violence, then, they will logically seek to align with stronger states in 
order to receive military capabilities needed to weaken or defeat this threat and therefore 
survive.  
Various examples elucidate that these factors motivate weak regimes to form 
internal threat alliances. Beginning in 2010, for example, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-
Assad faced a mounting insurgency fomented by Islamist and non-Islamist groups seeking 
to overthrow his government. In order to ensure his regime’s survival, Assad sought 
support from Russia, which provided munitions, weapons, and helicopters the regime 
proceeded to use against those actors threatening to remove him from power.39 Similarly, 
in Colombia, in response to rising threats from rebel groups and drug-trafficking 
organizations, the government brought its security policies into close cooperation with the 





perceived intensifying threats from the resurgent Taliban and other non-state actors 
fomenting political violence and therefore sought cooperation with the U.S. to balance 
these menaces.41 Leaders in each country needed resources and support in order to defeat 
or weaken actors contesting their rule. Aligning with the great power, therefore, made 
sense. 
ii. Why the Great Power Aligns: Threat to Interests Tied to Regime 
By definition, political violence and intra-state wars occur principally within 
borders; however, the effects of such conflict often spill over borders to affect the interests 
of other states, including great powers.42 And Steven David’s work on consequences of 
political violence for the U.S. demonstrates why political violence within other states can 
generate threats to interests of great powers and therefore spur them to balance against such 
consequences, including by forming alliances.  
Instability resulting from political violence can lead to lost economic opportunities, 
decreased access to crucial natural resources, and cross-border flows of refugees, among 
other implications. Instability in a country with weapons of mass destruction in general, 
and nuclear weapons and fissile material in particular, risks accidental detonations of such 
arms or loss of government control of weapons stores.43 Internal violence further debilitates 
already weak states, providing terrorist organizations “safe havens” from which they may 
plan and launch attacks onto international powers as well as their territories or strategic 
assets.44 Great powers rely on access to natural resources in general and oil in particular, 
and such conflict raises the cost of and inhibits access to each.45 Trade and investments 
abroad are the lifeblood of economic well-being at home—but political violence and the 
associated uncertainty it generates can send stock prices into a tailspin, with concomitant 





violence also threatens the citizens of great powers—either directly, by endangering 
expatriate communities abroad, or indirectly, by forcing mass flows of refugees across 
borders and affecting communities on the other side.47 For all of these reasons, great 
powers have an incentive to mitigate the aforementioned consequences that stem from 
internal war and political violence.48 Accordingly, they may bring their security policies 
into close cooperation with the besieged regime in order to weaken or defeat that threat. 
Various examples elucidate that these factors motivate great powers to get involved 
in internal threat alliances. After the Cold War ended, for example, France maintained such 
alliances with Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) and Omar Bongo (Gabon) in order to preserve 
these regimes and French interests linked to them. In Zaire, France needed to maintain a 
strategic ally in the region and protect the sizeable contingent of French expatriates there.49 
And in Gabon, France needed to maintain stability to preserve access to the state’s oil 
deposits and other natural resources while Bongo required military capabilities to balance 
internal opposition. To guarantee stability within Gabon and maintain access to such 
resources, France provided Bongo with approximately $1 million in annual military aid 
and placed French army officers in the regime’s security forces. 50 As Bongo described the 
core motivation for the alliance: “Gabon without France is like a car with no driver. France 
without Gabon is like a car with no fuel.”51 Returning to the more recent example of Syria, 
Russia provided military capabilities to the embattled Assad regime to (among other 
factors) safeguard its single military base outside the former Soviet Union as well as 
preserve access to oil and gas fields and other economic interests including Russian 





In sum, political violence and those actors who foment it directly imperil the 
physical and political survival of the regime within whose borders such violence is 
occurring. And the consequences that stem from such violence, including the potential 
demise (or instability within the borders) of an ally, can imperil a great power’s interests. 
To achieve the mutual security goal of balancing this threat, and because they lack 
sufficient capabilities to do so alone, the regime and great power align their security 
policies to balance the threat. Regarding why states form internal threat alliances, then, it 
can be expected that: if a great power and regime perceive a moderate level of threat 
(emanating from within the weaker ally’s borders) and are dependent53 on each other to 
balance it, then they will bring their security policies into close cooperation to do so.54 The 
location and profile of the threat driving internal threat alliances has implications for the 
characteristics of allies that will form such alliances. 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIES: INTERNALLY FRAGMENTED, MULTIPLE ACTORS, 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
 Traditional alliances are formed between states that that have some internal 
fragmentation but are essentially between two cohesive actors. For internal threat alliances, 
by contrast, the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally 
comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one stronger 
and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral state with 
major internal fragmentation. 
Great powers will not represent the source of the target threat or need to form 
internal threat alliances with their peers because they maintain a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force within their borders. And in the event political violence does occur 





retains capabilities sufficient to quell such threats. For example, instead of seeking 
assistance from other states to suppress riots and political violence in Paris and its environs 
in 2005/6, France employed its own security forces to do so and arrested more than 3,000 
people fomenting these acts.55 Though a weak state may align with another weak state to 
balance a common internal threat, the probability that this will occur is small: given low 
levels of development weak regimes generally lack capacity to preserve a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force within their own borders, let alone allocate capabilities to another 
state via an alliance. As a result, peripheral regimes will tend to pursue alliances with 
stronger powers as opposed to their peers.56  
Due to the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation (and location of the threat as within 
its borders) there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence 
alliance dynamics and therefore need to be accounted for in theory. This also means that 
the relevant levels of analysis need to be expanded from international (as with traditional 
alliances) to national and subnational. 
i. Weaker Ally: Internally Fragmented, Multiple Actors, Competing Interests  
The unequal levels of development and accompanying differences in internal 
fragmentation mean that allies—the great power and peripheral regime—do not share the 
same state characteristics. The great power’s internal political order is hierarchically 
structured. As a result, it will act as a unified unit that rationally prioritizes preserving 
national security when rendering decisions and associated actions related to the alliance. 
Therefore, the assumptions used in theory on external threat alliances to determine 
priorities and associated actions by great powers remain applicable.  
By contrast and as reflected in the literature on state-building in the periphery 





on artificially placed borders, and generally lack the robust institutions commensurate with 
a great power’s hierarchical ordering and the prioritization of national security above all 
else that comes with it.57 In contrast to traditional military alliances, then, the great power 
aligns not with another state but, rather, the elite-led regime atop its state apparatus. 
Accordingly, because the allies are fundamentally distinct in character the same 
assumptions used in IR to determine priorities and associated actions by great powers 
cannot be used to understand decisions and associated actions of the weaker state’s regime 
vis-à-vis alliance dynamics. New assumptions are required.  
Problematizing the influence of a weaker state’s characteristics onto alignment 
decisions in general and alliance dynamics more broadly is in keeping with the precedent 
in IR theory as represented by the work of Steven David (1991) and Randall Schweller 
(2006). These scholars predict (concerning external threat alliances) that characteristics 
within a state’s limits—in particular its regime type—will inform its alliance behavior 
outside of those borders including choice of allies as well as ability to mobilize resources 
to balance the external enemy.58 This remains relevant for explaining the formation of 
internal threat alliances; however, the nature of the internal threat means that the weaker 
state’s characteristics are also relevant to understanding bandwagoning, cohesion and 
effectiveness. 
The weak state’s lower level of development and associated fragmented internal 
political order introduce two factors distinct from great powers examined in traditional 
alliance theory that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions in the 
alliance. First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies 





policy. This differs from great powers, which control all elements of the state. And second, 
the regime (central decision-makers or bureaucratic agencies) may prioritize interests 
other than the national interest when making decisions. And this is distinct from great 
powers, which act rationally and prioritize national security. As outlined in David’s “omni-
balancing” framework, the central regime will prioritize its political and physical survival 
over the state’s national interest. Since the principal concern of leaders is to remain in 
power, they will at times “protect themselves at the expense of promoting the long-term 
security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.”59 Regimes, like states, seek 
to survive and will therefore act in ways to keep themselves in power.  
The patron-client relations imbedded in such lesser developed states represent a 
second factor that peripheral regime actors may prioritize over securing the national 
interest.60 Though the specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending 
on the context—some are based on tribal and ethnic linkages, while others are rooted in 
economic exchange—they fundamentally represent a source of power and influence for 
actors that comprise the regime. In making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime 
actors may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence 
(or that of their client) as opposed to the national interest. This includes contravening stated 
alliance goals and strategy. Given that this is not addressed in existing alliance scholarship, 
I consult the comparative politics literature on clientelism to account for it.61 For example 
and illustrative of the lack of central control and factors that may trump the national 
interest, the regime may instruct a bureaucratic agency (as agreed with the great power) to 
implement a strategy aimed to defeat or weaken a rebel movement or drug-trafficking 





of implementing the central regime’s decision, however, the agency ignores or acts in 
contradiction to it in order to maintain its relationship with the rebel movement or 
traffickers—in exchange, the agency actor receives some form of payment or benefit. 
Instead of balancing against the threat, they bandwagon with it. 
Due to the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation (and location of the threat as within 
its borders) there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence 
alliance dynamics by balancing against (or bandwagoning with) the threat and therefore 
needed to be accounted for in theory. This also means that the relevant levels of analysis 
need to be expanded from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and 
subnational. 
ii. Bridging the International and Subnational Levels of Analysis: Accounting for 
Actors “In the Field” 
The domestic nature of the threat with internal threat alliances means that the great 
power/regime confront it principally within the territorial borders of the weaker state. For 
example, beginning in 2001 the Philippines and U.S. brought their security policies into 
close cooperation to ensure the regime’s survival in the face of attacks from insurgent 
groups. Security forces of the former applied alliance resources within its borders in order 
to weaken these actors.62 Accordingly, understanding the dynamics of such internal threat 
alliances requires an expansion in levels of analysis from those employed to problematize 
traditional military alliances. The international level of analysis remains important because 
internal threat alliances by definition involve two states working together to balance a 
threat; however, the threat’s location/profile make the national and subnational levels 





depends not only on interaction between states and thus the international level but also on 
what transpires at the national and subnational levels.  
The weaker ally’s internal fragmentation also makes necessary this expansion to 
national and subnational in order to account for the influence of those great power and 
peripheral regime actors working together within the weaker state’s borders to devise 
strategy and apply alliance resources. The central decision-makers of the great 
power/regime remain important to all dynamics: they communicate and decide to bring 
their security policies into close cooperation (formation), collaborate to set alliance strategy 
(cohesion) and to some extent control how pooled resources are applied against the 
common threat (effectiveness). As the great power/regime proceed to coordinating goals 
and strategies (cohesion) and then applying resources against their common enemy 
(effectiveness), though, additional bureaucratic agencies outside the writ of the central 
decision-makers become involved—partner militaries, for example, work together to 
devise joint strategies and combat forces attacking the regime. Returning to the Philippines 
example, its central regime and U.S. counterpart agreed to form an alliance (international 
level), but the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other subnational officials collaborated 
to use alliance resources to balance the threat (national and subnational levels).63 To 
explain variation in bandwagoning, cohesion and effectiveness, then, decisions and actions 
of these bureaucratic agencies relevant to the alliance but outside of the central regime and 
acting at the national and subnational level must also be examined.64  
Expanding the levels of analysis employed in alliance theory is in keeping with the 
precedent in IR literature for problematizing phenomena at the subnational level and 





the international and domestic levels of analysis in general and examine the international 
aspects of internal war in particular, Rosenau (1964) disaggregates the “conflict-ridden” 
state into various “subsystems” and argues that to fully examine the relationship between 
political violence and international relations, one needs to delve beyond the national to the 
subnational, writing: “The interplay between the two sets of variables is continuous and 
complex, leaving the analyst no alternative but to examine a broad range of political and 
social processes, from subnational to national to international.”65 To some extent this is in 
keeping with Waltz’s (1954) precursor, seminal work that examines the effects onto IR of 
three “levels”: state system, state, and individual.66 And specifically conceptualizing the 
influence of actors at these lower levels or “subsystems” of analysis is consistent with a 
precedent in IR theorizing as arguably initiated by Jervis (1976) who, citing the tendency 
in IR to view states as unitary (as inapplicable to non-Western polities), argues that the 
state should be viewed as disaggregated into various parts with distinct interests which in 
turn affect their actions and overall state behavior.67 Though developed to understand 
external alignment decisions, the assumptions underlying his framework provide a 
foundation for and are relevant to understanding the influence of such “component parts” 
of the state and weaker regime onto the dynamics of internal threat alliances. 
As George Liska (1968) presciently argues in one of the first works on alliance 
politics, the strategies and goals set by policy-makers in the capital must be carried out by 
“those in the field.”68 For external threat alliances, these are partners’ armed forces working 
together in sea lanes or foreign territories to combat a common enemy. In the context of 
internal threat alliances, the “field” is located within the weak state’s borders and therefore 





subnational officials) working with their great power counterpart to debilitate or defeat the 
threat. I refer to these actors as “Critical Bureaucratic Agencies,” defined as those actors 
outside the central regime holding a mandate related to security and directly involved in 
the alliance including but not limited to the Ministries of Defense and Interior, Army, 
National Police, and governors of subnational areas in which the alliance partners confront 
the threat. Given that existing alliance scholarship does not provide assumptions on which 
to explain priorities and associated actions vis-à-vis alliance dynamics of such agencies, I 
leverage insights from the bureaucratic politics literature to do so.69 These agencies are 
active at the national level, interacting and collaborating with the central regime and its 
great power counterparts, and subnational level, using alliance military resources against 
the common threat. And as alliance partners work together to devise strategies (cohesion) 
as well as apply military capabilities to balance their common threat (effectiveness), they 
are increasingly involved and operating in contexts independent of the central decision-
makers based in allies’ respective capitals. Bureaucratic agencies of the great power can 
be viewed as an extension of the central decision-makers. Though the weaker state’s 
agencies are not entirely outside the central regime’s control, the state’s fragmented 
character may reduce the regime’s control over these actors.  
Just as the regime’s central decision-makers may prioritize their survival or desire 
to enhance power and influence over the national interest (and therefore alliance strategy) 
so too may the weaker ally’s bureaucratic agencies at the national and subnational levels. 
What is more, even if the central regime acts in accordance with agreed alliance strategy 
as derived in agreement with their great power ally, bureaucratic actors at the subnational 





some actors within one of the allies may cooperate and balance the threat (per the alliance 
agreement) while others do not and instead bandwagon with it.  
In sum, traditional alliances are formed between states that that have some internal 
fragmentation but are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for internal 
threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will generally 
comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation. As a result, 
there are a large number of actors within the threatened state that can influence alliance 
dynamics and therefore need to be accounted for in theory.  
3. WHY AND WHEN REGIME ACTORS BANDWAGON: SIMULTANEOUS WITH BALANCING 
AND MOTIVATED BY CLIENTELISM (AND SURVIVAL, PROFIT)  
Like external threat alliances, after aligning and in the face of escalating threat an 
actor comprising the peripheral regime may decide that the alliance is no longer able to 
advance its interests. As a result, the central regime or those bureaucratic agencies involved 
in the alliance may defect from the alliance and “bandwagon” with the threat out of fear 
for their survival or to enjoy the winning side’s spoils of victory.  
Adjusting and extending from the existing IR concept to account for the nature of 
the internal threat, this is referred to as “subnational bandwagoning” and defined as 
alignment between peripheral regime actors and those entities fomenting political violence, 
including any behavior that aids the threat (bandwagons with it) as opposed to pursuing the 
purpose of the alliance (balancing it). Instead of acting in accordance with the alliance and 
carrying out agreed strategy or tactics devised to weaken the internal threat, these actors 
decide to bandwagon with it. Like actors who form external threat alliances, the weaker 





bandwagon to ensure their regime’s survival or their own patron-client interests rather than 
advancing the national interest (as in external threat alliances).  
Due to the nature of the threat and characteristics of the weaker ally, though, the 
profile and scope of bandwagoning will be distinct from that experienced in traditional 
military alliances in three ways (in addition to location).  
i. Balancing and Bandwagoning Occur Simultaneously 
First, because the central regime does not fully control all bureaucratic agencies 
balancing can occur simultaneously with bandwagoning. The central regime may work 
with the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while 
its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with 
actors fomenting violence. Similarly, a given component of a regime agency (the Army or 
National Police, for example) may balance while another component bandwagons. In 
external threat alliances aligning against or siding with the “source of danger” is a binary 
phenomenon—states either balance or bandwagon. Here, they can bandwagon and balance 
at the same time, thus complicating the relationship and making it distinct for internal threat 
alliances. 
ii. Bandwagoning to Advance Regime Interests, Patron Client Ties (and Survival, 
Profit) 
Second, in addition to bandwagoning to survive or share in spoils of victory, regime 
actors (central or subnational) will bandwagon to preserve or expand clientelistic 
relationships that enhance their power and influence. These relationships are generally 
based in  patronage but also include those based in fealty to tribe or ethnicity. If the weaker 
state’s actors have an alternative loyalty to those actors fomenting violence—insurgents or 
narco-traffickers, for example—they may prioritize this loyalty (and thus bandwagon) over 





addition to bandwagoning to ensure survival or profit share. Including patron-client 
linkages as a motivating factor is important to explain a wider range of such behavior, 
including why subnational bandwagoning may occur in locations and by actors whose 
survival is not threatened as well as by actors not necessarily motivated by a share in the 
spoils of victory. For example, during the internal threat alliance between the U.S. and Iraq 
to quell political violence threatening regime survival, various (Sunni) representatives of 
the (predominantly Shia) government and its security forces colluded with Sunni 
belligerents instead of implementing agreed alliance strategy; and in Afghanistan, 
government officials bandwagoned with instead of balanced insurgents due to prioritizing 
fealty to ethnicity (Pashtun) as well as economically or politically profitable illicit business 
ties (“it is a toxic triangle of alliances…corrupt officials work with drug traffickers who, 
in turn, help the Taliban.)”70  
iii. Two Manifestations of Subnational Bandwagoning: Active and Passive 
Third and finally, regime actor subnational bandwagoning (motivated by threat, 
profit, or patron-client) will manifest in one of two forms: “active” and “passive.” Active 
bandwagoning comprises any action that directly aids and thus reflects alignment with the 
internal threat including but not limited to diverting alliance resources to the threat; turning 
a blind eye to threat activities; or refusing to enforce laws aimed to hinder the threat. For 
example, a regime actor funneling money to insurgents or a member of the judiciary not 
prosecuting narco-traffickers would constitute active bandwagoning. Passive 
bandwagoning involves peripheral regime actors diverting aggregated capabilities to their 
clients and thus away from their use for the alliance purpose; however, capabilities are not 
diverted directly to the threat. For example, a representative of the Ministry of Interior may 





tribesman. This constitutes bandwagoning in so far as the regime precludes alliance 
resources from being used to balance the threat. Whether active or passive, the implication 
for alliance effectiveness is that actions divergent from terms of the alliance will empower 
(as opposed to weaken) the source of the threat. Active bandwagoning will have a more 
acute effect, yet both forms of bandwagoning will hinder alliance effectiveness.  
Two examples of bandwagoning by peripheral regime actors help elucidate these 
distinct manifestations and motivations of bandwagoning in internal threat alliances. The 
internal threat alliance between the U.S. and Afghanistan includes examples of peripheral 
regime actors bandwagoning due to fear for survival (police in Helmand turned a blind-eye 
to insurgent activity to survive) as well as patron-client relations rooted in tribe/ethnicity 
(the governor of Kapisa actively aiding insurgents)71 and illicit industries linked to 
enhancing power and influence (security forces were “more concerned with extracting 
revenue for themselves and doing their local patrons’ bidding…than effectively combatting 
the insurgents”).72 In each case regime actors violated alliance strategy and bandwagoned 
in order to pursue a priority they deemed more important; this occurred while the central 
regime was working with the U.S. to balance insurgents.  
Similar forms of bandwagoning occurred on the other side of the globe and in the 
context of the U.S.-Mexico alliance formed to quell political violence as fomented by drug-
traffickers. Instead of implementing agreed alliance strategy and working to weaken and 
defeat the various cartels, for example, elements of Mexico’s police and army in specific 
provinces bandwagoned with these drug trafficking organizations: out of fear for survival 
or patron-client relations rooted in desire to enhance personal power and influence, these 





they did so as the central Felipe Calderon regime worked with the U.S. to balance against 
these drug-traffickers. These examples demonstrate that bureaucratic agencies of the 
regime working within the alliance at national and subnational levels prioritize their 
survival or enhancing personal power and influence over the national interest and alliance 
strategy. Contravening guidance from the central regime, they bandwagoned with the 
source of threat as opposed to balancing it.  
In sum, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances proceeds as 
follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables balancing and 
bandwagoning to occur simultaneously (whereas states in traditional alliances can either 
balance or bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the clientelistic 
relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for bandwagoning 
(patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory 
(both found in external threat alliances). Given that bandwagoning for internal threat 
alliances is not binary—that is, regime actors bandwagon while the allies are together—it 
will have implications for alliance cohesion and effectiveness, as addressed below. 
4. PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS: LEADERS OF THREATENED 
STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL INTEREST  
After forming an internal threat alliance and like their external threat counterpart, 
the great power/regime engaged in an internal threat alliance must work together “to agree 
on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends.”74 As 
with traditional alliances, this is referred to as “cohesion,” where the “goal” of the alliance 
is commensurate with its purpose and defined as defeating or debilitating the common 
internal threat to the extent that allies no longer perceive it as a core threat to their 





is referred to as the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.”76 As with traditional alliances, 
specific variables will cause variation in both cohesion and effectiveness. Comparable to 
traditional alliances, level of threat will influence whether the great power/regime are able 
to work together and agree to strategy (cohesion) and the amount of resources they are able 
to amass will determine whether they weaken their common menace (effectiveness).  
The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—
the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of 
the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the leaders act after the alliance has 
formed and in response to threats—and therefore understanding cohesion and 
effectiveness—requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in 
the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is 
best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning and 
in response to threats these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that advance 
their interests. In order to understand internal threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness, 
then, theory must take into account these regime-specific interests. 
A. COHESION: ALSO INFLUENCED BY REGIME-SPECIFIC PRIORITIES 
Due to the weak state’s fragmented character and the motivation’s driving its 
decisions, cohesion in internal threat alliances will be distinct from traditional alliances in 
one fundamental way. In addition to level of threat and military dependence, cohesion for 
internal threat alliances will be further determined by regime-specific interests. 
Specifically, whether collaborating across all alliance strategy components and against (to 
balance) all actors generating violence advances the regime’s desire to ensure and 
maximize political survival and power. The central regime (or components therein) may 





patron-client ties to actors responsible for political violence. At precise junctures and in 
response to threats, then, the regime may decide that working to defeat specific actors or 
implement specific tactics (and collaborating with the great power to do so) is detrimental 
to regime political survival, power, and influence. Working with the great power across all 
areas of strategy and tactics might be in the national interest, but not necessarily help the 
regime remain in power or secure re-election. Such regime priorities will not be enough to 
pull the allies apart in the face of a high level of threat—because the regime still relies on 
the great power to survive—but will make it more difficult for the allies to agree on specific 
strategy and tactics. Accordingly and distinct from traditional allies, cohesion may slightly 
decline even as the threat level remains high.  
The U.S.-Afghanistan case and Hamid Karzai’s actions demonstrate the influence 
of regime-specific political/patron-client priorities onto internal threat alliance cohesion 
and how internal threat alliances place the primary focus on the interests of the leader rather 
than the national interests of the state. Time after time, Karzai worked against the national 
interest of Afghanistan by subverting national institutions, appointing known corrupt 
officials, and cooperating with the drug trade, not because these actions benefited 
Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but because they helped keep him in power. 
This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated by the difference in Karzai’s actions before 
and after he was re-elected president in 2009. 
From 2001 through 2004, Karzai needed U.S. largesse and influence to (1) help 
him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system that would 
consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby enhance his 





agreed to work with the U.S. and cohesion remained moderate to high. Close collaboration 
with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime authority. After Karzai won the 2004 
elections and had leveraged U.S. support to secure passage of institutions and legislation 
that cemented powers in his office, however, the central regime began to treat non-military 
aspects of the alliance strategy as a liability to winning and consolidating power for the 
long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that Karzai “combat corruption” (passive 
bandwagoning) to ensure proper use of alliance resources and bolster Afghan state 
capacity.77 For Karzai, appointing “corrupt” clients to regime positions, turning a blind-
eye to their diversion of alliance funds, and himself using regime monies (alliance or non-
alliance) as patronage were vital to garnering support sufficient to win re-election in 2009. 
Alliance goals called for the central regime to curb these forms of bandwagoning because 
reducing corruption and erecting more viable and reliable institutions was in the better 
interests of Afghans writ large; however, doing so was contrary to what would facilitate 
Karzai remaining in power. Consequently, the central regime proceeded to engage in 
simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning: a high threat level pushed Karzai’s regime to work 
with the U.S. on military tactics and balance because its physical survival relied on doing 
so; however, he began violating non-military aspects of the alliance (bandwagoning) in 
order to grease the wheels of his get out the vote machine including by diverting (and using 
as patronage) alliance resources and appointing corrupt officials to bolster patron-client 
links key to re-election.78 
When two states work together in a traditional alliance to balance an external 
enemy, regime-specific factors related to their political survival largely do not affect 





respond to rising threats by rationally rank-ordering priorities and acting to protect the 
national interest and territorial integrity. A regime’s fragmented character and core 
motivation for alignment, by contrast, coalesce to complicate cohesion in internal threat 
alliances: working with the great power in response to threats and across all areas of 
alliance strategy must be in the regime’s interests.79 These regime-specific interests (and 
their ability to change rapidly, with turnover in regime) affect internal threat alliance 
cohesion but are not relevant to understanding traditional alliances, where rising threats 
(and allies’ shared dependence to defeat them) press states together and to agree on strategy 
and tactics.  
B. EFFECTIVENESS: ALSO INFLUENCED BY REGIME WILLINGNESS TO CURB 
BANDWAGONING 
Like external threat alliances and drawing on Weitsman’s (2004) treatment of 
effectiveness, the principal determinant of internal threat alliance effectiveness will be 
allies’ ability to aggregate capabilities sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat. Only when 
the great power/regime are able to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate 
activities directed toward those ends (as a result of consistently high cohesion), will they 
be able to collectively amass resources sufficient to weaken or defeat their common 
menace. Due to the weak state’s fragmented character and the motivation’s driving its 
decisions, however, internal threat alliance effectiveness will be distinct from traditional 
alliances in two ways.  
First, the weaker ally’s internal fragmentation means that it cannot be assumed that 
the regime’s actors will (as with unitary states in traditional alliances) necessarily apply 
capabilities pooled through the alliance, in line with agreed strategy. When examining 





alliance theory generally assumes that allies act in order to advance the national interest 
and therefore automatically apply resources according to agreed strategy and against the 
common external threat. Provided the level of capabilities is sufficient to defeat the 
common adversary, the alliance should be more likely to achieve its goal.  
The weak state’s fragmented character and the motivations driving its decisions, 
however, mean that elements of the regime may contravene agreed strategy and not apply 
resources to combat the common menace. This takes the form of active or passive 
bandwagoning and (regardless of motivation) can hinder effectiveness by: (1) precluding 
unified balancing; and/or (2) diverting resources amassed as part of the alliance either away 
from their intended purpose (passive bandwagoning) or directly to those actors fomenting 
violence (active bandwagoning). For internal threat alliances dealing with regime survival 
as opposed to the national interest, then, pooling resources sufficient to weaken the internal 
threat will be necessary to ensure effectiveness but not sufficient.  
Regime actor bandwagoning during the U.S.-Colombia alliance clearly 
demonstrates that bandwagoning hinders effectiveness in internal threat alliances. While 
U.S. President Reagan and Colombian President Gaviria were collaborating to defeat 
“narco-insurgents,” for example, cohesion increased due to a surge in threat and the 
regime’s desire to survive politically. However, bandwagoning regime actors hindered 
allies’ ability to implement anti-cartel tactics—and effectiveness therefore suffered. In 
response to cartel threats (and in order to survive) or promised bribes (to cement patron-
client ties), Police and Military elements bandwagoned with traffickers by providing tips 
on anti-cartel efforts.80 Distinct to internal threat alliances, a regime agency was 





other agencies) were simultaneously seeking to balance them. As a result, Reagan and 
Gaviria were forced to find alternative means by which to secure their interests and 
circumvent these bandwagoning elements. This included forming a police unit of vetted 
(non-bandwagoning) staff to destroy the cartels, what Gaviria’s Defense Minister called an 
“island of integrity in a sea of corruption.”81  
Such efforts to curb bandwagoning, including creating a component within a 
regime agency that could be relied on to balance (not bandwagon), would not be necessary 
in traditional alliances where agencies implement government guidance (balance) to 
advance the national (not their own) interest. The U.S. was presented with a situation in 
which the central regime was more willing than its component parts to target actors 
imperiling American interests, leaving the great power to juggle alliance dynamics between 
multiple actors. This does not occur in traditional alliances where the allies’ central policy-
makers agree on alliance policy (or do not) and, in line with such agreements, work to 
devise strategy and tactics (or do not).  
As a result and representing the second difference between traditional and internal 
threat alliance effectiveness—the ability and willingness of the peripheral regime to curb 
such bandwagoning will be an additional determinant of effectiveness. To some extent this 
is a modification of a factor Weitsman (2004) indicates will determine effectiveness—the 
ability of allies to “prevent a separate peace”; that is, to stop a state within their alliance 
from defecting. My concept is distinct, however, because the nature of the threat renders 
the great power less able (relative to external threat alliances) to curb such bandwagoning. 
In the context of internal threat alliances, then, whether allies achieve their goal will be 





component parts to balance in a unified manner. Should the weak regime be able and 
willing to curb bandwagoning, alliance effectiveness should not suffer. In the event the 
weak regime is unable or unwilling to do so, however, alliance effectiveness may decrease. 
With traditional alliances between two essentially cohesive actors, these factors are 
generally not relevant.  
Events through the internal threat alliances in Syria and Mexico reflect these two 
core differences between internal and traditional alliance effectiveness. In Syria, a high 
level of threat to the regime pushed the Assad regime and Russia together, leading them to 
agree on strategy and build up capabilities accordingly. In spite of continued arms transfers 
to the embattled regime, however, bandwagoning (defections) by the regime’s army and 
other agencies hindered allies’ ability to weaken those insurgents seeking to topple the 
regime. This included bandwagoning by high-level generals (Army and Air Force) as well 
as an estimated 50,000 soldiers (of 280,000) seeking to survive, share in the spoils of 
victory, or maintain their patron-client relations as motivated by ethnic ties (soldiers 
prioritizing loyalty to fellow Sunnis).82 Similarly, in Mexico, the Calderon regime and its 
U.S. counterpart have (particularly since a surge in violence in 2006) been pushed together 
by a shared high level of threat. Stemming from the associated ability to devise strategy 
and associated tactics, they pooled resources to balance their common foe—the U.S. has 
contributed nearly $1.4 billion to the alliance in order to strengthen the regime’s security 
forces (army and federal police) to balance the cartels threatening its survival.83 Though 
the military hardware and other resources have helped enable the regime to balance the 
common internal threat, bandwagoning by the same actors receiving resources (and the 





In sum and akin to external threat alliances, whether alliances derived to cope with 
internal threats achieve their goal will be determined by allies’ ability to amass capabilities 
sufficient to weaken or defeat their common adversary; and their ability to consistently 
agree on alliance goals and strategy will determine whether they do so. Due to the nature 
of the threat and because allies are cooperating to ensure the weak regime’s existence, 
however, achieving this goal will be further determined by the regime’s willingness and 
ability to ensure its actors engage in subnational balancing (as opposed to bandwagoning). 
The table below summarizes the four ways in which dynamics of internal and external 




















Table 1. Summary of Differences Between External and Internal Threat Alliances  
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In this chapter I drew from and modified aspects of existing IR theory to 
demonstrate the following four ways in which the characteristics and associated dynamics 
of internal threat alliances are distinct from military alliances designed to defeat external 
threats. Collectively, these four elements represent the dissertation’s contribution to IR 
theory and provide a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for 
understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. 
First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat domestic in origin that imperils a 
regime. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is external in origin 
(another state or group of states) and imperils the state as a whole. Accordingly, the 
motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak 
regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns 
because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as 
thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests 
linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where 
states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.  
Second, while external threat alliances are formed by countries that have some 
internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for 
internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will 
generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one 
stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral 
state with major internal fragmentation. Due to this fragmentation, there are a large number 





to be accounted for in theory. Distinct to internal threat alliances, the great power does not 
deal with a single and unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national 
interest (as with traditional alliances). Instead, the great power deals with a fragmented 
regime that sits atop but lacks control of its agencies and other subnational actors.  Each of 
these actors has respective interests they seek pursue. 
Hence, these characteristics of states in internal threat alliances are distinct from 
traditional alliances where allies are essentially cohesive actors with political orders 
structured in a hierarchical fashion and central governments that control all component 
parts. Combined with the nature and location of the threat, this requires expanding the 
relevant levels of analysis from international (as with traditional alliances) to national and 
subnational. 
Third, because of this fragmentation, “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances is 
distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances. 
The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime is unable to control all of its 
component actors. As a result, balancing and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the 
central regime may work with the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance 
the common threat, while its police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, 
are bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence. This contrasts with traditional alliances, 
where states either balance or bandwagon when faced with an external enemy. And the 
clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a motivation for bandwagoning 
(patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory 





bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon while the 
allies are together. As a result, it can affect cohesion and effectiveness.  
In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with 
external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance 
strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional 
alliances) the great power will juggle relationships between cooperative central regimes 
and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power 
may need to bypass a bandwagoning central regime and work with other regime elements 
to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found 
in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either 
do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
Fourth and finally, when threats are encountered leaders of fragmented countries 
are more likely to calculate what to do in response to this threat focusing on their own 
political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. In traditional (external) 
alliances, after aligning the states work together “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, 
and to coordinate activity directed toward those ends.”85 This is referred to alliance 
“cohesion.” And in so doing, they are working toward their shared goal of deterring or 
defeating their common external menace; whether they achieve this goal is referred to as 
the alliance’s degree of “effectiveness.” In external threat alliances, specific variables cause 
variation in both cohesion and effectiveness—level of threat influences whether the great 





aggregated capabilities determines whether they weaken their common menace 
(effectiveness). However, in response to external threats and due to the allies’ internally 
cohesive nature their decisions related to cohesion and effectiveness are made so as to 
advance the national interest and ensure territorial survival.  
With internal threat alliances, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level 
of threat and amount of aggregated capabilities will determine cohesion and effectiveness, 
respectively. Distinct to internal threat alliances, however, when making decisions related 
to cohesion and effectiveness the threatened state acts not in the national interest, as is the 
case with traditional alliances, but in the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, 
determining how the leaders act after the alliance has formed and in response to threats—
and therefore understanding cohesion and effectiveness—requires asking not what is in the 
best interests of the country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. 
Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their 
power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and 
actions that advance their interest.  
V. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
In order to evidence the four aspects of internal threat alliances the dissertation 
unfolds in five chapters including this one. Chapter two provides a review of the alliance 
theory literature to demonstrate the gaps in this body of work my dissertation seeks to fill. 
It also points to areas of extant scholarship that I drew from to inform this chapter and 
describes the dissertation’s research methodology. Chapters three and four use case study 
analysis to evidence the dissertation’s core arguments. They show how the U.S.-Colombia 





were clear examples of an internal threat alliance that differed from external threat alliances 
in the aforementioned four ways. Chapter five provides conclusions, summarizes findings 
from the case study chapters, points to areas for future research, and outlines the 


























1 In spite of the immensity of alliance theory there is no one commonly accepted definition for the term. 
Some scholars use alliance to refer to a formal treaty between states, where others employ the term more 
loosely and to denote alignment of security-related policies. I do not attempt to contribute to this particular 
conceptual debate and instead use “alliance” and “alignment” interchangeably and to reflect the following: 
when a state brings its policies into cooperation with another state in order to pursue mutual goals related to 
national security. 
2 The debate surrounding conceptualizations of and definitions for those states outside what has been termed 
the “international liberal system” is often hotly contested, with some arguing that “periphery” should replace 
previously employed “third” or “second world.” One useful conceptualization is offered by Goldgeier and 
McFaul (1992), who divide the post-cold war era into “core” and “periphery” states (or “spaces”) according 
to factors related to economy and power. The “core” is comprised of the industrialized states of Western 
Europe, North America, and Japan. By “periphery” they refer to “the agriculturally based, industrializing 
states of the developing world”. Concerning measure of “power” the peripheral space is occupied by “states 
which are “weak” relative to the core of great powers.” Steven David (1992) makes a persuasive case that 
despite the decline in utility of the term “Third World” many states who were formerly associated within this 
name indeed often share the same characteristics. Although they make distinct arguments, Goldgeier and 
McFaul and David agree on some key points that distinguish the periphery from the core – among others, (1) 
that military force remains a viable tool to secure political outcomes; (2) the “newness” of such states, often 
sovereign in “name only” and formed “overnight” as opposed to through centuries of war, means that they 
often lack strong state institutions and therefore face internal and external challenges to their rule – thus 
conditioning their behavior; and (3) these states do not have a set of “shared norms” or, according Goldgeier 
and McFaul, the “predictability” that would accompany them given the presence of regional security systems 
with different forms of government. James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core 
and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era”, International Organization, Vol. 46, (Spring 1992), 467. Steven 
R. David, “Explaining Alignment in the Third World”, World Politics, Vol. 43 (January 1991).” Steven 
David, “Why the Third World Still Matters”. International Security 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992), 127 
3 “International power” and “great power” are used interchangeably throughout and refers to those countries 
considered, broadly within the IR literature, as great powers following the end of World War (WW) II, given 
the dissertation’s focus on alliances formed during this period. Scholars employ different measures for and 
definitions of what constitutes a great power. The dissertation recognizes that the list of great powers evolved 
from WWI as well as through inter-war period and during and after WWII. While recognizing this as well as 
the debate within IR theory on thresholds of power and definitions for great power, the dissertation does not 
aim to make a theoretical contribution here. Rather, it accepts and employs the following conceptualization 
of state power and how a given state’s ‘rank’ of great power should be determined: “States are placed in the 
top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the 
following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military 
strength, political stability and competence. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1979), 131. Based on this criteria as well as status in international organizations such as the 
UN Security Council, the following states can be considered great powers: United States, China, the United 
Kingdom, France, Japan, and Russia. For an overview of the evolution of great powers in the international 
system, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Random House, 1987). 
4 In keeping with prior work on alliance theory capabilities are defined as any military or economic resource 
aggregated between the great power and peripheral regime the purpose of which is to shift the balance of 
power in favor of the alliance and against the target threat. 
5 This dissertation recognizes the contested nature of the term “national interest” and does not seek to 
contribute to this debate. Rather, it uses the term interchangeably with “national security” and employs the 
definition provided by Morgenthau: “national security must be defined as integrity of the national territory 
and its institutions.” In other words, and as applied to alliances, states form traditional alliances so as to 
aggregate sufficient power to safeguard the integrity of their national territory and associated domestic 
apparatus. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1959), 586.  
6 In this dissertation “civil war,” “intrastate war” and “internal war” are used interchangeably. Although many 
agree that civil wars have negative consequences, the definition for what actually constitutes a “civil war” is 





                                                                                                                                                 
itself disputed. This debate essentially revolves around the number of battlefield deaths that must occur 
initially and for each year of the conflict thereafter. One of the more commonly used definitions is armed 
conflicts occurring in mainly one country that yield at least 1,000 battle-field deaths per year. See the 
Correlates of War (COW) project. Noting that 1,000 is perhaps too high, other scholars lower the battlefield 
death threshold to 100 or 500 per year. Adherents of the latter definition include Patrick M. Regan, Civil 
Wars and Foreign Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). I do not attempt to contribute 
to this debate. Rather, I use the essential elements of the CoW definition as set forth by Small and Singer, 
that a civil war comprises the following elements: (1) military action internal to borders of the state; (2) active 
military action taken by the national government; (3) effective resistance from the national government and 
opposition group or groups. Melvin Small and David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 
1816–1980 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing, 1982). I find the 1,000 battlefield death threshold somewhat 
arbitrary and do not include it here; however, nor do I offer a different threshold.  
7 Stephen M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
8 Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War; Second figure 
according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which collects information on various aspects of 
armed violence that have occurred since 1946. For a review of the methodology underlying this estimate, see 
the UCDP web-site http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/program_overview/ 
9 Intra-state “war” refers to conflicts that meet or exceed the 1,000 battlefield death threshold. Correlates of 




10 Christopher Blattman, and Edward Miguel, “Civil War,” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (2010), 
3-4.  
11 For an excellent analysis of why civil wars will continue and persist as the principal form of mass organized 
violence, see Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). See also Ann Hironaka, Never-ending Wars: The International 
Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005). 
12 K.J. Holsti, “Diplomatic Coalitions and Military Alliances,” in Alliance in International Politics, Julain R. 
Friedman, Christopher Bladen, Steven Rosen, eds. (Boston, MA: Alyn and Bacon Inc., 1970), 102. 
13 The alliance was formalized in 1894 in what is referred to as the Franco-Russian Alliance. William L. 
Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1967). 
14 Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: A Complete History, (New York, NY: Holt, 2004). 
15 Non-structural treatments of military alliance dynamics as reviewed in next chapter hold that alignment 
decisions are based on the “perception” of these threats. Contours of the international system and distribution 
of power influence state behavior; however, their precise influence is refracted through and informed by 
perceptions of a core group of national security policy makers—in some cases referred to as the “Foreign 
Policy Executive”—who make alignment decisions. Prominent examples of neoclassical realist include: 
Michael E. Brown et al., eds. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Randall L. Schweller. Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy 
of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive 
Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); Fareed 
Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1998); Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World 
Politics 51, no. 1 (1998), 144-172; and Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).   
16 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 90. 
17 Though other bureaucratic agencies (in particular the armed forces of each partner) are also involved in 
devising strategy and applying aggregated resources to balance a common threat, alliance theory, as reviewed 
in the next chapter, largely does not theorize explicitly regarding effectiveness—and those select few scholars 
who do problematize effectiveness tend to conceptualize partner regimes as unitary.  
18 Foreign Policy Executive” (FPE) is defined as the “head of government and ministers and officials 





                                                                                                                                                 
foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 43. Definition 
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the influence onto foreign policy outcomes of “small group dynamics” in general and “societal elites” in 
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in the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). See also Steven E. Lobell, “The International 
Realm, Framing Effects, and Security Strategies: Britain in Peace and War,” International Interactions Vol. 
32, no. 1 (2006), 27-48. On “societal elites” see Lobell’s work on the influence of “inward leaning 
nationalists” and “outward-oriented internationalists” see Lobell, (2009), “Threat assessment, the state, and 
foreign policy,”: 45-74. According to Lobell, where a shift in a component of a rising state (as threat) power 
enables a coalition to emerge (consensus between the FPE and societal elites), the FPE remains unconstrained 
and thus can devise an “efficient” counterbalancing response. “Unefficient” responses emerge where such 
coalitions do not occur. 
19 Though fighting may occur within one of the allied states (A or B) and thereby lead to some interaction 
between the armed forces of S (the adversary) and national entities in A or B, this interaction is minimal and 
not the primary location in which conflict occurs. 
20 William Oliver Stevens and Allan Westcott A History of Sea Power (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1942). 
21 Richard Lowry, The Gulf War Chronicles: A Military History of the First War with Iraq (New York, NY: 
iUniverse, 2008). 
22 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17. 
23 Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), 21 
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the rising threat as opposed to balancing against it. See also Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alliance 
Formation: The Case of Southeast Asia,” International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988), 277.Randall L. 
Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in," International Security 19, no. 
1 (Summer, 1994), 72-107; Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World 
Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
25 Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion (New York: 
Norton, 1973), pp. 187-92. 
26 Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987), 17. 
27 Their conceptualization of cohesion contains both behavioral and attitudinal components. To measure the 
behavioral component, the scholars take the “mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads 
connecting all alliance members.” They used an “indirect” research approach to quantify and measure the 
attitudinal aspect of cohesion and defined this component as “co-orientation of decision-makers toward an 
external actor which is perceived by all members of the alliance…this assumes that the more similarly the 
alliance members perceive the same object, the greater will be the cohesion among them.” Ole R. Holsti, P. 
Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative 
Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1973), 94-95 and 100-102. 
28 Authors citing “decision making structure” include: Haas 1969; Duchacek 1966; Fedder 1962; those citing, 





                                                                                                                                                 
Miller 1959; Liska 1968; North, Kich, and Zinnes 1970; Olson and Zeckhauser 1970; and Dinerstein (1965) 
makes the argument related to the “scope of the alliance” and extent to which interests overlap. 
29 Holsti, Hopmann, Sullivan, (1973), Unity and Disintegration, 16. 
30 As discussed in chapter two, these factors are “integration of forces” (Liska 1968) and “trust” between 
partners (Morgenthau 1959). 
31 As discussed in the chapter two, these scholars list cohesion as a prerequisite for effectiveness and list 
additional factors that determine whether an alliance is effective. Coupled with cohesion, and presuming 
unified application of capabilities, the effectiveness of ‘war-time’ alliance is further determined by: “trust” 
between allies and whether they “help each other diplomatically” (Holsti 1970) and the allies’ “willingness 
to endure harm to achieve their goal” or “cost-tolerance” (Rosen 1970). Holsti (1970) conceptualizes this as 
whether an alliance is an effective “fighting organization.”  
32 Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances – Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004).  
33 Weitsman (2004), Dangerous Alliances, 150. 
34 See, for example, “The War on the Mexican Cartels,” Final Report, the Institute of Politics National 
Security Student Policy Group (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, September 2012). 
35 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model,” in Norrin 
M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 51. 
36 The dissertation focuses on political violence including but not limited to the extent to which it would be 
defined as a civil war that involves non-state actors contesting the peripheral regime’s control over its 
territory, including but not limited to insurgency. Where referenced, insurgency is defined as “a struggle to 
control a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more 
popularly based, non-state challengers.” David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 
(2004), 112. A recent useful study differentiates between rebellions and insurgencies that seek to replace the 
government (replacement) or alter the relationship between government and society (legitimacy). David 
Sobek and Caroline Payne, “A Tale of Two Types: Rebel Goals and the Onset of Civil Wars,” International 
Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (March 2010), 213-40. 
37 David, (1991), Choosing Sides, 6. 
38 David, (1991), “Explaining Alignment in the Third World,” 236. 
39 There are conflicting reports as to the precise level and type of assistance Russia provided to Syria. 
However, reports indicate this assistance included guns, helicopters, and a missile defense system. See for 
example Chris McGreal, “US says Russian-made weapons are killing Syrians on ‘an hourly basis’,” The 
Guardian, June 13, 2012. Syria also sought similar military assistance from China. 
40 Further details regarding this case as well as evidence for the regime’s motivations are presented in Chapter 
three. 
41 Further details regarding this case as well as evidence for the regime’s motivations are presented in Chapter 
four. 
42 For the most comprehensive analysis of why internal war affects the interests of states in general and the 
U.S. as great power in particular, See Steven R. David, “On Civil War,” The American Interest (March/April 
2007); and David, (2008), Catastrophic Consequences. 
43 David (2008) makes this argument with regard to risks posed to the U.S. by instability in Pakistan.  
44 Various scholars demonstrate that weak states and “ungoverned territory” therein may provide the space 
in which non-state actors including terrorist organizations may plan and launch attacks against states in 
general and great powers (as well as their assets) in particular. See for example Stewart Patrick, “Weak States 
and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), 30. Patrick elaborates on 
this initial version of the framework in Stewart Patrick, Weak Links – Fragile States, Global Threats, and 
International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 18-60. See also Angel Basa, Steven 
Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O'Brien and John 
E. Peters. “Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks,” (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2007.). Steven R. David, Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American 
Interests (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2008), 
45 David, (2008), Catastrophic Consequences. 
46 David (2008) makes this argument with regard to China, which holds a large amount of U.S. Treasury 





                                                                                                                                                 
47 David (2008) makes this argument with regard to Mexico, which borders the U.S. and hosts a large expat 
community. 
48 Overall argument made by David, (2008) Catastrophic Consequences. 
49 The rebels contesting Mobutu’s rule were led by Laurent Kabila, a Katangan soldier who served under 
Patrice Lumumba in the early 1960s. He led the rebellion under the name of the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL), and, at the outset of the fighting, quickly made significant 
gains in eastern Congo. Raymond Bonner, “France Linked to Defense of Mobutu,” New York Times, May 2, 
1997.  
50 James Brooke, “Gabon Keeps Strong Links with France,” New York Times, February 23, 1988. 
51 “Obituary: The corrupt nepotist who ruled Gabon for 40 years,” The Independent (UK), June 9, 2009. 
52 Various articles and analyses have examined Russia’s interests in Syria and therefore why the great power, 
as applied to my framework, might align with the Assad regime. For a review of these factors see: “Why 
Russia Protects Assad,” CNN, January 26, 2012. Analysis provided by Oxford Analytica and reposted by 
CNN. Available here: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/26/why-russia-protects-assad/. 
53 The presence of threat will be necessary but not sufficient for states to bring their security policy into close 
cooperation to balance it—for an alliance to form the two states must perceive the threat as sufficiently high 
and thus imperiling their security and dependent on each other to balance it. States pursue alliances to balance 
internal threats because they cannot balance this threat alone—they are dependent, for a range of reasons, on 
another state to do so. Considering this factor helps explain why, for example, a great power will choose to 
work with and through the peripheral regime, as opposed to employing unilateral intervention; and why the 
peripheral regime will seek assistance from the great power to quell a rebellion. To conceptualize military 
dependence I use Glenn Snyder’s (1997) definition of the term. Although Snyder’s alliance “management” 
framework examines external threat alliances, its military dependence concept comprised of the following 
three core factors is applicable for examining dynamics of internal threat alliances: (1) a state’s need for 
military assistance [as informed by the threat it faces and whether it has sufficient capabilities to balance that 
threat], (2) the degree to which the ally fills that need, and (3) alternative ways of meeting the need. As the 
great power and peripheral regime are more dependent on each other they will be more likely to form an 
alliance (to meet the need they cannot fill alone) as well as remain within it and work with their ally to agree 
on goals and strategy associated with aggregating capabilities. As these three factors increase for both alliance 
partners, their need for each other will also increase. A state’s need for military assistance is a reflection of 
its existing capacity (military and economic) and therefore intimately linked to the level of threat perceived 
by the peripheral regime and great power. As applied to internal threat alliances, these factors are applicable 
to the great power and peripheral regime in the following ways. For the peripheral regime, the need for 
assistance derives from lacking capabilities (military and economic) needed to balance the internal threat to 
its survival. If the peripheral regime has an alternate way to obtain these capabilities—through increasing its 
own spending or finding another ally to offset the need—its dependence in general and on the great power in 
particular will decrease. For the great power, the need for assistance derives from requiring cooperation from 
the peripheral regime to combat their common threat—either tacit or direct—to address the threat within the 
regime’s borders. This specific attribute of internal threat alliances, therefore, increases the great power’s 
dependence on its ally. As the great power perceives the threat to its interests increasing, it will be 
increasingly dependent on the peripheral regime to balance that threat—and without other options to do so 
(such as adding a different or additional ally) aside from aggregating more resources. 
54 The formation of an internal threat alliance is defined as when two states bring their security policies into 
close cooperation. An internal threat alliance has formed when the two states have aligned their security 
policies as well as agreed to aggregate military and other capabilities in order to balance their commonly 
perceived threat internal to the peripheral regime. 
55 On the riots in 2005, for example, see BBC News, “French violence 'back to normal',” November 17, 2005. 
56 I do not rule out the potential for internal threat alliances between regional powers seeking to support their 
peripheral regime neighbors, yet in this work focus primarily on such alliances that comprise a great power 
and peripheral regime. 
57 For three excellent analyses of the “non-modal” patterns of state-building and what this process differed 
from that of Western states, see Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin 
America (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in 
Africa (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2000); and Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the 






                                                                                                                                                 
58 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of 
Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
59 David, (1991), Choosing Sides, 7. 
60 Patron-client relations, also referred to as “clientelism,” is a form of relationship widely examined in the 
political science literature at both the micro- and macro-levels—examples of the former include studies of 
village level politics, where macro-level studies might, for example, demonstrate why an entire political 
system could be characterized as “clientelistic” in nature. Clientelism is examined in political science as both 
dependent and independent variable. For the former, there are two general approaches that seek to explain 
why clientelism (explanatory variables) developed in a given country. Scholarship on this topic tends to be 
divided into “culturalist” and “developmentalist” explanations—the former argues that clientelism stems 
from cultural traits unique to particular countries and give rise to such behavior, including familism, tribalism, 
and clannism. Developmentalist approaches argue that clientelism develops and persists in particular 
countries due to the lack of formal institutions of representation. There is no single definition of clientelism 
accepted across the academy. In general, however, scholars tend to agree on a small set of characteristics that 
make a relationship “patron-client.” First, the relationship is dyadic and occurs between actors who have 
unequal power and status. Second, the relationship is based on some agreement of reciprocity—maintaining 
the relationship is based on the expectation that the client will provide agreed goods in exchange for those 
goods provided by the patron. And third, the relationship is private and tends to fall outside the remit of 
public law—in other words, formal law or institutions to not govern its operation Much of the political 
science literature on clientelism examines the relationship between political candidates (as patron) and voters 
(as client), with the former doling out a variety of goods in exchange for the individual’s vote. However, 
there are many other arguments that use a broader conceptualization of patron-client relations to include elite 
networks that dominate the state and attempt to build and solidify networks of clients in order to maintain 
their power and influence throughout a given country. I draw on some literature within the first group, though 
rely most heavily on authors within the second. The specific definition of ‘goods’ depends on the actor 
(patron or client) and specific form of exchange. Robert R. Kaufman, “The Patron-Client Concept and Macro-
Politics: Prospects and Problems,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 3 (1974), 285. In 
addition to clientelism in lesser developed polities, a separate strain of political science literature examines 
the relationship between political party and candidate (as patron) and voter (client), and the resources and 
goods the former provides to the latter in exchange for their political support. In weaker states and given the 
resources and power they represent, state actors may have greater loyalty to (and prioritize) their client than 
to the state and securing the national interest. This is common in non-Western states which have not benefited 
from centuries of state-building where institutions were formed in order to repel external threats and thus 
commanded loyalty from the populace. By contrast, primary loyalties in lesser developed polities can be to 
tribal, familial, or ethnic linkages. Clientelism is not limited to underdeveloped countries but tends to be more 
prevalent in these polities because strong, independent institutions do not exist as a check onto such actions. 
And even if such institutions do exist, the regime tends to control them and therefore negates any possibility 
that they will perform their intended role. Faced with two options in a given decision, elites may prioritize 
the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as opposed to the 
national interest. The effect of this phenomenon is to hinder the efficient use of government resources in 
particular and governance more broadly, which in many cases retards economic development.  
61 I am not concerned with why patron-client relations develop in a given polity, nor do I attempt to contribute 
to the associated scholarly debate. Rather, I accept the premise that the behavior of regimes in weaker states 
tends to be characterized by patron-client relations and instead list those three insights from this literature 
applicable to understanding decisions and actions of peripheral regime actors (both the FPE and CBAs). First, 
elites who occupy government positions in lesser developed societies have relationships with clients, which 
represent a source of power and influence, which can be based on a range of motivations including but not 
limited to ethnic ties (or factions), economic motivations (illicit industries), regional loyalties, and political 
ideologies. Factionalism is understood as involving a political and economic competition between ‘clans’, 
‘tribes’, or “regional” (both ethnic and non-ethnic) groupings. Patrons seek to solidify their power and 
influence and therefore endeavor to maintain and strengthen those relationships perceived as crucial to doing 
so. These relationships represent loyalties that compete with a given actor’s loyalty to the state. In making 
decisions, elites in general and those in government positions in particular may prioritize maintaining these 
relations/loyalties over the national interest or betterment of society as a whole. For the FPE, this group of 
actors may or may not rely on maintaining these relationships for their political survival. Regardless, the FPE 





                                                                                                                                                 
context, corruption can be viewed as a form of patron-client relations. As applied to understanding internal 
threat alliance dynamics, the peripheral regime’s FPE and CBAs will have patron-client relations that may 
lead them to act in ways contrary to the national interest. The FPE sees maintaining these relations as 
beneficial to their power and influence, including political survival or economic well-being. Actors within 
CBAs, as components of the state, can also have patron-client relations that affect their decisions and 
associated behavior. Such patron-client links can be sufficiently robust to motivate CBAs to act in ways 
contrary to guidance from the FPE in particular and contrary to the national interest in general. In sum, actors 
(in particular CBAs) within peripheral regimes may prioritize maintaining ability to reap benefits from 
patron-client ties over achieving the alliance purpose. Second, elites and by extension those with control over 
the FPE and CBAs may divert state resources to their clients (as a source of patronage) in exchange for 
elements associated with enhancing one’s power or influence including political support or loyalty, economic 
gain, or ethnic affiliation. The motivation that undergirds the link between patron and client may vary. Like 
all governments, weaker states have budgets with associated coffers—and those with control over these 
capabilities at times divert them to key supporters as a form of patronage in exchange for support and the 
power this brings. By doing so, the regime precludes the use of these resources for their intended purpose (a 
result of diversion of economic resources) or decreases the efficiency of government (a result of allocating a 
political post to an unqualified individual, for example). Applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, actors 
(FPE and CBA) with patron-client relations will divert government resources, including those capabilities 
aggregated as part of the alliance. By extension, just as patron-client relations can hinder economic 
development by diverting resources, the mis-use or diversion of capabilities can also decrease the 
effectiveness of internal threat alliances—patrons may coopt those resources transferred as part of the alliance 
in order to issue patronage to their clients and thus secure their core priority, which is not always in line with 
the national interest and thus alliance purpose. Third and finally, elites and by extension those with control 
over the FPE and CBAs may enact (or refuse to enforce) government policies to benefit their clients and by 
extension their power and influence. In exchange for political support or a financial pay-off state actors may 
‘turn a blind eye’ to actions by their clients that contravene stated law and government policy. As applied to 
internal threat alliance dynamics, actors (FPE and CBA) with patron-client relations may contravene 
government policy, including the purpose of the alliance agreement, by not working against the internal 
threat. This may take various forms including but not limited to deciding to turn a blind eye to CBAs aiding 
actors fomenting political violence or not stopping CBA actors from diverting alliance capabilities from their 
intended purpose.  
62 Jim Garamone, “U.S. Forces to Help Philippines Fight Terrorists,” American Forces Press Service, January 
16, 2002. 
63 On the internal threat alliance between the U.S. and Philippines after 2001, see also Ben Reid, “Bush and 
the Philippines after September: hegemony, mutual opportunism, and democratic retreat,” in Mark Beeson 
(ed.) Bush and Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006). 
64 The actors involved in internal threat alliance dynamics are the Foreign Policy Executive and Critical 
Bureaucratic Agencies (CBAs). In keeping with neoclassical realism, actors of the Foreign Policy Executive 
will be the most central to understanding alliance formation, cohesion, and effectiveness; decisions by great 
power and peripheral regime FPEs are important as they interact to decide to form an alliance, devise strategy 
and aggregate capabilities, and then apply those capabilities to combat a common internal threat. After the 
point at which an alliance is formed, however, CBAs will be involved in agreeing on alliance strategy and 
tactics (cohesion) as well as carrying out associated activities toward those ends (effectiveness). Bureaucratic 
agencies of alliance partners can to varying degrees be viewed as extensions of their FPE counterparts; none 
are entirely outside the control of its central government.  
65 James N. Rosenau, Ed. International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1964), 1. 
66 Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 
67 Robert Jervis (1976) argues that “The state’s behavior is usually seen as centrally controlled rather than as 
the independent actions of actors trying to further their own interests and their partial and biased conceptions 
of the national interest.” This is part of his broader argument that in order to fully explain foreign policy-
related decisions analysis must also take into account the way in which decision-makers perceive the world 
and the actors in it; these actors do not always accurately perceive the world or the intent or actions of actors 
in it—these departures from reality (misperceptions) inform their behavior. Robert Jervis, Perception and 





                                                                                                                                                 
68 Liska (1968) states “An alliance supplies the undeniable justification and the irremovable sanction for the 
exercise of control; actual authority has to be supplied by those who implement the alliance at the summit 
and in the field.” George Liska, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1968), 40.  
69 Two aspects of Allison’s organizational process model (1999), one of the seminal works on bureaucratic 
politics, are applicable for conceptualizing the interests and associated influence onto alliance dynamics of 
great power and peripheral regime CBAs. In drawing on these elements of Allison’s framework, however, I 
do not adopt Allison’s view that state behavior is a combination of organizational outputs or seek to contribute 
to organizational theory or the scholarly debates therein. I do not accept nor apply all aspects of Allison’s 
model, however. Instead, I apply only those aspects applicable to and most relevant for explaining the 
formation, cohesion, and effectiveness of internal threat alliances. First, bureaucratic organizations within a 
given state can affect that government’s specific decisions and overall behavior vis-à-vis other states. 
Building on insights initially flagged by Jervis (1976), Allison holds that the actor in IR is not a single, unitary 
state but, “a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations” each of which has primary responsibility for 
its particular “facet of foreign affairs”—for example, a Ministry of Defense purchases arms and coordinates 
troop deployments, while a state’s intelligence service coordinates gathering information on potential threats. 
In Allison’s view, the central administration (the FPE in my framework) of a given state remains critical to 
explaining that state’s actions, but the influence of other organizations (CBAs in my framework) within a 
given state must also be considered to gain a richer and more nuanced explanation of state behavior. The 
influence of these bureaucratic organizations is enabled by their autonomy from the central administration as 
well as the authority (“primary power”) they wield over their facet of foreign affairs. Central leaders (FPE) 
“can substantially disturb” but “rarely precisely control” the behavior of these bureaucratic organizations.”69 
As a result, “each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions 
with considerable autonomy. Allison, (1999), 143 and 166. Drawing on Allison and as applied to internal 
threat alliance dynamics, the FPE will retain some control over CBAs but these actors will still pursue their 
interests and objectives independent of the central administration. This is particularly pertinent for examining 
phenomena relevant to alliance cohesion and effectiveness, wherein alliance partner CBAs collaborate to 
agree on a strategy, aggregate resources, and then apply these resources against their common, internal 
adversary. The second insight from Allison’s framework I leverage to understand CBA decisions and actions 
is that interests other than a rational summation of what is best for the national interest can affect the 
behavior of these bureaucratic organizations. In Allison’s view, the bureaucratic organization’s behavior is 
not driven by an overarching and automatic sense of rationality but, rather, a “logic of appropriateness” 
defined by their “mission” [commensurate with their facet of foreign affairs] and “the view held by the 
dominant group in the organization” of what their mission should be and those capabilities required to achieve 
that mission.69 How the organization implements its mission is affected by a “sets of beliefs about how a 
mission should be implemented and what capacities are needed or wanted to perform it.” These beliefs stem 
from the organization’s “primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems” combined with the “gritty, 
everyday requirements of action” (Allison 1999, 167). This set of beliefs creates as “organizational culture,” 
the components of which create in such organizations “relatively stable propensities concerning priorities, 
operational objectives, perceptions, and issues.” The individuals within these organizations (the “operators”) 
aim to achieve stated targets. For the operators, performance is equated with compliance with successful 
performance. Allison (1999), 177. As applied to internal threat alliance dynamics, the decisions and actions 
of CBAs (great power and peripheral regime) vis-à-vis alliance dynamics will be affected by their perceived 
“logic of appropriateness,” which can include desire to secure resources commensurate with their mission or 
other motives. The extent to which these decisions and actions deviate from the need to assure the country’s 
security, however, will depend on the degree of autonomy these CBAs have. Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 143 and 166. For other 
prominent works on the bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy-making see Graham T. Allison and 
Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics Vol. 
24 (1972), 40-79; and Graham T. Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational 
Connection (New York: Basic Books, 1976). 
70 On government actors in Iraq colluding with Sunni insurgents see, for example, Michael Eisenstadt and 
Jeffrey White, “Assessing Iraq’s Sunni-Arab Insurgency,” Military Review, (May/June 2006). As outlined in 
O’Hanlon and Sherjan (2010), referring to the Iraqi security forces and U.S. efforts to train them: “In effect, 
we were equipping them for contributing to sectarian warfare rather than stopping it, because the units were 





                                                                                                                                                 
Michael E. O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 92. On government actors in Afghanistan colluding with insurgents due to ethnic 
ties see. This and other examples of collusion between the Afghan regime’s agencies with sources of threat 
are outlined in “The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” International Crisis Group (Brussels, Belgium: 
June 2011). On government actors prioritizing illicit business ties see, for example, Dexter Filkins, “Convoy 
Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry,” New York Times, June 6, 2010.  
71 This and other examples of collusion between the Afghan regime’s agencies with sources of threat are 
outlined in “The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland,” International Crisis Group (Brussels, Belgium: 
June 2011).  
72 David Isby, Afghanistan - Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Boderlands (New York, NY: 
Pegasus Books, 2010), 325. 
73 For an overview of the cartels as well as role of police in aiding their operations, see Colleen W. Cook, 
“CSR Report for Congress: Mexico’s Drug Cartels,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
October 2007). See also Marc Lacey, “In Mexico Drug War, Sorting Good Guys From Bad,” The New York 
Times, November 1, 2008. 
74 The “strategy, tactics, and activities” are those items on which the alliance partners agree to achieve this 
purpose and are related to aggregating capabilities perceived as necessary to balance the internal threat. Ole 
R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: 
Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley & Sons Publishing, 1973), 94-95 and 100-102. 
75 Cohesion will range from low to high, with highly cohesive alliances being more able to aggregate 
capabilities sufficient to balance their common menace. Cohesion is said to have increased when capabilities 
have been aggregated. Low cohesion is apparent when partners have initially agreed on alliance goals—thus 
having aligned—but experience great difficulty in setting strategy and implementing associated tactics. 
Moderate cohesion is reflected when the great power and peripheral regime agree on alliance goals, yet 
experience difficulty in setting strategy and coordinating associated activities. High cohesion is reflected 
when the great power and peripheral regime agree on alliance goals and strategy and experience few 
difficulties in coordinating activities directed toward those ends. As the ability of partners to coordinate 
strategies and tactics to achieve this purpose increases, cohesion will be reflected by the extent to which 
resources are aggregated for subsequent use against the common adversary. As alliance partners are more 
able to agree on their strategy and tactics, aggregation of capabilities should ensue. Highly cohesive alliances 
are more able to aggregate capabilities sufficient to balance the common internal threat. Moderately cohesive 
alliances are less able to aggregate capabilities sufficient to balance the common internal threat. Variance in 
cohesion is demonstrated through tracing collaboration between alliance partners (FPE and CBAs) to 
establish a strategy (including tactics and activities) to balance the threat as well as measured though level of 
aggregated resources. To trace and measure variance in cohesion, various indicators of those capabilities 
aggregated between partners (as well as transferred to the peripheral regime) are employed. To measure 
aggregation of military capabilities four principal data factors are employed: (1) funds (adjusted for inflation) 
transferred to the peripheral government to purchase military arms and equipment; (2) direct transfer of 
military arms and equipment; (3) amount of training provided including number of trainers deployed to the 
peripheral state and number of military personnel trained; (4) number of military personnel deployed to assist 
the peripheral regime to balance the internal threat including Special Forces, ground troops or other 
operations support staff. To measure aggregation of economic and aid capabilities four principal data factors 
are employed: (1) funds (adjusted for inflation) transferred to the government to implement aid programs 
linked to the alliance purpose; (2) funds (adjusted for inflation) given to the government to combat access to 
illicit financing (for example, crop eradication or drug interdiction); (3) number of aid personnel (government 
or contractor) deployed to assist with these development efforts; (4) amount of training provided as measured 
by number of trainers deployed to country and number of government personnel trained. 
76 Effectiveness of internal threat alliances is demonstrated by indicators that reflect the capability of the 
internal threat and will range from low to high—low when the threat continues to imperil the security of both 
allies; and high when the threat is no longer a core threat to partners’ security. To conceptualize variation in 
alliance effectiveness and therefore measure whether the internal threat has been debilitated as a result of the 
alliance the following measures related to the opposition are used: (1) total number of opposition personnel 
relative to the government’s military personnel; (2) amount of territory controlled by the opposition and (3) 
number of attacks employed by the opposition (and where possible, frequency and intensity of those attacks). 
A decrease in these factors is considered an increase in ally government ability to balance against an internal 





                                                                                                                                                 
vis the peripheral regime, while the second provides an indication of the opposition’s ability to organize and 
leverage their personnel to obtain territory. This second factor is also a useful measure to track changes in 
strength of the threat opposition strength throughout the intervention and identify relationships between these 
factors. For example, should amount of opposition-held territory decrease following formation of the alliance 
and continue to decline, this may be an indication of alliance effectiveness. The third and final data factor 
also provides an indication of the opposition’s ability to organize and leverage their personnel, yet in this 
case to plan and implement kinetic actions. This third factor is also a useful measure to track changes in 
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77 Per the “The Afghanistan Compact,” as released by NATO, 
78 Richard Oppel Jr., “Afghan leader Courts the Warlord Vote, but Others Fear the Cost,” New York Times, 
August 8, 2009. 
79 This follows Weitsman’s conceptualization of “ambiguous threats” in external threat alliances. Just as 
allies in “wartime” alliances may attribute the threat to one actor more than another, the “symmetry, clarity, 
and commonalty” of the way in which allies perceive threats in internal alliances will determine the extent 
to which they “agree on necessary action to confront those threats” including goals, strategy, and tactics. 
80 Interview with author, Rafael Pardo, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, October 
2012. 
81 Following Escobar’s escape, the U.S. and Colombia worked closely to track him down and kill him, 
demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and Colombia to closely cooperate and coordinate their policies and 
activities. The effort involved collaboration by the CIA, DEA and their counterparts in Colombia. Interview 
with author, Rafael Pardo, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012. 
82 Due to the fluid situation in Syria and inability of journalists to access areas and interview individuals as 
well as verify reports, it is difficult to corroborate statistics regarding bandwagoning (defections) as well as 
their impact onto alliance effectiveness. For a running estimate of “high-level” defections, see “Interactive: 
Tracking Syria's defections,” Al-Jazeera. Available here: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/syriadefections. Various news reports since the beginning of 
the internal conflict evidence that army officers, cabinet officials, and others have defected. For example, 
see: Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syrian army defectors say Assad regime crumbling,” Reuters, July 18, 2012.  
83 Specifically, the funds have gone to procuring Blackhawk helicopters and aircraft to increase 
responsiveness of Mexican law enforcement agencies and providing technical training to police and military. 
The Merida Initiative includes assistance to Mexico and other countries in Central America to combat drug 
trafficking. U.S White House Office of the Press, “FACT SHEET: US-Mexico Discuss New Approach to 
Bilateral Relationship” April 16, 2009. For a description of the Merida Initiative see: US Department of State, 
Merida Initiative, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/122397.htm. 
84 For an overview of U.S. Assistance to Mexico in general and the influence of bandwagoning (in particular 
corruption and collusion by the Federal Police with cartels) onto effectiveness, see June S. Beittel, “Mexico’s 
Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence,” (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 7 January, 2011). Available here: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155587.pdf.  
85 Their conceptualization of cohesion contains both behavioral and attitudinal components. To measure the 
behavioral component, the scholars take the “mean proportion of cooperation relative to conflict in all dyads 
connecting all alliance members.” They used an “indirect” research approach to quantify and measure the 
attitudinal aspect of cohesion and defined this component as “co-orientation of decision-makers toward an 
external actor which is perceived by all members of the alliance…this assumes that the more similarly the 
alliance members perceive the same object, the greater will be the cohesion among them” Ole R. Holsti, P. 
Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative 





ALLIANCE THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE INTELLECTUAL TERRAIN 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of international relations (IR) literature on 
alliance dynamics and has two objectives. First, to demonstrate the need for my 
contribution to theory by highlighting that existing IR scholarship has yet to adequately 
examine internal threat alliances and in its current form is ill-equipped to explain their 
dynamics. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the nature of alliance-making has 
changed dramatically; however, scholars have yet to update IR theory to account for and 
explain the more common forms of alliances in the contemporary world.  And second, the 
chapter seeks to highlight those elements of existing literature applicable to understanding 
internal threat alliance dynamics that were therefore modified and incorporated in the 
previous chapter. The chapter also provides an overview of the dissertation’s case study 
research methodology.  
The literature review portion of the chapter proceeds in five core sections, one each 
for works on alliance formation, bandwagoning, cohesion, effectiveness, and unified 
frameworks (scholars that examine more than one dynamic in a single cohesive theory). 
Each section traces the evolution of alliance literature, provides a critical review of the 
main arguments, and highlights gaps the dissertation seeks to fill. The final section outlines 
the dissertation’s research methodology. 
I. ALLIANCE FORMATION 
“It is the existence of an enemy…that gives rise to the need for allies.”1 
 
Alliance formation consists of two core issues that scholars have attempted to 
explain. First, why do states bring their security policies into close cooperation with another 
state? In examining this question, IR scholars broadly agree that presence of a common 
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external threat—a state or group of states—is the most prominent factor motivating states 
to form alliances. And second, why do states seek to align with one specific state (or group 
of states) instead of another? In exploring this issue, scholars aim to account for the size of 
particular alliances as well as the pattern of alliance formation over time (Riker 1968; Gross 
1970; Rosen 1970).2 The former is most relevant to my dissertation and therefore the focus 
of this section.  
Theories on why states form military alliances generally agree that they do so in 
response to an external threat as represented by a state or groups of states (counter alliance) 
but remain divided over whether this external threat, broadly conceived, is the only factor 
that affects alliance formation.3 For the sake of presentation, these arguments can be 
disaggregated into scholars who give primacy to external threat as motivating alignment 
(and view states as like units defined by capabilities) and those arguing that other non-
material variables also determine alignment decisions (and examine the influence of 
domestic variation onto alignment). 
1. LIKE UNITS ALIGN TO BALANCE EXTERNAL THREATS  
Scholars in this strain of literature include those who examine alliances as responses 
to threats represented by specific states (or groups thereof) and those more closely 
associated with balance-of-power theories. Generally, they conceptualize states as similar 
units defined by capabilities whose domestic structure mostly does not condition behavior. 
These internally cohesive polities form alliances in order to secure the national interest 
defined in terms of state security and territorial integrity.  
A. EARLY ALLIANCE LITERATURE: STATES ALIGN TO BALANCE EXTERNAL ENEMIES  
Representing the advent of political science literature on alliances, Arnold Wolfers 
(1962) and George Liska (1968) examine alliances as state responses to balance external 
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threats. According to Wolfers, states form “cooperative arrangements” (alliances) that “line 
up” the partner countries for “mutual assistance against a common external foe”4 in order 
to “to ward off threats to their national security interests…emanating from some specific 
country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential.”5 
States choose to form alliances due to “the conviction that the creation of military strength 
sufficient to ward off the specific threat would be beyond their national capacity.” 6 Like 
Wolfers, Liska argues that an external threat to security is the primary factor that spurs 
alliance formation. States form an alliance “only when another state intervenes as a threat” 
and with the purpose of “supplement(ing) each other’s capability” to reduce “the impact of 
antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one’s independence.”7 Without 
the capabilities to alone defeat/deter this threat, states will pool resources with others to be 
able to do so. Motivated by their core desire to maximize security and preserve territorial 
integrity, states weigh the costs and benefits of forming alliances and proceed accordingly 
after determining that such arrangements provide more security-related gains than 
liabilities.8  
Two other early alliance theory scholars echo Liska’s position and use economic 
theory to argue that states form alliance in order to produce a “public good” that is in the 
“interests of all” in the alliance: deterring “aggression by a common enemy” (Olson and 
Zeckhauser 1970).9 Alone, states lack the capabilities necessary to produce the public good 
(security) and therefore will join together to do so.10 In line with with their focus on threat 
and treatment of states as similar units defined by capabilities, these scholars downplay the 
relevance of other factors for explaining alliance formation including “religious and 
ideological homogeneity” (Wolfers 1968) or shared “ideology” (Fedder 1968).11  
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 Scholars who championed the early study of alliances made important 
contributions to understanding why states form them and the purposes they serve. In doing 
so, they motivated subsequent scholars to examine alliance dynamics in greater detail and 
provided a foundation of assumptions on which the academy could build. Despite these 
advances, they offer few generalizable insights applicable to a broader universe of cases in 
general and internal threat alliances particularly. In defining threats as external and 
comprising a state (or group thereof) Wolfers, Liska, and others overlook why threats other 
than states—such as political violence and associated instability emanating from within a 
given polity—might also motivate two governments to align their security policies. Though 
Wolfers and Liska do mention alliances between great powers and smaller states, they still 
largely conceptualize states as defined by capabilities and overlook (or do not theorize 
regarding) the potential influence onto alliance formation of differences in structure within 
allies. Though weaker powers may be less developed and thus fragmented, with various 
groups therein jockeying for power, these early works on alliances do not problematize the 
potential influence of such differences and generally focus on alliances between great 
powers. 
Within the strain of literature focused on external threat as the primary factor 
motivating alliance formation are those that can be broadly conceived as balance of power 
theories. Where Wolfers and Liska conceptualize external threat as a state or group of states 
and alliances as a means to ensure security in response to such threats, balance of power 
frameworks (in particular with the advent of neorealism) cast alliances as responses to 





B. ALIGNING TO BALANCE ACCUMULATIONS OF POWER / THREAT  
Traditional balance of power theory focuses on systemic responses to 
accumulations of power, where constraints put in place by the structure of the international 
system inform patterns of state behavior. As Friedman (1970) writes in one of the earlier 
studies on alliances, “the alliance process supplies the means for maintaining the balance 
of power” and “can stabilize the balance and counter tendencies toward its disruption.”12 
The distribution of capabilities across states within the international system is viewed as 
the principal force motivating alignment behavior.13 Without an authoritative world-
spanning government to provide security, states exist in a “self-help” environment based 
on power and must rely on themselves to survive. As an “ordering principle” distinct from 
domestic politics, anarchy within the international realm promotes a pattern of state 
behavior and “balancing” dynamics that characterize international politics. According to 
this approach, states form alliances to prevent any one state or group thereof from securing 
predominant power.  
Unique to balance of power theories is their position that alliances form almost 
automatically and in response to perceived power shifts. States are like units who rationally 
rank-order their preferences and seek to amass power to preserve their own security. As 
states perceive modifications to the distribution of power they will seek alliances with other 
states in order to offset this shift and restore the balance, selecting prospective alliance 
partners based solely on their capabilities and ability to help achieve this purpose.14 
One of the earliest proponents of this position is Hans Morgenthau (1959), who 
argues that “the historically most important manifestation of the balance of power…is to 
be found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations between one 
nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.”15 According to Kenneth Waltz’s (1979; 
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1986) version of balance of power, states are viewed as “like units,” hierarchically 
structured, that serve the same list of functions, differing according to their capabilities and 
seeking at minimum to survive. Due to the anarchic nature of the international realm, 
states16 will engage in balancing behavior—“externally” (forming alliances) or “internally” 
(increasing military strength)—to prevent any one state or alliance of states from 
dominating the international system. 17 In order to survive, states “behave in ways that tend 
toward the creation of balances of power.”18 States align with a given state as a matter of 
“expediency” and the common need for security and to aggregate capabilities, and not a 
shared “principle,” similar ideology, regime type, or other factors.19  
In an important theoretical advance, Stephen Walt’s (1987) “Balance of Threat” 
theory builds from Waltz and prior alliance literature to argue that states balance external 
threats instead of only accumulations of power.20 Level of threat is comprised of another 
state’s total power, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity, and hostile intentions: 
as level of threat increases, so too does the probability that a threatened state will form an 
alliance.21 Though Walt found that allying against a threat (balancing) is more prevalent 
than allying with it (bandwagoning), others such as Randall Schweller (1994) hold that he 
underestimates the prevalence of the latter.22 In particular, Schweller argues states may in 
specific circumstances find it most advantageous to bandwagon to benefit from efforts by 
the revisionist state.  
These structural accounts made important advances relative to earlier “traditional” 
alliance theory by presenting theoretical frameworks that incorporate systemic influence 
onto alignment decisions. Despite these and other advances, these works also have two 
principal gaps. First, their definition of threat remains focused on external enemies and 
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largely overlooks why threats emanating from within a given polity (such as coups and 
civil war, and the consequences these might bring for great powers and their allies alike) 
may also motivate states to align. By focusing on external threats as the predominant factor 
affecting alliance formation, these frameworks overlook why internal threats might also 
inform alignment decisions. Second, by conceptualizing states as unified entities defined 
by capabilities, they do not recognize the potential influence onto state behavior in 
general—and alliance formation in particular—of differentiation within states. This is 
especially relevant for smaller, weaker states whose internal character may not be 
hierarchical and unified in decision-making (and therefore with the national interest as their 
top priority) but, in contrast, fragmented and characterized by various groups competing 
for control of government.  
2. NON-MATERIAL VARIABLES & DISAGGREGATING THE STATE 
Arguments within this strain of literature differ in three ways from those reviewed 
above. First, other early alliance scholars responded to work by Liska and Wolfers to argue 
that non-material variables in addition to external threat must be considered to fully explain 
formation. Second, later frameworks built from Waltz and Walt and blended systemic 
influences with domestic variables in order to explain alliance formation. And third and 
finally, traditional and more contemporary arguments problematize states’ internal makeup 
and the influence of such domestic factors/institutions onto state behavior/alignment. 
A. EARLY ALLIANCE LITERATURE: FORMATION AS INFLUENCED BY IDEOLOGY / 
CULTURE 
To some extent responding to work by Liska and Wolfers, other earlier alliance 
scholars argue that external threat alone is insufficient to fully explain alignment. External 
enemies, they concede, motivate states to pursue alliances; however, states choose a 
particular ally not only because they provide capabilities necessary to defeat/deter their 
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enemy but also because this prospective ally shares some common characteristic including 
but not limited to: “ideological affinities” or “psychological penetration” of one ally’s 
ideology onto the other (Osgood 1968; Teune and Synnestvedt 1970); common traits 
(Russett 1960; Dawson and Rosencrance 1966), “cultural similarity” between allies 
(Guetzkow 1957), and language.23 To some extent the “democratic peace” theory can be 
viewed as an extension of these earlier works and a response to balance of power 
explanations: due to cultural and structural factors, democracies are predisposed to align 
with (rather than confront) each other.24 
Scholars who offered revisions to traditional alliance theory and cited the influence 
of non-material factors onto alignment decisions made contributions by recognizing that 
allies’ political structures may vary and affect alignment decisions. At the same time, these 
arguments largely view states as unified units that rationally rank-order their preferences 
and seek to amass power to preserve their own security. And despite noting that domestic 
characteristics can affect alliance formation, they focus on external (as opposed to internal) 
threats as the principle factor that initially spurs alignment. Additionally, and most 
problematically, these arguments generally do not describe or provide sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate the causal mechanisms through which non-material variables (ideology, for 
example) affect alliance formation more than threat. The more recent addition of 
democratic peace theory also makes an important contribution by considering domestic 
factors when examining alignment decisions. In addition to broader empirical issues with 
democratic peace theory as outlined by others, however, it is generally unable to explain 





B. ALIGNMENT AS INFLUENCED BY DOMESTIC STRUCTURE, THREAT PERCEPTION 
Later frameworks presented more nuanced treatments of how domestic factors 
influence alignment decisions (Barnett and Levy 1991; Levy and Barnett 1992; Kaufman 
1992). 25 Within the neoclassical realism strain of IR theory, for example, scholars concede 
that contours of the international system influence state behavior but argue that the precise 
influence (including onto alignment decisions) is refracted through/informed by 
intervening domestic variables. These include domestic politics and the strength of a 
country’s state apparatus or “state power” (Zakaria 1998)26 and decision-makers’ 
perception of threats and dominant intellectual currents that inform those perceptions. It is 
not so much external threats themselves (still represented by states) that inform alignment 
but, rather, states’ misperception27 of them. Christensen and Snyder (1990), for example, 
show that civil-military relations and past experience can lead states to misperceive the 
distribution of offensive or defensive capabilities in the international system, producing 
“chain-ganging” and “buck-passing” behavior, respectively.28 Others such as Lobell 
(2009) show that threat perception can lead great powers to respond to a component of 
(instead of aggregate) a rising power’s capabilities and in turn generate “over” or under 
“reaction” (“inappropriate balancing”).29  
By disaggregating the state and allowing for variation on those factors that inform 
threat perception, these scholars make an important advance by addressing one 
shortcoming of traditional balance of power/threat theories. Nonetheless, they still 
predominantly employ a narrow understanding of threat as an external challenge. As a 
result and like traditional balance of power approaches they seek to amend, such analyses 
overlook threats internal to sovereign entities. Finally, though they advance theory by 
problematizing the influence onto alliance formation of internal state structure, they tend 
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to overlook why internal fragmentation and threats emanating from within a given state 
may affect that same polity’s alignment. This gap in particular, however, is filled by Steven 
David (1991) and Randall Schweller (2004; 2006).  
C. ALIGNMENT AS INFLUENCED BY INTERNAL THREATS AND CONSTRAINTS  
Steven David is one of the few scholars to have recognized that states pursue 
alliances to balance external and internal threats. David’s omni-balancing framework 
amends the neorealist conceptualization of the state and posits a theoretical approach that 
accounts for internal fragmentation and varying degrees of anarchy and hierarchy and 
associated (in)stability. Where traditional balance of power theory focuses on alignment 
behavior by states in response to external threats from other states, David’s theory focuses 
on leaders of weaker states and recognizes that they face domestic (internal) threats—coups 
or secessionist movements, among others—that also influence their alignment decisions.  
External threats to states cannot be ignored, but internal threats tend to exert a more 
powerful influence on alignment behavior, which in the Third World is ultimately driven 
by the “rational calculation” of “leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do 
whatever necessary to keep them in power.”30 As a result, leaders will seek external 
alignments (even with states they consider a secondary threat) in order to balance the “more 
immediate and dangerous” threat to their survival.31 Since the principal concern of leaders 
is to remain in power, they will at times “protect themselves at the expense of promoting 
the long-term security of the state and the general welfare of its inhabitants.”32 This amends 
traditional balance of power theory and is an important advance on other alliance politics 
literature which assume that alignment decisions are driven primarily by the national 
interest. Regimes, like states, seek to survive and will therefore act in ways (including 
forming alliances with secondary threats) to keep themselves in power. Others such as 
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Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997) attempt to build on David’s framework, but whether 
their contribution is unique remains unclear.33  
To some extent building from David’s work, Schweller’s (2004; 2006) theory of 
“underbalancing” argues that four domestic-level factors predominantly found in weaker 
states can lead to “paltry” and inadequate responses including “under-balancing” in 
reaction to rising threats in the form of other states.34 Where traditional balance of power 
assumes a state’s ability to mobilize resources to balance, Schweller argues that such 
assumptions do not necessarily apply to weaker states where a lack of elite consensus, 
societal fragmentation, and internal instability lead to under-balancing.35 These 
characteristics make it more difficult for such states to display full balancing behavior in 
line with the actual threat level.  
The work of David and Schweller contain two important advances over prior 
scholarship that make them superior to balance of power/threat for examining internal 
threat alliances. First, they disaggregate the state, demonstrate why the neorealist view is 
not necessarily applicable to weaker polities, and therefore why particular internal 
structures (or lack thereof) of such states must be considered when attempting to explain 
their alignment decisions. In the case of David’s omnibalancing framework in particular, 
it is not so much the “state” as the central elite “regime” that is making alignment decisions. 
And second, they go beyond neoclassical realists to clearly devise a broader 
conceptualization of threat: weaker states face external pressures as well as internal 
challenges to their rule and both can affect their alignment decisions.36 This is an important 
advance in two ways: it broadens the academy’s conceptualization of threat beyond 
external pressures as represented by states or groups thereof; and second, David recognizes 
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that regime survival (rather than only the national interest) can also motivate alignment. At 
the same time, both David and Schweller do not directly recognize that the threat internal 
to the weaker regime could also threaten and therefore motivate alignment decisions of a 
larger power—that is, they do not problematize alliance formation between great powers 
and weaker (peripheral) regimes where the internal threat is common to and therefore 
motivates both states to form an alliance. Harknett and VanDenBerg also overlook why 
threats internal to the peripheral state can be common to that regime and the great power.  
Alliance Formation: Summary of Gaps in Theory 
As the review outlined above demonstrates, IR theory mostly overlooks internal 
threat alliances and has various gaps that render it incapable of explaining why they form. 
First, theories examining why great powers align narrowly conceptualize the threat that 
prompts this behavior as external and comprised of a state or counter-alliance. In part, this 
stems from the universe of cases examined. Writing at a time where inter-state war was at 
its peak (pre-Cold War) or very possible (during the Cold War), scholars understandably 
developed theories to explain why these factors external to states’ borders drove alignment 
decisions. These works also assume that states align in order to safeguard the national 
interest—that is, state security and territorial survival. David’s omnibalancing framework 
and Schweller’s underbalancing theory bring the academy a step closer to filling these gaps 
by demonstrating why threats (or constraints) internal to a weak regime’s borders can affect 
that regime’s external alignment behavior. And David’s theory rightly notes that weak 
regimes have motives other than the national interest—remaining in power—that drive 
their alignment decisions. At the same time, both David and Schweller do not focus 
specifically on those factors motivating the alignment decisions of the external, stronger 
power with whom weaker regimes align. David rightfully notes that internal threats affect 
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the weaker regime’s alignment decisions and Schweller demonstrates why internal 
fragmentation hinders weak regime capacity to mobilize resources (and thus balance); 
however, both do not explicitly recognize that such instability within the weaker regime 




The term “bandwagoning” was first used in IR theory by Waltz (1979) to essentially 
describe the antithesis of balancing—a state joining the stronger coalition, whereas 
balancing reflects aligning allying with the weaker side.37 Building from Waltz, Walt 
(1987) further refines bandwagoning but retains the dichotomous, “either or” 
conceptualization of balancing/bandwagoning: “when confronted by a significant external 
threat, states may either balance or bandwagon” (emphasis mine).38 According to Walt’s 
(1987) definition, whereas balancing represents “allying with others against the prevailing 
threat,” bandwagoning signifies “alignment with the source of danger” and can take two 
forms as distinguished by motivation or purpose. 39 “Offensive” bandwagoning is a state’s 
decision to align with the dominant state in order to share its projected “spoils of victory.” 
And “defensive” bandwagoning is a “form of appeasement” where a state aligns with an 
aggressive state in order to avoid attack and survive.40 According to Walt, weak states are 
particularly prone to bandwagon because they lack capabilities necessary to affect the 
outcome of a given conflict and therefore need to select the “winning side” in order to 
survive. And allying against a threat (balancing) is more prevalent than allying with it 
(bandwagoning). Many other scholars have discussed bandwagoning, yet employ Walt’s 
definition and therefore need not be reviewed here.41  
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Other scholars have critiqued Walt’s argument that balancing is more common than 
bandwagoning.42 Schweller (1994) holds that Walt underestimates the prevalence of 
bandwagoning and argues that states will bandwagon even in the absence of a threat by 
entering a conflict on the side they perceive to be stronger (and more likely to win) with 
the aim of securing material benefit in the event that side wins.43 That is, states “bandwagon 
for profit.”44 While differing from Walt in this respect, Schweller retains his dichotomous 
understanding of balancing/bandwagoning and assumption that the core factor motivating 
states to bandwagon (or balance) is to secure the national interest defined broadly as state 
security and territorial survival. 
In a later examination, Weitsman (2004) differs from Walt and Schweller by 
arguing that bandwagoning is a function of the level of threat a state faces rather than the 
size of the state being threatened. Where Walt argues that smaller (weaker) states 
bandwagon, Weitsman holds that “big states” can also be “asymmetrically threatened” and 
therefore exhibit bandwagoning behavior. Despite the slight differences between Walt, 
Schweller, and Weitsman, they all agree on two points: states bandwagon (whether to 
survive or for profit) in order to advance the national interest; and bandwagoning/balancing 
is a binary phenomenon where states do one or the other.  
In analyses centered on cohesion, bandwagoning is one factor IR scholars hold may 
lead to the “dissolution” of external threat alliances: after aligning and facing an escalating 
threat, an ally may decide that the alliance can no longer advance its national interest. The 
state defects from the alliance and aligns (bandwagons) with the external threat.  
Bandwagoning: Summary of Gaps in Theory 
Scholars who examine bandwagoning made important advances to IR theory yet 
can be critiqued on two grounds as it relates to understanding internal threat alliances. First, 
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by viewing balancing and bandwagoning as an “either or” phenomenon the potential for 
these to occur simultaneously is overlooked. This shortcoming is linked to scholars’ 
conceptualization of the state. In treating allies as generally cohesive units whose internal 
orders are structured in a hierarchical manner, these frameworks discount the possibility 
that agencies or components within a given state may seek to bandwagon with another state 
while the central government is balancing it, or vice versa. When examining alliances 
between two generally cohesive actors, this manifestation of fragmented and simultaneous 
balancing/bandwagoning would be uncommon. At the same time, it renders traditional 
alliance theory’s treatment of bandwagoning not fully applicable to understanding the 
dynamics of internal threat alliances where one ally is weak, internally fragmented, and 
comprised of actors who act to advance their own interests and may choose to bandwagon 
rather than balance. Accordingly, a new conceptualization of bandwagoning in the context 
of internal threat alliances remains necessary. 
III. ALLIANCE COHESION 
“Common interests are the rock on which all alliances are built. Yet upon this rock 
all kinds of structures may be erected, some solid and spacious, others crumbling and 
confining”45 – Hans J. Morgenthau 
 
  IR scholars have also examined why (or why not) alliance partners remain together 
and are able to cooperate in pursuit of their stated goals. Broadly, these aspects of alliances 
are referred to as alliance “cohesion” and used in three principal ways: (1) the ability of the 
alliance to survive, where alliances are cohesive if they do not “disintegrate”: (2) the degree 
to which alliance partners are able to set goals, a strategy to achieve these goals, and then 
coordinate activities to implement the agreed strategy; and (3) the extent to which allies 
“maintain similar attitudes about objectives and targets and continue to behave in a 
collaborative manner.”46 Though definitions vary, scholars examine the following factors 
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that affect whether alliance partners stick together and work together to confront the 
common menace: external threat; allies’ capabilities; as well as alliance structure and 
“scope.”47 Even though external threat is the single factor most agreed upon across the 
literature as affecting cohesion—and supported by robust analysis—I discuss the other two 
factors so as to demonstrate the evolution of alliance theory. 
1. COHESION AS INFLUENCED BY LEVEL OF EXTERNAL THREAT 
There is wide agreement across the literature that a common external threat is a 
prerequisite for alliance cohesion. States form an alliance in response to a threat and when 
that threat disappears allies no longer (necessarily) need to remain together and thus might 
disband.48 The more useful arguments examine actual variation in cohesion and why 
change in the intensity or level of external threat—and whether alliance partners’ are 
equally threatened—affects cohesion. Theorists coalesce on two positions related to threat 
and cohesion.  
First, the intensity of the external threat influences the degree of cohesion—as the 
threat from the external enemy rises, cohesion should increase as partners need to cooperate 
more closely to be able to address that threat; in tandem, cohesion will decrease as the 
intensity of threat dampens. Increases in threat intensity can enhance group (state) 
cohesiveness and “unify” alliance partners (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Boulding 1962).49 And 
a decline in threat can “undermine,” “weaken”, or “decrease” cohesion (Wolfers 1966; 
Stevens 1961; Calvocoressi 1966).50 In sum, “greater conflict between alliances tends to 
exert an integrative impact on alliances” (Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan 1973).51 Others 
argue that a high enough level of threat can “trump” disagreements or strains within the 
alliance (Holsti 1967).52  
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And second, the influence of level of threat on cohesion depends on the extent to 
which this threat adversely affects all alliance partners equally. The “unity” of the alliance 
can decrease should there be a “discrepancy” in the degree of threat faced by alliance 
partners (Wolfers 1959) and “decision-making” within alliances is made more difficult 
should the threat focus on one (rather than all) alliance partners (Liska 1962).53 In sum, 
alliance partners will remain together and be more likely to work together should: the 
common external threat be present, high, and perceived as such by all alliance partners. 
Should the threat decrease or one ally perceive it as lower than another, collaboration 
between partners decreases.  
There are two main shortcomings with these arguments. First, they focus on 
external threats and overlook threats internal to one of the alliance partners that could also 
influence cohesion. And second, they tend to conceptualize states as like units that are 
hierarchically structured. While applicable to alliances between two generally cohesive 
units, this makes the frameworks less able to explain cohesion of alliances involving a 
weaker state. In such cases, actors of the ruling regime might perceive threats differently—
the small ruling elite, for example, may view the threat as greater than actors in other 
bureaucratic agencies or governors. In turn, these actors may be more or less inclined to 
work with their ally to balance, leading to variation in cohesion.  
2. COHESION AS INFLUENCED BY ALLIES’ “CAPABILITIES”  
Some scholars also argue that allies’ capabilities can influence cohesion and tend 
to agree that the capabilities an ally brings to the alliance affects their “bargaining power” 
within the alliance. 54 In defensive alliances the “core” power can use coercion in order to 
push their weaker ally into line and force them to cooperate, thereby increasing cohesion 
(Morgenthau 1948; Liska 1968; North, Kich, and Zinnes 1970).55 The “distribution of 
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power” within the alliance determines whether partners are “able to coordinate” to achieve 
alliance goals and the more powerful ally is likely to “have its way.”56 But, an ally may 
have a specific valuable “asset” that despite traditional measures of power increases its 
leverage within the alliance (Morgenthau 1948; Miller 1959; Olson and Zeckhauser 
1970).57 Scholars also note that “heterogeneity of alliance partners” can affect cohesion, 
but there seems to be less agreement on (and evidence for) this point. 58  
Insights on why allies’ capabilities affect cohesion are important in so far as they 
logically note that power may affect who gets what in a given alliance. Despite these 
advances, in focusing on capabilities scholars largely assume that all (in particular weaker) 
allies are eager and willing to cooperate, that all actors within this ally and relevant to the 
alliance share this willingness and are acting to secure the national interest. It has been 
argued that as alliance partners have greater capabilities they will be more able to devote 
those resources necessary to work together. In the context of an internal threat alliance, 
though, the weaker regime (or specific actors within it) may prioritize (as David notes) its 
survival or interests over the alliance. Despite the logical relevance of this factor, the extant 
literature has not fully examined its influence on alliance cohesion.59  
3. COHESION AS INFLUENCED BY ALLIANCE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE / “SCOPE”  
The size and decision-making structure of alliances—political and military 
arrangements made to coordinate goals, strategies, and then aggregate capabilities—is the 
third factor said to influence alliance cohesion. Aside from noting that larger alliances 
make coordination more difficult, scholars take two polar positions about the influence of 
decision-making structure on cohesion. On one side, they argue that centralized and 
hierarchical decision-making structures make alliances more cohesive (Haas and Whiting 
1956; Haas 1969)60 and able to “readily respond to external threats” (Masters 1961).61 At 
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the same time, others argue the opposite and that hierarchical decision-making structures 
with a dominant leader decreases cohesion by fomenting resentment (Fedder 1962; Liska 
1968; Duchacek 1966; Rothstein 1966). 62  
Linked to the influence of decision-making structure is the alliance’s “scope” 
(number of issues addressed) and the degree of overlap on partners’ interests as it relates 
to alliance goals.63 The cohesion of the alliance (in these arguments referred to as its 
“durability”) will be inversely related to its scope: alliances that address fewer issues and 
are clear on goals (“limited” alliances or those of “limited purpose”) should have higher 
cohesion (endure longer) because it is easier for partners to initiate and maintain 
cooperation on fewer issues (Liska 1962; Dinerstein 1965; Morgenthau 1959; Haas 
1969).64  An alliance will last longer if it is based on “limited interests” and more likely to 
be operative should the interests of partners extend to “concrete policies and measures.” In 
a later study, however, Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan (1973) find that there is only a weak 
relationship between the scope of an alliance (“goal structure”) and coordination 
(cohesion). 65   
All of the arguments about the influence of decision-making structure or scope onto 
cohesion seem plausible, but can be critiqued due to their conceptualization of states as 
like units that are hierarchically structured. This renders them largely unable to recognize 
the various actors within a given state—the police, military, Ministries, among others—
involved in setting goals and strategy (core elements of cohesion) that might influence (and 
therefore explain) allies’ ability to work together. Whether defensive or offensive, alliances 
are complex endeavors involving coordination and planning by various actors within each 
partner; however, the reviewed works largely overlook these sub-state actors and opt 
 
79 
instead for assuming that states’ leaders act to advance the national interest and make 
decisions related to cohesion accordingly.66  
Alliance Cohesion: Summary of Gaps in Theory 
As the review outlined above demonstrates, the literature has various gaps in 
general and that render it incapable of explaining cohesion of internal threat alliances 
particularly. First, scholars are right to highlight that level of threat influences cohesion, 
but largely overlook internal threats. Second, and rooted in the universe of cases 
examined—mostly great powers and Western states of comparable degrees of internal 
cohesiveness and development—they conceptualize states as unified and hierarchically 
structured units and in so doing overlook the potential influence of other bureaucratic 
agencies within the state. These various entities may perceive threats differently, or 
prioritize other interests (patron-client ties, for example) over the national interest, and 
therefore express higher, or lower, degrees of cooperation. Instead of acting in accordance 
with alliance strategy and balancing the threat, for example, they might decide to 
bandwagon with it. As the alliance dynamic under consideration changes from formation 
to cohesion, and thus the establishment of the alliance to coordinating its strategy, more 
actors become involved. But, the extant literature largely overlooks such actors. Third and 
finally, scholars largely assume that allies will be willing to work together to derive and 
implement strategy and tactics. In the context of great power/peripheral regime alliances, 
actors comprising the latter may not necessarily act in accordance with initially agreed 







IV. ALLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS 
“States form alliances for a purpose, but do not always achieve that aim.” - Brent 
Scowcroft 
 
Alliance effectiveness has broadly been defined as “the ability of the alliance to 
achieve its goals.”67 For traditional “defensive” (or “peacetime”) alliances the goal is to 
deter an attack; and for “offensive” (or “wartime”) alliances to defeat a common enemy. 
Scholars have focused on the former but also examined why offensive alliances do (or do 
not) achieve their goal. 
For defensive alliances, effectiveness is conceptualized as allies’ ability to remain 
together with sufficient capabilities to deter a common enemy’s advances. For these cases, 
which represent the lion’s share of alliance theory, effectiveness is generally equated with 
degree of cohesion (or “durability”). Most make no specific reference to effectiveness, but 
two scholars do mention “effectiveness” and factors in addition to cohesion that influence 
an alliance’s ability to deter its enemy. According to Liska (1968), alliance effectiveness 
(“efficacy”) is influenced by allies’ ability to act together to “restrain the adversary” 
(cohesion) and the degree to which allies’ activities are “integrated” in specific areas.”68 
Like Liska, Morgenthau (1959) argues that alliance effectiveness (“quality”) is influenced 
by cohesion and “the relations of trust and respect among its principal statesmen.”69  
Though most literature examines defensive alliances, some scholars have 
problematized offensive alliance effectiveness.70 Like Morgenthau, Holsti (1970) argues 
that cohesion and “trust” between allies that each will fulfill commitments shall influence 
the ability of alliances to be effective “fighting organizations.”71 With perhaps the most 
straightforward argument on effectiveness, Rosen (1970) contends that a combination of 
alliance “strength” and “cost-tolerance” (willingness of allies to endure harm) influences 
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whether allies achieve their goal. 72 Though Rosen notes that allies’ “sharing of costs may 
be a heated controversy,” and thus hinder effectiveness, he does not fully explain the 
mechanisms underlying this relationship.   
Alliance Effectiveness: Summary of Gaps in Theory 
Scholars working on why alliances do (or do not) achieve their goals make 
important advances on other work by highlighting factors in addition to cohesion that might 
influence effectiveness. At the same time, they have two principal shortcomings that must 
be addressed to enrich IR theory in general and understand internal threat alliance dynamics 
particularly. First, while it seems plausible that higher degrees of integration (Liska) and 
trust (Morgenthau) might influence alliance effectives, these arguments are neither 
presented as generalizable insights nor tested through case study or further analysis. And 
second, due to their focus on Western states these arguments are grounded in the 
assumption that partners are internally cohesive and will unswervingly apply alliance 
resources according to alliance strategy. Unitary states that are internally, hierarchically 
structured prioritize the national interest and therefore act accordingly: to balance the 
adversary. While this may apply to developed states, the assumption may not necessarily 
hold when one of the partners is a weaker, peripheral state devoid of an internal character 
characterized by hierarchy and rationality.  
V. UNIFIED THEORIES OF ALLIANCE DYNAMICS  
 
Building on insights and arguments from many of the scholars reviewed above, 
three theoretical frameworks attempt to explain more than one aspect of alliance dynamics 
in a single study (Holsti, Hoppmann, and Sullivan 1973) or contiguous theoretical 
framework (Snyder 1997; Weitsman 2004). These frameworks make important advances 
on prior scholarship but also share some of the gaps in works outlined above. 
 
82 
1. CORRELATIONS ON FORMATION AND COHESION 
One of the first attempts to examine more than one aspect of military alliance 
dynamics in a single study was by Holsti, Hoppman and Sullivan (1973) who employ 
bivariate quantitative analysis to determine those factors that across hundreds of cases 
explain alliance formation and cohesion. Effectiveness as distinct from cohesion is not 
explicitly addressed. The authors confirm states typically form alliances in response to 
external threats and rule out other variables as relevant to alignment. And in examining 
variables said to influence cohesion, their analysis confirms higher threat as one of the only 
variables across cases that has a strong influence on cohesion: “greater conflict between 
alliances tends to exert an integrative impact.”73 In addition to disproving other commonly 
cited variables as relevant to formation and cohesion—and evidencing threat level as 
crucial to explaining each—the authors made an important contribution by developing 
perhaps the first succinct definition of cohesion applicable to a broad range of defensive 
and offensive alliances (other than the propensity for allies to stay together): the ability of 
states within an alliance “to agree on goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities 
directed toward those ends.”74  
The authors make important advances by offering and testing generalizable 
insights. However, they share many of same shortcomings referenced above. First, they 
focus on external threats as represented by states and therefore bypass internal threats. 
Second, what they gain in presenting high-level correlations between commonly examined 
variables—and ruling out many of the previously described factors said to influence 
formation and cohesion—they lose in being unable to demonstrate through careful tracing 
of mechanisms why, for example, a higher threat necessarily generates greater cohesion. 
Third and finally, the universe of cases examined includes defensive or peacetime 
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alliances. This limits the generalization of these insights onto alliances whose goal is to 
defeat an external (or internal) enemy. 
2. ALLIANCE FORMATION AND “MANAGEMENT” (COHESION) 
Glenn Snyder’s Alliance Politics (1997) leverages assumptions from game theory 
to present one of the first unified theoretical frameworks about formation and cohesion of 
alliances “with a military or security purpose.”75 Employing an approach that includes 
cost/benefit analysis (like Liska [1968]) and viewing states as like units defined by 
capabilities, Snyder contends that states form alliances when pressed by an external threat 
and when the benefits (increased security obtained through the ally’s commitment) 
outweigh the costs (loss of autonomy).76 
Approximating cohesion, Snyder defines the “management” of alliances as “the 
joint and unilateral processes by which alliance members try to keep the alliance alive and 
advance their interests within it.”77 Management focuses on short-term interactions 
(bargaining) within an alliance and between the alliance and its external threat.78 Allies and 
adversaries interact and through these interactions exhibit variation in behavior in three 
“arenas” of IR in accordance with alliance goals: to deter an attack (“preparedness”); to 
negotiate terms with another state or alliance (“diplomacy”); or to work together to attack 
another state or group of states (“action”).79 Allies’ bargaining power determined by 
military dependence, commitment,80 and interests81 influences outcome of interactions.  
“Alliance stability,” or the probability allies remain together, examines longer-term 
interactions and how allies maintain and maximize their net benefit from the alliance. 
Stability is governed by the “alliance security dilemma”: allies fear being abandoned and 
entrapped and associated risks vary inversely.82 If allies share the same adversary and need 
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to balance it for the same reason, the security dilemma is low and cohesion or “alliance 
stability” high.83  
Snyder’s framework enhanced IR theory on alliance dynamics by: examining 
multiple facets of alliance dynamics in a single framework; employing a broader definition 
of threat; demonstrating causal mechanisms of formation and cohesion (as opposed to 
correlations); and referencing the influence of domestic structure onto dynamics.84 Despite 
these important advances, the framework has three gaps that make it ill-equipped for 
examining internal threat alliances. First, it retains the literature’s focus on threats external 
to allies’ borders and alliances as responses to secure the national interest in the face of 
such dangers. Second, Snyder says intra-alliance bargaining occurs related to action (war) 
but presents no hypotheses or arguments related to this particular arena.85 By contrast, 
internal threat alliances deal with what Snyder would characterize as action: coordinating 
and implementing policy and action to defeat a common internal threat. This limits the 
applicability of Snyder’s work to offensive alliances in general and internal threat alliances 
particularly. Third and finally, Snyder references domestic factors (implying a more 
nuanced view of the state) by arguing that the influence of threat level and the anarchic 
nature of the international system is translated through “a domestic politics prism 
consisting of the perceptions and values of decision-makers and the domestic constraints 
that bear on them.” However, he provides little explanation of these decision-makers or 
how their perceptions affect alliance dynamics.86 Despite referencing domestic differences 
of allies, then, he largely retains prior structural treatments of such states as comparable 





3. DYNAMICS OF PEACETIME AND WARTIME ALLIANCES  
In an important shift from prior scholarship, Weitsman (2004) offers a unified 
theory of alliance formation and cohesion of peacetime as well as wartime alliances. To do 
so, Weitsman combines into a single framework assumptions from realist (balance of 
power) and rationalist (institutionalist) theory to argue that level of external threat explains 
alliance formation and cohesion. The framework differs from prior scholarship in three 
ways. 87 
First, in examining formation Weitsman argues that different levels of threat 
produce four distinct types of alliances (behavior). The core motivation for each remains 
to secure the national interests; however, “tethering” and “hedging” alliances have 
purposes and levels of commitment slightly different from the traditional balancing and 
bandwagoning.88   
Second, Weitsman follows prior scholarship to argue that level of external threat 
affects cohesion but diverges from the academy by showing that threats within the alliance 
also matter: whether allies perceive threats from each other and disagree on the “raison 
d’etre of the alliance.”89 As Weitsman says: “If states are coming together to counter a 
uniform external threat, it will certainly be relatively easy for them to coordinate their goals 
and strategies to attain those goals…if states ally in order to reduce the conflict between 
them…the very forces that lead states to ally will inhibit the cohesion of the resulting 
alliance.”90  
Third and finally, Weitsman examines the dynamics of peacetime and war-time 
alliances. This departs from Snyder and others who predominantly examine either pre-1914 
alliance behavior or formation and cohesion of the American and Soviet alliance “systems” 
during the Cold War.91  She demonstrates that the different circumstances confronting an 
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alliance in wartime as opposed to peacetime influence alliance cohesion in distinct ways. 
Accordingly, she argues, assumptions derived to explain peacetime alliances cannot 
therefore simply be applied to explain wartime alliances. As a result, Weitsman modifies 
concepts to accommodate aspects of alliance behavior unique to each.  
Despite these important improvements, Weitsman’s framework has three 
shortcomings that limit its utility in explaining dynamics of internal threat alliances. First, 
the framework examines only alliances formed between equal powers in response to threats 
from other states; and although wartime alliances are examined, the framework 
predominantly centers on peacetime alliances. Second, Weitsman explores the influence of 
“internal” threats but employs the term in reference to the probability that one ally will 
attack the other. As a result, the theory overlooks why a threat within one of the allies that 
is common to both might influence alliance dynamics. Third and finally, Weitsman largely 
employs the realist conceptualization of the state and overlooks the role and associated 
influence of partner bureaucratic agencies onto cohesion and effectiveness.92  
VI. CONCLUSIONS ON LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The discussion above provided a critical review of IR literature on alliance 
dynamics and achieved two goals. First, it demonstrated the need for my contribution to 
theory by highlighting that existing IR scholarship has yet to examine internal threat 
alliances and in its current form is ill-equipped to explain their dynamics. Particularly since 
the end of the Cold War, the nature of alliance-making has changed dramatically; however, 
scholars have yet to update IR theory to account for and explain the more common forms 
of alliances today. And second, the chapter highlighted those elements of existing literature 
applicable to understanding internal threat alliance dynamics—particularly David’s work 
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and associated assumptions—that were therefore modified and incorporated in the previous 
chapter. 
Weitsman filled a gap in IR theory by providing a framework to explain the 
dynamics of war-time alliances. Doing so required modifying and adding to extant 
literature to devise assumptions and arguments most applicable to the unique context and 
associated circumstances for such alliances. Understanding the dynamics of internal threat 
alliances requires a similar effort. Providing mid-range, contingent theoretical 
generalizations regarding the divergent characteristics and associated dynamics of internal 
threat alliances collectively represent the contribution this dissertation seeks to make to IR 
theory. In the following chapters, I evidence these core differences through analysis of two 
cases: the internal threat alliances between the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the 
U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). Before proceeding to case analysis in the next chapter, 
however, an overview of the dissertation’s research methodology is warranted. 
VII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Much the same as other political science fields, IR theory on alliances includes 
quantitative and qualitative studies—both research approaches have strengths and 
weaknesses as well as topics and questions for which they are generally most appropriate 
to tackle. With these trade-offs in mind, scholars must select a research methodology best 
suited to achieving the goals of their particular inquiry. The purpose of this section is to 
explain why I employed a qualitative research approach involving case studies for this 





Quantitative or Qualitative? 
Quantitative or “variable-oriented” analysis is particularly useful for identifying 
macro-level correlations between variables across a large number of cases. Accordingly, 
much of IR literature on alliance employs quantitative analysis due to their scope and 
focus—generally analyses exploring subjects such as patterns of alignment, the frequency 
of alliance formation, or when states bandwagon rather than balance. Indeed, quantitative 
analysis is appropriate for such endeavors that seek to evidence correlations between 
independent and dependent variables across longer periods of time. What such quantitative 
analyses gain in being able to identify macro-level relationships across a large number of 
cases (large-N), however, they lose in being less capable of identifying and evidencing 
relationships between and mechanisms linking these variables. This is where qualitative 
research approaches come in.  
Qualitative studies focus on uncovering and demonstrating how and why variables 
are linked as well as the mechanisms that enable one variable to generate change on 
another. This is particularly true with the case study approach, where scholars examine in 
greater depth a smaller number (n) of cases and delve deeper into hypothesized 
relationships therein. This form of qualitative, causal analysis is focused on explaining 
what occurred and why rather than obtaining more robust significance test scores—and 
evidence for correlation between two variables—by increasing the number of observations. 
The qualitative approach is rooted in the “method of causal imputation” which diverges 
from “the mode of causal inference in statistical-correlational studies.”93   
Scholars must select a research approach best suited to achieving the objective of 
their particular inquiry. This dissertation’s research objective was to produce mid-range, 
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contingent theoretical generalizations regarding the dynamics of internal threat alliances. 
As a result, the most appropriate way in which to evidence the four core elements of 
internal threat alliance dynamics was to identify the mechanisms linking variables within 
each. This made a qualitative approach the most appropriate choice to address the 
dissertation’s core research questions and subjects. Based on the scope of the research 
project, the dissertation employs a qualitative case study research approach comprised of 
two research tools: process-tracing and semi-structured interviews. The following sections 
briefly outline the research approach and methodology. This approach, described below, 
included primary and secondary document review as well as extensive interviews and field 
work in both Colombia and Afghanistan.  
1. RESEARCH APPROACH: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS USING CASE STUDIES 
The case study approach can be defined as the “detailed examination of an aspect 
of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable 
to other events.”94 The case study is an “in-depth” analysis “of a single unit (a relatively 
bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of 
similar phenomena.”95 Based on their puzzle and topic, the researcher selects a particular 
episode delimited by time, location, and presence of key variables. As with any topic in 
political science, there is a separate literature debating the pros and cons of employing a 
case study approach versus others.96 This is in addition to epistemological divides over the 
purpose and aims of different strands of social science inquiry. A full review of these texts 
is beyond the scope of this chapter and marginal to its central analysis; however, a brief 
outline of pros and cons of using case studies is necessary in order to demonstrate why this 
approach was best suited for the dissertation.   
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Scholars highlighting the “drawbacks” of case study research typically argue that 
social science inquiry should approximate the hard sciences in method and objective. As 
such, they contend that one of the principle disadvantages of case study research is the 
lower number—relative to quantitative analysis—of cases; or what they refer to as the 
“small-n problem.” Within this strain are scholars such as Lijphart (1971) and King, 
Keohane and Verba (1994) who tend to argue that social science research should 
approximate the logic of the hard sciences, the standard bearer for demonstrating cause and 
effect.97 In order to determine whether a given observed pattern is systematic or “just due 
to the transient consequences of random processes,” the best way is to increase the n 
(sample size) and employ repeated tests across different contexts.98 Based on these 
positions, these scholars tend to view case studies as a tool but one that needs to be 
improved in order to “meet the standards for valid inference.”99 
On the other side of this epistemological division are scholars who champion 
qualitative research and argue that social science inquiry need not approximate that of the 
hard sciences. The world and universe of questions that political scientists (as well as 
sociologists and others) examine is “messier” (or “less reactive”) than, say, chemistry and 
therefore not necessarily subject to similar research methodologies. “These complexities 
of human and social reality,” Almond and Genco (1977) argue, mean that “the explanatory 
strategy of the hard sciences has only limited application to the social sciences.”100 Despite 
the legacy of the hard science-driven methodology of quantitative analysis and causality, 
therefore, the social sciences needs its own philosophy of science.101  
Building from this position there has been a “resurgence” in qualitative methods 
generally—and case study approaches particularly—in political science.102 Within this 
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strain are scholars who argue for the value of qualitative methods independent from 
quantitative research in general and case studies particularly (Eckstein 1975; Gerring 2006; 
George and Bennett 2005).103 Case study research is not a “primitive form” of variable-
oriented research that needs to be “improved”—rather, it is “a different mode of inquiry 
with different operating assumptions.”104 In one of the seminal works on qualitative case 
study research, George and Bennett demonstrate that case studies have a different 
methodological logic than other approaches and value without increasing the number of 
observations and have important implications for both theory testing and development.  
Even within the strain of literature on case studies, scholars recognize the 
advantages and disadvantages of using case studies.105 Though others exist, some of the 
cited disadvantages of case studies are as follows.106 First, information gleaned can be 
unique to the specific event or process studied. To account for this, the researcher needs to 
employ well-defined concepts and can increase the number of cases examined. Second, it 
can be difficult to establish “external validity”—that is, to demonstrate that the findings 
are applicable to a broader range of cases. To account for this, the researcher must be 
careful to define the “class” or “subclass of events” (cases) that they seek to examine and 
perform focused, structured analysis. In so doing, they must concretely specify the universe 
of cases being examined and be clear that insights gained are applicable in a contingent 
manner to this finite class of cases. The researcher’s findings, therefore, are not broadly 
generalizable—rather, they are mid-range generalizations contingent to this specific set of 
cases. If the researcher wants to put forth insights generalizable to a broader universe of 
events—for example, to all forms of alliances—the scholar should perhaps not employ the 
case study approach. And finally, some contend that case study approaches are subject to 
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selection bias—that is, choosing cases that demonstrate a predetermined outcome. To 
account for this, the researcher should clearly define case selection criteria and ensure 
variation across variables examined. 
On the other side, the case study approach has various benefits that make it 
appropriate for specific research projects.107 Principally, case studies enable the scholar to 
perform more in-depth analysis of politically complex phenomena. The inherent trade-off 
as described above, however, is the degree of generalization the researcher can render. 
Associated with this advantage, case studies are particularly optimal for identifying causal 
mechanisms between variables, an element that is necessary for explanation.108 Where 
quantitative studies point to correlations between variables across a broader set of cases, 
the detailed analysis inherent to case studies enables the researcher to delve deeper into 
and explain the mechanisms underlying target phenomena where “mechanism” is defined 
as “the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished.”109 
A further benefit of employing the case study approach is that it can help account for 
equifinality—that a single outcome could have resulted from multiple paths.110  
With these advantages and disadvantages noted, the dissertation employs a case 
study approach for two core reasons. First, because it is best suited for obtaining and 
analyzing information vital to achieving the objective of this research: to demonstrate the 
four core elements of internal threat alliances, provide a detailed explanation of the 
relationships inherent to each, and evidence that these elements are indeed generalizable to 
a broader yet contingent universe of cases. My research objective was to develop 
theoretical generalizations contingent to a finite set of alliances (internal threat alliances). 
This required a research approach and associated methodology suitable for identifying why 
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variables are linked and the processes by which one generates variation on the other. 
Producing contingent, mid-range generalizations relies on the researcher’s ability to 
identify these links and demonstrate the mechanisms underlying associated processes.  
Accordingly and second, the case study approach was selected because it inherently 
entails deep analysis of mechanisms and relationships—including across multiple levels of 
analysis—and therefore is calibrated to demonstrating the relationships and associated 
mechanisms inherent to the four examined elements of internal threat alliances. For 
example, I needed to examine and evidence why balancing and bandwagoning occur 
simultaneously with internal threat alliances. To explain this distinct manifestation of 
bandwagoning, I needed a research approach that enabled detailed analysis of mechanisms 
linking why a state’s internal fragmentation enables balancing/bandwagoning to occur at 
the same time. And to account for the distinct motivation spurring bandwagoning by regime 
actors, I required an approach that allowed me to display regime actors bandwagoning to 
advance their own (patron-client) interests—in addition to survive or “for profit”—and 
evidence this phenomenon at the national and subnational levels. Quantitative analysis 
would not have helped evidence the relationships inherent to this and the other core 
elements of internal threat alliances. As outlined in my conclusion, however, there are 
future areas of research on internal threat alliances where quantitative analysis could be 
useful.  
A. CASE STUDY APPROACH: CASE SELECTION AND “STRUCTURED, FOCUSED” 
COMPARISON METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
In order to demonstrate the four ways in which internal threat alliances are distinct 
from their external counterpart, I selected two cases or “classes of events” (George and 
Bennett 2005) that fit the “subclass” of alliance I seek to examine—“internal threat 
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alliances.” The empirical cases selected were the internal threat alliances between the U.S. 
and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). In each case, the 
great power/regime brought their security policies into close cooperation to balance a threat 
internal to the weaker regime’s borders yet with implications for the national security of 
(and thus common to) both states. In each case, the threat was associated with political 
violence and internal conflict within the weaker state.  
In addition to complying with the parameters of my definition for internal threat 
alliances, the cases were selected due to variation in duration and outcomes. Regarding 
duration, the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance was shorter in duration than the U.S.-Colombia 
alliance. And the cases had divergent outcomes (degrees of “effectiveness”)—by most 
accounts, the U.S.-Colombia alliance was more effective than the U.S.-Afghanistan 
alliance. In the former, the allies were by 2010 able to lessen the threat level whereas in 
the latter the Karzai regime remained under siege as Barack Obama’s first presidential term 
came to an end.  
As outlined in chapter one, the dissertation’s research objective was to explain a 
finite set of differences between “external threat alliances” and “internal threat alliances” 
and in so doing provide a framework of mid-range, contingent generalizations for 
understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. In order to achieve 
this research objective, the dissertation employed a version of George and Bennet’s case 
study research method of “structured, focused comparison.”111 This approach involved 
three principal steps. First, insights on the four core distinct aspects of internal threat 
alliances were developed. This involved constructing arguments regarding relationships 
between independent and depending variables for each core element. For example, 
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regarding why such alliances form, that alignment (dependent variable) is driven by a need 
to secure interests tied to the regime (independent variable for the great power) and need 
to preserve political survival (independent variable for the regime). These four elements 
comprised the framework which was then applied to and tested through each of the two 
cases.  
Second, the individual cases were constructed using the methods of process-tracing 
and semi-structured interviews (addressed below). Development of the cases was 
“focused” in two ways—first, as delimited by the specified period of time; and second, in 
that analysis centered on evidencing the four elements and not all aspects of the alliance 
writ-large. Accordingly, each case begins with an historical overview of the alliance period 
the purpose of which is to give the reader background on major events therein. Thereafter, 
the cases are structured by the four aforementioned elements. The third and final step was 
to compare across cases in a structured, focused manner. This step was critical for 
confirming that identified mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations were not only 
inherent to each alliance studied but, rather, generalizable to cases beyond those examined. 
During this step, focus was given to similarities and variation across the cases for each of 
the four elements examined. This step involved asking questions such as: Were the same 
mechanisms observed in both cases? Did relationships vary? If so, how? In order to 
construct the cases and perform the necessary focused, structured comparison two 






B. METHODS: PROCESS TRACING AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Process tracing is defined as a method that “attempts to identify the intervening 
causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable 
(or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”112 In employing this method the 
researcher “examines archival documents, interview transcripts, and other primary as well 
as secondary sources to determine whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables 
in that case.”113 This method is appropriate for analysis of case studies with the goal of 
extrapolating mid-level, contingent theoretical generalizations because it enables the 
researcher to identify and document causal mechanisms. Process tracing was vital to this 
dissertation in order to demonstrate, for example, factors motivating initial alignment as 
well as bandwagoning by regime actors.  
Primary and secondary sources were examined in order to construct and perform 
the structured, focused analysis of the two cases. To construct the cases, secondary sources 
included but were not limited to news reports from national and international news agencies 
and organizations, reports and analyses released by national and international think-tanks, 
and relevant works in history and political science. Where available, memoirs by officials 
working for the great power or weaker state during the period examined were also carefully 
scrutinized. Such secondary sources were used to construct a narrative of the case and 
illustrate relationships between presented variables. Primary sources were used to delve 
deeper into posited relationships and, in line with the literature on qualitative analysis, 
evidence posited causal mechanisms. Examples of primary sources examined for the 
dissertation included but were not limited to: speeches by great power and regime policy 
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makers, data released by government agencies (for example, figures released by the 
Colombian Ministry of Defense on military spending), and documents outlining alliance 
strategy or the outcome of alliance tactics or activities (for example, the U.S. government’s 
strategic plan for Afghanistan). Descriptive statistics were also used, from secondary and 
primary sources. The purpose of these statistics was generally to demonstrate increases and 
decreases in threat level as well as increases or decreases in resources pooled together by 
the alliances.  
Complementing the methods outlined above, I conducted “semi-structured” 
interviews with individuals who had knowledge of or participated in the aforementioned 
alliances.114 These interviews represented a core aspect of this dissertation’s data-gathering 
approach and included performing fieldwork and interviews in Colombia and Afghanistan. 
These interviews contributed to constructing case narratives but their primary purpose was 
to evidence posited causal relationships inherent to the examined internal threat alliance 
dynamics. Semi-structured interviews involve the researcher asking questions to 
interviewees identified to have information or insights relevant to the research topic. Where 
“structured” interviews involve asking the interviewee a predetermined set of questions 
and not deviating from this script, semi-structured interviewees are discussions framed 
around a set of themes relevant to the research topic. The interviewer asks questions 
relevant to these themes and aims to gather specific information; however, deviating from 
structured interviews, the questions are broader so as to allow the interviewee the 
opportunity to expand on particular topics. Additionally, the semi-structured format 




As a primary source of information, information gleaned from interviews was used 
in two ways: (1) to help identify posited relationships as well as demonstrate the causal 
mechanisms linking examined variables; (2) and to “triangulate” information gained 
through other means–that is, to either validate or repudiate relationships and mechanisms 
identified through process tracing analysis of primary and secondary sources. 
The interview methodology and approach was approved by the Johns Hopkins 
University Institutional Review Board (HIRB) on December 20, 2011.115 A standard set of 
interview questions was used for all interviews. Prior to initiating the interview, 
interviewees received a standard summary of the scope and purpose of the project and a 
confidentiality statement informing the interviewee they may stop the interview at any 
time. The semi-structured format framed discussion surrounding particular topics so as to 
enable gathering of key pieces of information, yet also allowed the interviewee to expand 
on particular topics based on their experience and knowledge. In accordance with 
confidentiality protocols and to ensure anonymity of the interviewees, names of 
interviewees are not listed in the text. The interviewee’s agency or employer affiliation is 
listed only if they agreed to its inclusion in the text. However, the interviewee’s title or 
position in this organization is not provided. As an additional precaution to ensure privacy 
of interviewees, all interviewees were assigned a code for information-gathering purposes. 
When taking notes during interviews, the interviewee-specific code was listed in these 
notes. A list of names and codes was developed and then stored on an encrypted hard-drive 
(password necessary). All interview notes were only stored on an encrypted hard-drive, to 
ensure only the researcher has access to this information. In some cases, the interviewee 
 
99 
indicated that their name may be listed in the dissertation text. For such cases, their name 
and affiliation are listed accordingly.  
In total, I conducted more than 75 interviews. The majority of these were performed 
in person, but others were done over the phone, Skype, or email due to individuals’ 
locations and varied availability. As previously mentioned, individuals interviewed 
included those who participated in or had knowledge of the respective alliances. In 
targeting potential interviewees I aimed to speak with members of both governments 
working at each of the examined levels. This included members of the Foreign Policy 
Executive and Critical Bureaucratic Agencies for the great power and peripheral regime 
alike.  
For both cases, I interviewed members of the U.S. Military (Army, Marines and 
Department of Defense) as well as representatives of the U.S. Department of State and 
USAID. For the Colombia case, I conducted interviews in Washington, DC and, through 
two weeks of fieldwork, in Colombia (in Bogota, Cartagena, and various other towns). In 
order to cover travel costs to Colombia I applied for and received a small grant from the J. 
Brien Key Fund, which allocates monies to graduate students completing theses or 
dissertations.116 While in Colombia—or before or after and via telephone or Skype—I 
interviewed representatives of the following agencies based in that country: Colombian 
Ministry of Defense, National Police, and Military, U.S. Military, and USAID. For the 
Afghanistan case, I conducted interviews in Washington, DC and, through three weeks of 
fieldwork, in Afghanistan (in Kabul, Kandahar, and other towns). For the case of 
Afghanistan, representatives from the following agencies based in Afghanistan were 
interviewed over the phone or email: Afghanistan Ministry of Defense, National Police, 
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and Military, U.S. Military and USAID. Additionally, I interviewed representatives of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and staff of non-governmental 
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security policy is derived in the other ally, complicating coordination and decreasing cohesion. And second, 
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state’s interference into the domestic affairs of its alliance partners can generate resentment within the latter 
and therefore decrease cohesion. According to Fedder (1962), decision-making structures which are more 
decentralized and enable smaller partners to voice opinion not only in the approval of policies by also in their 
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distrust arising from personality differences between political leaders.” If partners forge alliances based on 
“incongruent objectives,” though, such personal differences will likely cause insurmountable strains. Second, 
the more alliance partners share “cultural, political, and social traditions” the more likely the partners will be 
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alliances will experience low cohesion because states formed the alliance “as a consequence of their 
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91 For example, Weitsman modifies the three elements of cohesion in peacetime alliances in the following 
way to account for cohesion of wartime alliances: the capacity of members states of the alliances to 
coordinate their war-fighting strategy; the ability of members states to agree on war aims; and the ability of 
the alliance to “prevent a separate peace” (preventing an ally from defecting to form an alliance with a third 
state). These factors will have “direct implications on the prosecution of a war.” Whereas level of threat most 
prominently informs level of peacetime alliance cohesion, the “balance of interests” of alliance partners—
their motivations for entering the alliance—seem to play a greater role in wartime alliance cohesion. 
92 Weitsman only examines alliances between stronger powers that are relatively developed and as a result 
cannot be critiqued (as with Snyder, who examines “unequal alliances”) for failing to examine the influence 
onto alliance dynamics of various actors of underdeveloped regimes. 
93 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) 5, For further analysis on and instruction regarding the case study 
approach see John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
94 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005).  
95 Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For,” (2004), 341.   
96 For an excellent overview of some of the fallacies generally associated with qualitative research, see: 
Gerardo L. Munck, “Symposium I: The Quantitative/Qualitative Distinction,” Newsletter of the American 
Political Science Association - Organized Section on Qualitative Methods (2005). 
97 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science 
Review 65, no. 3 (September 1971). 
98 Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), 62. 
99 King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (1994), 42. 
100 Gabriel Almond and Stephen Genco, “Clouds, Clocks and the Study of Politics” World Politics 29:4 
(1977), 493. 
101 Almond and Genco, “Clouds, Clocks and the Study of Politics” (1977).  
 
110 
                                                                                                                                                 
102 For this terminology as well as an excellent review of this so-called resurgence, see David Collier and 
Colin Elman, “Qualitative and Multimethod Research: Organizations, Publication, and Reflections on 
Integration, in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, eds. The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Methodology, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 779-795. 
103 For this position as well as excellent overviews of the benefits of case studies, see: Harry Eckstein “Case 
Study and Theory in Political Science” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Handbook of Political 
Science, Vol. 7 (1975); John Gerring, Case Study Research – Principles and Practices (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); and George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005). 
104 Charles Ragin, “Turning the Tables: How Case-Oriented Research Challenges Variable-oriented 
Research,” in Henry Brady and David, Collier eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared 
Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 2000), 121. For an excellent overview of these “strengths and 
weaknesses,” see John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good For,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 98, No. 2 (May 2004), 341-354. 
105 For an excellent overview of these “strengths and weaknesses,” see Gerring, “What is a Case Study and 
What is it Good For,” (2004). 
106 For some of the common critiques of case studies, and a rebuttal to each, see Bent Flyvbierg, “Five 
Misunderstandings About Case Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry, 2006, Vol. 12 no. 2 (2006) 219-245.  
107 Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-
Making,” in Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2, eds. Robert F. Coulam and 
Richard A. Smith (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 21-58.; Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, 
“Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods,” Annual Review of Political Science 
9, no. 1 (2006), 455-476. 
108 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005). 145. 
109 John Gerring, “Review Article: The Mechanismic Worldview – Thinking Inside the Box,” British Journal 
of Political Science 38, no. 1 (2007), 178. 
110 For an explanation of equifinality and its importance in qualitative research see Henry Brady and David, 
Collier eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 
2000). 
111 For a detailed overview of “structured, focused comparison,” see Alexander and George and Bennett, 
Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005), 67-73. 
112 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005), 6. On process-tracing see also: 
Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, trans. 
Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., (New York: Free Press, (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68.;  
113 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, (2005), 6-7. 
114 For an overview of semi-structured interviews see Tom Wengraf, Qualitative Research Interviewing: 
Semi-Structured, Biographical and Narrative Methods (New York: Sage Publications, 2001).  
115 The interview methodology and approach was approved by the Johns Hopkins University Institutional 
Review Board (HIRB). The HIRB approved the researcher’s application for an exemption on December 20, 
2011. Letter of approval for application for an exemption is included as an annex.  






U.S.-COLOMBIA INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 1980-2010 
 
This chapter will show how the U.S.-Colombia alliance was a clear example of an 
internal threat alliance that differed from traditional (external threat) alliances in the 
following four ways, beginning with the nature of the threat and why great powers/weak 
regimes form internal threat alliances. As the first core difference, it demonstrates that the 
U.S. and Colombia brought their security policies into close cooperation and aggregated 
capabilities in response to political violence fomented by two principal actors (leftist 
guerrillas and narco-traffickers)  in order to preserve the regime’s survival (physical and 
political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) capabilities to 
secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from belligerents and 
drug traffickers, while the great power got involved to safeguard interests linked to the 
regime’s stability including: curbing drug flows onto American streets, maintaining access 
to oil reserves, and preserving stability in its “backyard,” among others. By the late 1980s, 
and particularly with the Berlin Wall’s collapse, the core factor underlying U.S./Colombia 
alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests 
associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states 
bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat external in origin 
(another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; and where states are 
motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.  
Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat 
alliances, it demonstrates that Colombia’s internal order was fragmented. Building from 
this, it shows that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire 
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apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of 
its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traces Colombia’s political 
trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that 
spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the 
alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as 
opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the 
U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these 
actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of 
internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some 
fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a 
hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act 
to advance the national interest.  
Third, it demonstrates why the motivations for and manifestations of 
bandwagoning in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced 
in traditional alliances. Colombia shows that in internal threat alliances, it is simplistic to 
ask whether states balance or bandwagon. Instead, they do both at the same time. As will 
be seen, while some elements of the Colombian National Police fought against drug-
traffickers, others actively cooperated with them. While some mayors resisted guerrilla 
incursions, others aligned with the belligerents. Clearly, the either/or dichotomy of 
traditional alliances concerning whether to resist or appease threats did not apply to 
Colombia. The case also shows that clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s 
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character generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to 
fear for survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat 
alliances). Military officials, police officers, and central regime representatives 
bandwagoned due to fear (for survival) and because they thought the opposition may win 
(for profit); however, they also did so to consolidate or further patron-client relationships 
based mainly in financial exchange. 
In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as 
with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to 
alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found 
in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between cooperative central regimes 
and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s presidency) 
or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. during 
Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning central regime and worked with the 
National Police to secure U.S. interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple 
actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital 
communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
Fourth and finally, it shows that when determining what to do in response to the 
target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on 
their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-
Colombia alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and 
resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the 
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common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s 
decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but 
rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime.  
Cohesion was higher during the Andres Pastrana and Alvaro Uribe regimes partly 
because they viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to their political survival 
(compared to prior presidents, who oscillated between viewing full collaboration as a 
liability or benefit) and they were able to reign in bandwagoning regime actors. With regard 
to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, pooling resources sufficient 
to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance weakened the internal threat. 
In addition to the consistently high alliance cohesion [and an increase in available U.S. 
state power for the alliance] that enabled the allies to amass resources sufficient to weaken 
actors fomenting violence, effectiveness was higher during the Pastrana/Uribe regimes due 
to their consistent efforts to purge civilian and security agencies of actors bandwagoning 
with the narco-guerilla threat. 
Following a brief historical study, I will show in detail how the U.S.-Colombia 
alliance differed from traditional alliances in each of these four ways. 
I. U.S.-COLOMBIA INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE (1980-2010) 
 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
FROM THE “BRINK OF COLLAPSE” TO “TURNING THE TIDE” 
 
The U.S. and Colombia began to bring their security policies into close cooperation 
in the 1960s in response to threats each state perceived from a surge in Colombia’s internal 
violence. This political violence is rooted in a civil war (“La Violencia”)1 between 
supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties that, since its inception, has claimed 
between 50,000 and 200,000 lives and internally displaced three million.2 From and 
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through this conflict two main actors emerged that fomented political violence that 
imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1) leftist guerrilla groups that aimed to 
topple the Colombian regime, principally the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) and 
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, or ELN) and (2) narco-
trafficking “cartels” who employed violence that threatened regime survival and 
produced/transported narcotics that took American lives and provided funding to the 
guerrillas.3  
Initially, the U.S. sought to cooperate militarily with Colombia as part of Plan 
LASO (Latin American Security Operation) that aimed to eliminate the “leftist” guerilla 
movements in order to balance Soviet influence in the Hemisphere.4 As the Soviet Union 
waned, though, and guerrilla forces, drug-traffickers, and associated political violence they 
wrought began to swell, the threat to the great power and the regime (and thus composition 
and dynamics of the alliance) began to change.  
Facing a narcotics “epidemic” in the 1970s and with drug traffickers exploiting 
Colombia as a transshipment point for cocaine,5 the U.S. decided to balance this threat by 
attacking drugs “at their source.” The Andean nation became ground zero for the great 
power’s “war on drugs”6 and the regime (and therefore its survival) vital to balancing this 
threat. The U.S. and Colombia further aligned their security policies and agreed that the 
great power would provide capabilities to balance the threat from narcotics and those actors 
involved in or enabling the trade: “The combination of leftist guerrilla activity with the 
narcotics industry…added a major dimension to what was already viewed as a security 
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threat…officials treated the guerrilla movement as a threat to Colombia, the U.S., and the 
region.”7  
Through the administration of president Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), U.S. threat 
perception and associated decisions vis-à-vis Colombia were informed by the need to 
balance the Soviet Union’s influence in America’s “backyard” and curb the flow of drugs 
onto America’s streets. And in the administration of Colombian president Cesar Turbay 
(1978-1982), the U.S. found a like-minded ally whose hardline approach to the guerrillas 
made “him consistent with the views and policies of the Reagan administration.”8 Closely 
consulting the U.S., Turbay gave the Army “carte blanche to crack down on communist 
guerillas and other lawless elements”9 and signed into law a treaty allowing the extradition 
of narco-traffickers to the U.S. for prosecution.10 
As the Reagan administration gave way to the Presidency of George H.W. Bush 
(1989-1993), the alliance morphed in full from external to internal threat alliance. As the 
Berlin Wall fell, the basis for the alliance officially morphed. What began as an alliance 
based on the great power’s need for Colombia as a means to balance the Soviet Union and 
preserve territorial security (and rooted in Colombian regimes’ need for military 
capabilities to thwart groups attempting to topple the government and weakening its 
economy) changed to one motivated primarily by high levels of political violence (and its 
consequences) common to both allies. 
If the states were only motivated to form the alliance to combat an external enemy, 
security cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia should have stopped with the Soviet 
Union’s demise. But instead, it escalated: “Despite the end of the Cold War, U.S. military 
aid has not only continued but towards the end of the 1990s it radically increased and made 
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Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world.”11 Building from 
prior engagement the great power/regime continued to work together to devise strategies 
to weaken and defeat insurgent forces and narco-traffickers and, by the late 1980s, were 
engaged in an internal as opposed to external threat alliance. As Randall argues, “The 
combination of guerrilla activity with the narcotics industry…was viewed as a major 
national security threat,” leading the U.S. to “assist Colombia in containing armed 
insurrection.”12 The U.S. viewed political violence in Colombia as a threat to its ally 
regime’s survival and this threat perception drove the great power to form (and maintain) 
an alliance whose core motivation was to preserve the regime and thereby safeguard 
American interests associated with it. 
Despite work to quell violence and dismantle burgeoning drug-trafficking outfits, 
the Medellin and Cali drug cartels increased in influence and operational capability, 
drawing renewed concern from the U.S. that its ally may fall. Echoing the U.S. Ambassador 
to Colombia’s cable noting that increased violence was “threatening to topple the state,”13 
domestic U.S. policy-makers began calling for further U.S. action to stand-up its ally and 
curb this challenge to national security. Representative of such demands are remarks by 
U.S. congressman Charles Rangel, who said: “If Colombia falls, we could find ourselves 
an island of democracy in a sea of narco-political rule.”14  
This escalation in “narco-terrorist” violence during the Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) 
presidency pushed the great power/regime closer together and into an “abrazo de oro” 
[golden embrace], where “Bogotá needed Washington’s cooperation” and the U.S. needed 
the Barco regime’s cooperation to pursue what had become a “top national security 
priority” of curbing drug flows into the U.S.15 As part of this enhanced alignment, the U.S. 
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provided funding and training to better equip the Colombian military and police to 
offensively combat the FARC as well as dismantle the Medellin and Cali drug cartels.16 In 
accordance with the Bush administration’s regional strategy (the “Andean Initiative”) to 
quell narco-trafficking, the U.S. augmented assistance to Colombia, granting $65 million 
in emergency military aid to help enable Colombian security forces regain control territory 
held by the FARC and drug traffickers.17 Though official U.S. policy stated funds were 
only for use against narcotics trafficking, “a significant amount of U.S. assistance” was 
“employed to combat the guerrillas.”18 
Though political priorities and regime-specific interests hindered cooperation 
somewhat during the Barco and then Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) administrations, the allies 
were able to devise alliance strategy, tactics, and carry out associated activities because the 
regime needed to show progress against the guerrillas and narcos to ensure political 
survival and the U.S. needed a stable regime in place to curb drug flows.19 As a result, by 
the end of Gaviria’s term the “foundations of a good working relationship” had been 
established and associated enhanced cohesion yielded alliance victories, including the 
capture and killing of Medellin drug cartel boss Pablo Escobar.  
In spite of such advancements, however, insufficient military resources and 
bandwagoning by regime elements (notably the Police and components of the Judiciary) 
with insurgents and narco-traffickers hindered allies’ ability to lessen the internal threat. 
Consequently, as Gaviria stepped down the FARC had escalated attacks to levels not seen 
under prior presidents;20 and though they had killed the infamous Escobar, other drug-
running outfits filled his void.  
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Relations between the allies deteriorated with the election of Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998) due to suspicion among core U.S. policymakers that he bandwagoned with 
drug cartels, notions confirmed when evidence surfaced that Samper had accepted $6.1 
million from a cartel for use in his presidential campaign. This so-called “Processor 
8000”21 case/scandal22 sent alliance relations into a tailspin: “The country went through 
four years of relative international isolation, as an historic alliance…was interrupted by 
constant and public confrontations between Washington and Bogota.”23 Needing a central 
regime committed to balancing, the U.S. began publicly recriminating Samper in an 
attempt (according to some) to discredit the president domestically and internationally so 
that he would resign (or be impeached) and be replaced with a more reliable, balancing-
prone president.24  
Though Samper was eventually absolved of “direct” involvement, the U.S. deemed 
Colombia not sufficiently cooperative in anti-narcotics efforts and “decertified” it, 
rendering the regime (in 1996 and 1997) ineligible to receive U.S. capabilities in this area.25 
The nearly complete stoppage of resource flows associated with decertification and tense 
relations between the allies provided the guerrillas a window in which to expand their reach 
throughout the country: “By placing Colombia in the decertification doghouse and 
regularly bashing Samper, [U.S. President William] Clinton created a schism in Bogota 
that ruptured the credibility of the government and allowed the armed groups in the civil 
conflict to multiply their presence inside the borders of the nation…the bullying of Bogota 
aided the guerrillas.”26 As Samper stepped down, Colombia had reached a near “failed 




It was in this state of hyper violence that Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) campaigned 
for president and won on a “strong peace platform” and promise to end his peoples’ 
suffering from decades of conflict. As he took office in 1998, Colombia faced a surge in 
political violence arguably not witnessed since the early days of the nation’s civil war.28 
Unless it was “drastically restructured” and strengthened, the Army faced an “absolute 
defeat within five years” from “drug-financed Marxist guerrillas,” according to a leaked 
U.S. Intelligence report.29 And a U.S. military official who in 1997 assessed the “strength 
of the Colombian state” echoed this by telling me that Colombia “was on the brink of 
failure” and needed “increased assistance from the U.S. to prevent its full collapse.”30  
Informed by its view on why prior presidents failed to weaken the “narco-terrorist” 
threat, Pastrana’s regime assumed a different approach (and policy agenda) to do so, fulfill 
his mandate, and secure its political interests: negotiate from a position of power and, if 
that fails, have the military means to wipe out the belligerents.31 Further diverging from 
prior regimes, Pastrana openly recognized the link between the insurgents and narco-
traffickers and that to defeat the former his regime needed to curb cocaine-linked financing. 
As he said, “To achieve peace in Colombia…we needed to strengthen all the programs 
related to the fight against narcotics, because they were the main financial sources of the 
illegal armed groups.” Accordingly, the regime began developing a strategy to balance the 
“narco-insurgent” threat (later developed into “Plan Colombia”); however, to implement 
it and secure his associated political mandate Pastrana needed resources to grow the 
Colombian security forces. And in the administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton (1993-
2001) he found a great power ready to assist, secure its interests tied to the regime, and 
sharing Pastrana’s view on the conflict: “Growing U.S. recognition of the insurgent threat 
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turned Colombia into a top national security priority” and (through 1998/9) “support 
among U.S. policy makers for a more direct role in the Colombia counterinsurgency effort 
grew considerably.”32 
As Clinton said in a press conference with Pastrana: “The narcotics trade and the 
civil conflict have fed off each other as rebels” do business “with violent drug traffickers” 
making the “fight” against them “our joint responsibility.”33 Noting why U.S. assistance 
was justified to balance this threat, Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, said that “well-armed narco-terrorists” posed such a threat that “without U.S. 
help” Colombia could “lose this war.34 Early in Pastrana’s term a common refrain among 
core U.S. policy-makers was: “This is our war as much as Colombia’s.”35 And Pastrana 
clearly shared the U.S. assessment, stating that “narco-terrorism” was the main threat to 
Colombia and a “common enemy” he and U.S. had to “unite our efforts to fight.”36  
In 1998, with peace negotiations ongoing but appearing likely to break down the 
U.S. and Colombia formed a bi-lateral working group “to facilitate increased U.S. training, 
sharing of aerial and satellite intelligence data,” and to generate strategies for “the 
modernization of the Colombian military.”37 Building from task force recommendations38 
the U.S. provided $289 million in military capabilities for Colombia’s use against the 
“Unholy Alliance” of guerrillas and narco-traffickers.39 After this military aid proved 
inadequate to stifle political violence, the U.S. and Pastrana agreed that further military 
resources were required and began discussing elements of a strategy that would eventually 
become Plan Colombia. Following high-level meetings between alliance delegations,40 
and after U.S. officials publicly called for a new strategy (and escalation in military aid) to 
balance the narco-terrorist threat, Pastrana released the broad contours of his regime’s 
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“Marshal Plan for Colombia”: a $7.5 billion initiative to lessen violence by increasing 
military capacity to defeat drug traffickers/guerrillas and addressing sources of violence 
through economic development.41  
Informed by prior discussions with Pastrana and his plan, in 2000 Clinton 
announced a proposed $1.6 billion aid package for Colombia, asserting to Congress that 
the majority of resources therein would enhance regime military capacity through training 
and new equipment (mainly helicopters) for two new specialized army battalions. After 
being decreased, the $1.3 billion Plan Colombia aid package was approved for alliance use 
to balance guerrillas and narco-traffickers.42 By the end of Pastrana’s term, cohesion was 
high and the allies had weakened the belligerents, but not to the point they no longer 
threatened regime survival and U.S. interests. Nonetheless, U.S.-Pastrana relations “laid 
the foundation” for “an even closer, more effective alliance” between the successor to 
Pastrana (Alvaro Uribe) and U.S. President George W. Bush (2001-2009).43  
When Uribe (2002-2010) took office, Colombia remained under a consistent and 
formidable threat from opposition forces. Though Pastrana and the U.S. has developed and 
began pooling military resources according to the Plan Colombia strategy, insurgent 
attacks reached all-time highs in 200244 and regime security forces were still not up to the 
task of weakening the narco-insurgents. This rising threat affected alliance dynamics by 
making finding a solution to dampening political violence more urgent and pushing them 
closer together to do so. However, cohesion also increased because Uribe strongly desired 
a second term, needed to bolster domestic support to pass the required constitutional 
amendment to allow presidential re-election, and therefore urgently needed to strengthen 
his military so as to show immediate results vis-à-vis the insurgency. This pushed Uribe 
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closer to the U.S. and to strategically agree (as Pastrana had already begun to do) to cast 
the narco-belligerents as narco-terrorists to ensure the U.S. would augment its flow of 
military aid. And in the Bush administration he found a great power ready to assist and 
secure its interests tied to the regime. As Bush said, “we stand with the Colombian people 
in their fight against narco-terrorists who threaten their democratic way of life.”45  
Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. viewed “ungoverned spaces” in general and 
those proximate to the American homeland particularly as a national security threat 
because terrorists could exploit them (as in Afghanistan) to launch attacks onto U.S. 
interests. As reflected by Ann Patterson, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia: “Plan Colombia 
continues to be the most effective anti-terrorist strategy we could ever have designed,” as 
the 9/11 attacks turned U.S. “attention to linkages with international violence; that includes 
terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime.”46 Linked to this, the 
U.S. classified the FARC as a national security threat and “the most dangerous international 
terrorist group based in this hemisphere.”47 Per the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, 
insurgents threatening regime survival were terrorists, drug-trafficking their key source of 
financing, and the U.S. needed to shore up its ally to defeat both.48 
Recognizing the increase in threat from instability in Colombia, and within the post-
9/11 context, U.S. domestic policy-makers augmented the “state power” available to the 
alliance by authorizing all capabilities to be applied as a “unified campaign” against 
“narco-trafficking and against activities by organizations designated as terrorist 
organizations.”49 This “expanded authority” enabled Bush/Uribe to openly use capabilities 
against the guerrillas (“narco-terrorists”). 50 To be sure, the allies had since the 1980s used 
alliance resources against both actors; however, the change enabled the U.S. “to be more 
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transparent with regard to the enemies it defined” and “present a more overt strategy for 
dealing with them.”51  
As part of the ongoing Plan Colombia, the U.S. and Uribe devised a strategy and 
associated tactics to weaken the “narco-terrorist” FARC that eventually took the form of 
Uribe’s new national security strategy, the Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
(DSDP). The core of the DSDP strategy, which drew criticism from domestic and foreign 
human rights groups,52 was to crush the guerrillas and “consolidate” regime control 
(provide security) throughout Colombia’s territory.53 As part of the DSDP, Colombia 
launched an extensive military offensive (Plan Patriota), developed with the U.S. and 
supported by 800 American advisors, to dislodge the FARC from urban areas and 
subnational strongholds.54 U.S. SOUTHCOM assisted the Defense Ministry in 
“operational and logistical support” and “security planning” and trained Colombian 
military units.55 Further, the U.S. trained approximately 2,000 Colombian troops in skills 
specific to weakening the narco-terrorist threat and56 ally agencies devised (and Uribe 
implemented) a restructuring of Colombia’s Army.57  
To make regime agencies more effective, the November 2002 U.S. Presidential 
Directive 18 expanded intelligence sharing with the regime from “drug-related targets” 
(under Clinton) to all U.S.-gathered intelligence including “tactical information such as 
insurgent groups’ movements and locations.”58 Needing to generate immediate results to 
advance his re-election prospects, Uribe immediately leveraged this “flood” of intelligence 
and new military hardware to conduct “an unprecedented effort to identify and kill those 
individuals orchestrating the violence for the narco-terrorists.”59 Additionally, Uribe 
increased extraditions.60 The allies devised and began implementing Plan Colombia’s non-
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military component, the National Consolidation Plan (NCP), which aimed to decrease 
threats to the regime by distributing social/economic assistance in cleared areas to prevent 
a recurrence of violence there.61 In 2005 Plan Colombia’s mandate ended, but the threat 
remained; accordingly, the U.S. funded a three-year extension [Plan Colombia 
Consolidation Plan (PCCP)] to enable the regime to continue balancing the “narco-
terrorists.”  
As Uribe prepared to step down (having won a second term) alliance effectiveness 
was high. Though minor disagreements occurred62 the allies had weakened the narco-
terrorist threat and accomplished “goals thought impossible in 1998.”63 The guerrillas and 
narco-traffickers no longer posed a threat to regime survival, Uribe had secured the 
amendment to allow and won a 2006 presidential election, and the U.S. had stabilized its 
Andean ally, removed terrorist safe havens, and secured increasingly significant oil 
stores.64 
There is a clear divergence in alliance effectiveness pre- and post-Samper 
presidency and Plan Colombia when the state went from the “brink of collapse” to being 
touted as a model to other polities facing similar internal threats.65 In sum, the allies were 
more able to lessen the internal threat from 1998 onward for two reasons. First, an increase 
in resources aggregated via the alliance augmented the ability of the regime’s security 
forces to combat the “narco-terrorist” threat. And second, Pastrana and Uribe took more 
concerted action to curb bandwagoning by actors within their regime. For descriptions of 
the variation in level of threat and how capabilities enabled the allies to weaken the 




II. CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT 
ALLIANCES 
 
Having provided an overview of the alliance period, this core section draws specific 
examples from the case to demonstrate the ways in which internal threat alliances differ 
from external threat alliances in the following four areas: (1) the nature of the threat that 
spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align, (2) the 
characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” 
and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. Collectively, these represent 
the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and 
explaining the more common type of alliance today. The core section is divided into four 
sub-sections–one each for these four elements.  
1. FIRST CORE DIFFERENCE - NATURE OF THREAT / WHY STATES ALIGN:  
INTERNAL THREAT / TO ENSURE REGIME SURVIVAL AND GREAT POWER INTERESTS 
“In Washington’s eyes, the Colombian government was fighting for its 
survival.”66 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the nature of the threat and 
core factor motivating the formation of internal threat alliances is distinct from that in 
traditional alliances. In traditional (external threat alliances), states form alliances in 
response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the 
state as a whole. Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to align 
is their need to preserve security and the national interest, defined in terms of power and 
territorial survival. 
In contrast, internal threat alliances stem from some threat domestic in origin to a 
regime that an outside country cares about. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is 
distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align 
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in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns because it needs (military and 
economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its 
existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s 
stability. 
To evidence this core difference, the section shows that the threat spurring the U.S.-
Colombia consisted of a high level of political violence including but not limited to internal 
war: both the threat to regime survival (physical and political) posed by non-state actors 
including insurgents mounting campaigns and the consequences such conflict poses for 
other actors (namely great powers) in the international system. And to demonstrate the 
distinct motivation underlying internal threat alliances, the section demonstrates that the 
core factor underlying U.S./Colombia alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s 
survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. It demonstrates that particularly 
by 1991 the U.S. and Colombia had shifted from an alliance motivated principally by the 
need to balance an external threat, represented by the further spread of Communism via 
formation of another Soviet satellite state, to one based on a common threat from within 










Table 2. U.S.-Colombia Alliance Formation: from External to Internal Threat Alliance  
 Motivation for Formation 
United States 







(Threat): Soviet Union disrupting 
Balance of Power  
 
(Motivation): Ensure regime 
survival to balance Soviet influence 
 




capabilities to ensure 







(Threat): Political violence from 
guerrillas and narco-trafficking;  
Soviet Union disrupting Balance of 
Power. 
 
(Motivation): Ensure regime 
survival to ensure regional stability, 
stem flow of drugs, and maintain 
access to oil.  






capabilities to ensure 






(Threat): Political violence from 
guerrillas and narco-trafficking;  
 
(Motivation): Ensure regime 
survival to ensure regional stability, 
stem flow of drugs, and maintain 
access to oil.  




capabilities to ensure 





A. PROFILE OF THE INTERNAL THREAT: INSURGENTS & NARCO-TRAFFICKERS 
IMPERILING REGIME SURVIVAL AND U.S. INTERESTS  
The threat that spurred the U.S. and Colombia to bring their security policies into 
close cooperation consisted of political violence from insurgents and narco-traffickers that 
imperiled regime survival (physical and political) and the consequences such instability 
and regime failure posed to U.S. interests.  
This political violence is rooted in a civil war (“La Violencia”)67 between 
supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties.68 Referred to as the “unholy trinity” of 
“generators of violence,” three actors emerged from and through this conflict that fomented 
political violence that imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1) the leftist 
guerrilla groups FARC and ELN that aimed to topple the Colombian regime; (2) narco-
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trafficking “cartels” who employed violence that threatened regime survival and 
produced/transported narcotics that took American lives and provided funding to the 
guerrillas; and (3) paramilitary organizations that citizens formed for protection against the 
guerrillas.69 Though the paramilitaries have their roots in and contributed to Colombia’s 
internal violence, sufficient evidence exists to suggest that the allies largely did not view 
these actors as a core threat to regime survival. On the contrary, Colombia’s military in 
many cases colluded with them to combat the guerrillas.70 The paramilitaries’ human rights 
abuses notwithstanding, then, the threat is viewed as principally comprised of guerrilla 
organizations and narco-traffickers.71  
i. Evolution of the “Narco-Guerrilla” Threat  
To protect against Conservative party supporters and their paramilitary “death 
squads,” members of the Liberal and Communist Parties established guerilla units in the 
country-side.72 Though most guerilla groups were demobilized before or killed/captured in 
a 1964 military offensive, others established five “Independent Republics” in southern 
subnational regions and continued to contest the regime’s authority and monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence.73 The ELN was established in 1963 and concentrated in the 
northeast, while the more formidable FARC was established in 1964 and centered in the 
Southern and Eastern regions.74 Broadly speaking, their goals remained relatively constant: 
to topple the Colombian regime in order to represent the interests of the rural poor. 75  
In tandem with, partly enabled by, and contributing to political violence in 
Colombia was the emergence of the drug-trade. A confluence of factors yet mainly demand 
from U.S. consumers contributed to a boom in cocaine production in Colombia in the 
1970s76 and the emergence of three principal cartels through the late 1990s:77 Medellin, 
Cali, and Norte del Valle.78 This expansion of Colombia’s cocaine “industry” posed threats 
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to the regime and associated U.S. interests in three ways that contributed to the formation 
and maintenance of the internal threat alliance.  
First, the flow of cocaine onto American streets took American lives and tax payer 
dollars to crack down on dealing and associated crime and healthcare costs. Second, the 
cartels in general and Medellin outfit particularly targeted and killed representatives of the 
Colombian regime (national and subnational) and to varying degrees over time imperiled 
its control over the country. The “narco-terrorist”79 Escobar and his associates intimidated, 
kidnapped, tortured, or assassinated rivals and uncooperative government officials who 
posed obstacles to their enterprise. As an official in the Colombian Ministry of Defense in 
the 1980s told me in an interview: “The narco-traffickers shook the country to its core and 
threatened the government’s very survival.”80 Further contributing to political violence, 
cartels exploited a political system rooted in patron-client relations and used bribes to 
ensure regime officials would turn a blind eye to (or actively assist) cartel operations. That 
is, these officials bandwagoned while others in the regime were balancing.  
Third and finally, narco-trafficking endangered regime survival by providing an 
additional source of financing to the guerrillas. As U.S. “Drug Czar” Barry McCaffrey said 
in the mid-1990s: “It is undeniable that the FARC and ELN are funded with millions of 
dollars in drug money.”81 Following the influx of drug production into Southern Colombia, 
the FARC generated revenue from cocaine by “taxing” coca farmers and traffickers 
operating in guerrilla-held territory, leading then U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Lewis 
Tambs to dub them “narco-guerrillas.”82 In the late 1980s, the relationship between the 
FARC and narco-traffickers became more symbiotic: “The drug traffickers struck a deal 
with the guerrillas: lay off the business, and we’ll pay the taxes. The rebels charged for 
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everything.”83 For U.S. and Colombian policy-makers, by the early 1990s the FARC 
essentially was a “drug cartel” using associated revenues to grow its military capacity.84  
In sum, brazen attacks, assassination attempts, and other forms of violence and 
illicit activity carried out by guerillas and narco-traffickers endangered the regime’s 
physical and political survival. Lacking the military/economic capabilities necessary to 
maintain their hold on power, Colombian regimes aligned and worked with the U.S. to 
obtain resources necessary to do so.  
B. WHY THE U.S. AND COLOMBIA ALIGNED: TO SAFEGUARD THE REGIME AND U.S. 
INTERESTS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH 
Responding to the threat profile outlined above, the U.S. and Colombia brought 
their security policies into close cooperation to balance against the threats each state 
perceived from a surge in Colombia’s internal violence. And as demonstrated through the 
discussion below, why the great power/regime aligned was clear and in line with the core 
motivations for formation of internal threat alliances. For Colombia, guerillas and 
traffickers indirectly and directly generated violence that threatened the regime’s survival 
and hold on political power. Without sufficient capabilities to balance the threat and stay 
in power, the Colombian regime sought U.S. assistance.  
For the U.S., these groups threatened their ally’s survival as well as sowed 
instability that enabled narco-trafficking to operate. Colombia has consistently been one of 
the top sources of narcotics consumed in the U.S. and in the 1990s was responsible for 90 
percent of cocaine on American streets. The flow of narcotics produced in or trafficked 
through Colombia had real costs for the U.S. in money and lives: from 1989 to 1999, 
100,000 Americans (14,000 annually) suffered cocaine-related deaths; 70 percent 
attributed to cocaine from Colombia.85 In addition to it being a core source of cocaine, 
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Colombia is strategically important to the U.S. for various reasons that could be imperiled 
due to high levels of political violence and instability endangering the regime there.  
In addition to the size of its population, location, and proximity to the Panama 
Canal, which make Colombia of geostrategic importance, it is consistently in the top ten 
suppliers of oil to the U.S.86 The Andean nation is also a prime trading partner with the 
U.S. and major destination for U.S. investment, with annual bi-lateral commerce averaging 
$11 billion through 2009.87 U.S. ability to extract oil, and investors’ confidence and ability 
to reap financial rewards, depend on political stability there. Further, political violence in 
Colombia threatens U.S. expatriates and can push individuals to seek refuge and economic 
opportunities elsewhere. The needs these individuals require upon arrival can strain the 
resources of the destination state; by 1999 Colombians were the second largest group of 
illegal aliens in the U.S. after those from Mexico.88  
Due to these strategic considerations, the U.S. had an interest in aligning with the 
peripheral regime to weaken the insurgents and narco-traffickers and ensure regime 
survival. While balancing the Soviet Union remained a concern through the 1980s, curbing 
the flow of drugs onto America’s streets began to increase in priority. Doing so was not 
possible without safeguarding its ally regime and weakening the traffickers and “narco-
guerrillas.”89  
i. External and Internal Threats (1981-1989): Reagan [U.S.] and Turbay, Betancur 
[Colombia] 
Through the Reagan administration U.S. threat perception and associated decisions 
vis-à-vis Colombia were informed by the need to balance the Soviet Union’s influence in 
America’s “backyard” and curb the flow of drugs onto America’s streets. Threats from 
Marxism’s potential expansion and the drug-trade in the Western hemisphere were 
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perceived as intimately linked: Communist ally governments in Latin America were 
viewed to collaborate with guerrillas in South America to facilitate the drug trade, 
financing from which they used to “support insurgencies and subversion.”90 In Colombia, 
Reagan saw a regime that might fall to the increasingly strong FARC and ELN and become 
“another Nicaragua or Cuba.”91 Facing skyrocketing consumption of drugs at home, 
though, Reagan also needed to stem the flow of narcotics onto U.S. soil and in 1982 
declared his “war on drugs.”92 The Reagan administration saw Colombia as a core producer 
of and transshipment point for narcotics and at the same time viewed the drug-trade as an 
increasingly important source of financing for the insurgents that threatened to topple the 
“friendly” Colombian ally. The narco-traffickers and guerrillas were perceived to be 
collaborating (and in some cases one in the same) and if left unchecked with the potential 
to topple the fragile regime.93 Safeguarding U.S. national security and interests, therefore, 
meant curbing the flow of drugs and those actors generating violence threatening regime 
survival. This perceived threat to the U.S. is reflected in Reagan’s April 6, 1986 National 
Security Decision Directive 221 (NSDD-221), which classified narcotics trafficking and 
violence as imperiling the regime’s survival as a threat to U.S. national security:  
The national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside U.S. 
borders…Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry, where 
a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural insurgents, and 
urban terrorists can undermine the stability of the local government…The narcotics trade 
threatens the integrity of democratic governments by corrupting political and judicial 
institutions. The effect on U.S. interests from such a situation can range from a regime 
unwilling or unable to cooperate with counter-narcotics programs to a government that is 
unable to control key areas of its territory and elements of its own judiciary, military, or 
economy…The international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States 
by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is therefore the policy of the United 
States…to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent 
and terrorist groups to use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the 
ability of individual governments to confront and defeat this threat.94 
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During the same period, the administration of Colombian president Turbay was 
confronted with burgeoning violence from guerrillas and narco-traffickers. In addition to 
violence, the narco-trafficking industry was bringing “distortions into the Colombian 
economy and increasing the drug problem among Colombians.”95 To quell violence and 
address these issues (among others) necessary to remain in power, Turbay would continue 
to work with the U.S. as well as “establish a drug control agreement” involving “additional 
security measures” in subnational areas.96 That Bogota and Washington were in agreement 
on the threats they faced, and therefore needed to remain aligned, is further echoed by 
Randall: “Turbay’s perception of the insurgency…made him consistent with the views and 
policies of the Reagan administration.”97  
When Belisario Betancur assumed the presidency, his regime shifted Colombia’s 
priorities and associated view on the alliance. That said, and still needing capabilities to 
balance the internal threat, he continued to collaborate with the U.S. “Despite Betancur’s 
goal of non-alignment in foreign policy,” Kline (1995) demonstrates, “extradition of 
Colombian drug dealers to the United State continued.”98 Late in Reagan’s term Colombia 
had further realized that narcotics trafficking, alone and through financing the guerrillas, 
“affect[ed] both internal stability and the democratic prospective of the country.”99 
Willingness of specific regimes to work closely with the U.S. to balance these threats 
varied, but all continued to do so because the capabilities provided by U.S. were vital to 
fulfilling political mandates and preserving their hold on power. The U.S. and Colombian 
government agreed on the “narco-guerilla link” and to bring security policies into close 




ii. The Shift to Internal Threat Alliance (1989-1993): Bush [U.S.] and Barco 
[Colombia]  
The period when U.S. president H.W. Bush and Colombian president Barco were 
in office includes the juncture at which the alliance morphed in full from external to internal 
threat alliance. Like Reagan, the H.W. Bush administration began its term perceiving 
analogous threats from Colombia: its role in deterring Soviet influence in the region and 
the threat to U.S. national security posed by narco-trafficking, belligerent forces, and 
political violence that endangered Colombia’s stability. Such continuities from Reagan to 
Bush notwithstanding, the latter administration arguably represents a change in the primary 
threat the U.S. perceived from Colombia and therefore basis for alignment. As of 1982 and 
summarized in NSDD 71, Reagan’s “highest priority” vis-à-vis Colombia was external and 
described as “the reduction—and eventual elimination—of the influence and presence of 
the Soviet Union on its client states in our immediate environs.”101 Similarly, through 1991 
the Soviet Union remained a threat to U.S. national security under Bush; however, not in 
the context of “containing” Soviet influence in the region—an objective associated with 
territorial survival declared “complete” in a 1989 National Security Decision Directive.102 
By 1989, then, the principal threat from Colombia to U.S. national security had evolved: 
from Colombia’s importance to balancing an external enemy to perceiving political 
violence, instability, and narco-trafficking as the principal threat to the U.S. That instability 
in Colombia generated by guerrillas/narco-traffickers was the core threat to U.S. national 
security is evidenced by the August 1989 NSDD 18,103 which made clear that these sources 
of political violence were a threat because they destabilized and endangered ally regimes 




One of the principal foreign policy objectives of this Administration is to reduce, and if 
possible, eliminate, the flow of illegal narcotics to the United States. The impact of illegal 
narcotics use on our society has been and continues to be devastating…the violence and 
corruption of the drug traffickers and their alliance with insurgent groups has had a 
destabilizing effect on friendly governments. It is thus imperative…that this problem be 
dealt with aggressively…Colombia…will be the primary focus of our effort ... [to assist 
them to] regain control of their country from an insidious combination of insurgents and 
drug traffickers.104 
Despite another change in regime, Colombia under Barco continued to require 
capabilities to balance internal threats. The regime initially pursued an “ideologically 
neutral” foreign policy in order to focus on its top priority relevant to retaining political 
office: growing the (faltering) Colombian economy.105 As part of this stance, Barco at first 
distanced himself from the U.S. for political purposes and refused American requests to 
extradite Colombian nationals to the U.S. This reticence soon gave way to more close 
collaboration, however, after the Medellin cartel assassinated (anti-cartel) presidential 
candidate Luis Galan.106 A more hardline stance was required to respond to calls from 
politically-influential actors. Consequently, and recognizing the “key U.S. support being 
provided to the police to defeat the traffickers,” Barco agreed to a strategy in line with U.S. 
recommendations and ordered an “all-out offensive” against the narco-traffickers: “The 
death of Galan prompted the Barco government to declare (with support of the Bush 
Administration) a “War on Drugs.”107 Following consultations with the U.S., Barco 
reinstated extradition by executive order.108  
As the Berlin Wall fell, then, the basis for the U.S.-Colombia alliance officially 
morphed. What began as an alliance based on the great power’s need for Colombia as a 
means to balance the Soviet Union and preserve territorial security (and rooted in 
Colombian regimes’ need for military capabilities to thwart groups attempting to topple 
the government and weakening its economy) changed to one motivated primarily by high 
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levels of political violence (and its consequences) common to both countries. As of 1991, 
then, the U.S. and Colombia were engaged in an internal threat alliance.  
In this section I demonstrated that the U.S. and Colombia aligned in response to 
threats domestic in origin and to the regime—high levels of political violence—and that 
the core factor underlying this alignment was the need to ensure regime survival and the 
great power’s interests associated with it. This is distinct from traditional alliances, where 
states align to balance external threats from other states and do so to preserve territorial 
security and the national interest. The following section examines the characteristics of 
allies who form internal threat alliances.   
2. SECOND CORE DIFFERENCE - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAKER ALLY: 
MAJOR INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING INTERESTS 
“The Colombian state is not the sum of its parts but, instead, the interplay of these actors 
and their competing interests…which would go on to sometimes hamper, and other times 
help, efforts to bring peace and stability to the country.”109 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the characteristics of the allies 
involved in internal threat alliances are distinct from states that form traditional military 
alliances. External threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal 
fragmentation; however, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for 
internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will 
generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one 
stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral 
state with major internal fragmentation. Given that the U.S. is a great power, its internal 
cohesiveness can be assumed. Focusing on the weaker ally’s characteristics, then, this sub-
section demonstrates that its major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct 
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from great powers in traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities 
and associated actions in the internal threat alliance.  
First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or 
components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the 
weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the 
specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core 
they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In 
making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational 
level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or 
that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
In sum, the section demonstrates that the U.S. was dealing not with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with 
essentially cohesive states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a fragmented central 
regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components therein, and other 
subnational actors, each with their respective interests.  
A. THE COLOMBIAN ALLY: FRAGMENTED REGIME, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING 
INTERESTS 
In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, Colombia 
lacks strong state institutions, firm control over those agencies that exist, or a writ that 
extends throughout its complex topography. This weakness stems partly from a history 
devoid of centuries of state-building, where a lack of external threats meant government 
actors were not compelled to create institutions to protect the nation and by extension 
command loyalty from the populace.110 Over time, Colombia would develop central 
agencies charged with maintaining a monopoly on the use of force; however, this 
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“consolidation of a central state” was a “slow and difficult accomplishment” given the 
nation’s “daunting geography” and “weak, outwardly oriented economy,” among other 
factors.111 The products of Colombia’s state formation relevant to alliance dynamics would 
be two-fold: first, bureaucratic agencies that were weak, corrupt, and did not always act to 
advance the regime’s interests, and a central regime that could not wholly control their 
actions; and second, a fragmented nation characterized by subnational systems of political 
and economic power, the regime actors in which prioritized their interests (patron-client, 
survival, or a share in the spoils of victory) over the central regime (and eventually alliance 
strategy). As Bejarano and Pizzaro (2004) argue, where the “central state has severely 
contracted” at the subnational level, there are “unparalleled opportunities for accumulation 
of group and personal power and wealth” where actors “invest heavily in controlling or 
overcoming their competitors in order to enjoy the advantages of power within a secure 
and expanding territory.”112  
For the period examined, Colombia’s central regime was comprised of the 
President and his Cabinet.113 These actors worked with the U.S. to align security polices 
and agree to alliance strategy and tactics. The Executive has authority to formulate (and 
quickly alter) foreign and defense policy, enabling these alliance-relevant policies to 
change quickly (and decidedly) from one presidential regime to the next.114 The implication 
for alliance dynamics, and combined with (until 2004) single-term limits on the presidency, 
was that the U.S. faced an ally whose policies, political priorities, and preferred strategies 
related to balancing the threat turned over rapidly.  
The core bureaucratic agencies involved in devising alliance strategy and carrying 
out agreed tactics “in the field” were the Ministries of National Defense and Interior and 
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the National Army and Police.115 Technically, Colombia’s Ministry of Defense controls 
the Army. However, Colombia’s lower level of development and political history 
combined to grant them greater autonomy in terms of policy planning and activities, 
especially in subnational areas.116 This is rooted in reforms in the 1940s/50s aimed to 
“depoliticize” the armed forces which had the unintended consequence of providing a 
degree of autonomy more “than would be desirable within a democratic regime.”117 As 
Bejarano (2011) argues, over time “Colombia’s civilian elite openly abdicated their 
responsibility in terms of formulating and implementing defense and security policy, 
therefore granting the military key reserved domains in these policy-making areas.”118 The 
military’s autonomy “consistently expanded” and includes “capturing and preserving” key 
“domains in the areas of internal security and public order.”119 Through the period 
examined the military continued “to have a powerful veto on matters of internal 
security.”120 Leveraging this autonomy from the central regime and to maximize resources 
flowing into their coffers, the Military and Police (and components therein) would take 
actions (including violating central regime guidance) to jockey for a greater share of the 
defense budget.  
Colombia’s fragmented character is aptly encapsulated by Geddes (1994), who 
argues that analysis of the state in Latin America generally, and Colombia particularly, 
assumes that states “behave as unitary actors” whereas “in reality, they often do not.” The 
issue is not that the level of development is so low that there is no state, or, as she says, 
“that there is ‘no there there,’ but instead that there are “too many theres there”—the 
fragmented state is comprised of component parts not necessarily under the control of a 
central government, “each having different capacities, intentions, and preferences.”121  
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In sum, the regime’s fragmented character meant that during the alliance agencies 
and components therein leveraged their autonomy and made decisions (and used 
government resources) to advance their interests—maximize resources or solidify 
patronage ties—over alliance goals. What is more, the further intra-fragmentation of 
regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency components (Police unit 
A, for example) may be balancing the threat, but others (Police unit B) could 
simultaneously be bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to understanding external 
threat alliances, the great power had to juggle dynamics between the central regime and a 
menagerie of agencies in order to secure its interests. This fragmented character enabled 
various regime actors to influence alliance dynamics in general and to simultaneously 
balance/bandwagon particularly. 
B. CLIENTELISM: COMPETING LOYALTIES AND A DISTINCT SOURCE OF 
BANDWAGONING  
Various scholars of Latin American politics and history have documented the root 
causes and presence of patron-client relations (clientelism) in Colombia as well as its effect 
onto the Andean nation’s politics, governance, and economic development.122 A full 
review of these texts is beyond the scope of this chapter and marginal to its central analysis; 
however, a brief outline of the causes and main manifestations of clientelism (relevant to 
impelling actions by regime elements) in Colombia is necessary to demonstrate its 
influence onto alliance dynamics.  
Lacking a strong central state apparatus and faced with a vast and mountainous 
topography, Colombia was unable (and for years made few attempts) to extend its writ 
throughout its territory; individuals therefore forged loyalty to powerful actors in their 
given region as opposed to the national interest. Though state weakness in some ways 
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enabled clientelism to emerge, the contours of these relations—the identity of the patron 
and forms of patronage—and their affect onto politics and decisions made by regime actors 
evolved over time. Initially, patron-client relations were rooted in “caciquismo” or loyalty 
to an individual strongman, generally a large land-holding elite.123 For these regional elites 
and their clients “local power was more important than the abstract concept of a nation-
state.”124 The effect was to firmly embed a sense of loyalty—and thereby influence onto 
decision-making—to regional power-brokers over a central state or national 
interest/identity. As the country’s main political parties emerged and their reach into 
subnational areas grew, party leaders largely supplanted regional strongmen as primary 
patron with relations evolving into a clientelistic system based on party patronage. 
Regional and local leaders received patronage (money, regime posts) in exchange for 
mobilizing votes for party leaders in Bogota, while individuals and the state institutions 
they ran prioritized fealties to party over the national interest or other considerations.125 
The effect was that “when Colombian leaders had to choose between their need for political 
survival [clientelism] and longer-term interests in regime stability [building the state], they 
chose the former.”126  
As Colombia modernized the basis of clientelism morphed again. The state became 
patron: “Rather than the dominant party” the state “would provide services in the best 
clientelistic tradition, with support presumably flowing throughout the formal hierarchical 
structure.”127 Drug-trafficking’s rise further consolidated (including among government 
actors) prioritizing patron-client relations over the national interest: “Along with the new 
resources these actors [drug traffickers] injected…they also helped create new regional 
alliances, linking sectors of the security forces, traditional party cadres, drug traffickers, 
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and local elites behind private violence.”128 These regime actors favored relationships that 
would enhance their personal wealth and power as opposed to loyalty to the state, and drug-
trafficking revenues enhanced the incentive to do so.  
Political and economic “decentralization” reforms (1988-1991) changed the 
contours of clientelism further.129 By increasing the amount of public funding going to 
local governments and the control subnational officials had over these monies, the reforms 
swelled the pool of resources guerrillas could attempt to extort from subnational officials. 
This also further incentivized attempts to press regime representatives to bandwagon (for 
survival or clientelism). As a result, “the same patronage practices that used to bolster the 
traditional parties alone now benefit the FARC.”130 
The detailed trajectory of Colombia’s variant of clientelism aside, this process 
yielded two products that continued to make regime actors choose their interests and 
patron-client relations over loyalty to the national interest (and thus subnational 
bandwagoning, over balancing) during the period examined and are directly relevant to 
examining alliance dynamics. First, it firmly entrenched and incentivized prioritizing 
increasing power/influence over the national interest and therefore bandwagoning over 
balancing: “the allegiance…to patron was more basic than identification with an 
amorphous national identity known as Colombia.”131 And second, regionally-based power 
structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to 
patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national interest. 
Referred to as “political archipelagoes” (Kline 2007), mini “mafia” states (Vargas 2004), 
or regional “control systems,” these arguably approximate the “subsystems” Rosenau 
(1964) argued IR scholars must problematize when examining the link between political 
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violence and international relations.132 These sub-systems based in maximizing personal 
power/influence over the national interest motivate regime agencies to contravene orders 
from the central regime: “It is at the regional and local level that the political archipelagoes 
are most evident with politicians from those areas with different power bases than the 
national president, hence at times likely to oppose (either overtly or covertly) what the 
chief executive is trying to do.”133  
In sum, Colombia was a fragmented nation characterized by subnational systems 
of political and economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime elements to act 
in ways contrary to the alliance or national interest including by contravening central 
regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. In accordance with this distinct 
characteristic of internal threat alliances, and as the following section on bandwagoning 
further demonstrates, it was not two generally cohesive states working together (as in 
traditional alliances), but a great power dealing with multiple actors of a fragmented weak 
regime (agencies, components therein, and powerbrokers within subnational state-lets) that 
each had competing interests. Sometimes they prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; 
other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. 
3. THIRD CORE DIFFERENCE – WHY AND WHEN ALLIES BANDWAGON: 
SIMULTANEOUS WITH BALANCING AND MOTIVATED BY FEAR, PROFIT, AND PATRON-
CLIENT RELATIONS 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate  that the weaker ally’s internal 
fragmentation makes “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances distinct in manifestation 
and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances.  
In traditional alliances, countries either balance (resist threats) or bandwagon 
(appease threats) when faced with an external enemy. Driven by the core motivation to 
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preserve the national interest and territorial survival, states bandwagons with the threat in 
order to ensure their survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition (“for profit”).  
By contrast, with internal threat alliances the peripheral ally’s weak character 
means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, 
balancing and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with 
the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its 
police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors 
fomenting violence. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a 
motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and 
to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances).  
Through the period examined, regime actors in the capital or subnational areas 
including police, military, governors, or central regime actors contravened alliance strategy 
and bandwagoned in order to survive, “for profit” (share in the spoils of victory), or to 
maximize their own power/influence (as rooted in patron-client relations). Distinct to 
internal threat alliances, even as the great power and central regime collaborated to balance 
insurgents and narco-traffickers, that regime’s agencies (and components parts therein) 
were simultaneously bandwagoning with these actors. The discussion below demonstrates 
that balancing and bandwagoning occur simultaneously in internal threat alliances and 
provides examples of bandwagoning motivated by all three factors.  
i. Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources 
As part of their repertoire of action aimed at toppling the regime, guerrillas entered 
subnational areas and threatened civilian (mayors, for example) and security sector 
(national police, in many cases) regime actors to the point they agreed to collude with the 
insurgents in order to survive. As of 1998, for example, more than 70 percent of mayors in 
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one province indicated that they had to “hand over 10% of their budgets to finance the 
narco-FARC,” or be “killed or kidnapped.”134 To ensure their survival, regime actors 
handed over money or agreed to appoint FARC-preferred candidates to positions with 
control over the coffers. The guerrillas “would tell us to either agree to our terms, resign, 
or die,” one official holding office in the late 1980s said.135  
Following the decentralization reforms, FARC attempts to force bandwagoning 
increased. In order to fuel their operations, the FARC through 1998 had become 
increasingly “involved in the armed oversight of municipal budget administration, which 
has involved kidnapping and threatening mayors.”136 According to estimates from the 
Colombian Army, 13 percent of Colombia’s mayors through the late 1990s had “direct 
links” with the FARC or ELN, with a further 44 percent “collaborat[ing] in some form with 
the insurgency” including by “implement[ing] policies that are favorable to the insurgency” 
as well as “divert[ing] government funds to the guerrillas.”137 In the department of Valle 
de Cauca, for example, by 1998 the threat level from guerrillas heightened to the point 
where the governor, in a move “independent of the national government” (and contrary to 
alliance strategy), pursued a “peace” deal for his department with the guerrillas. He went 
so far as to travel abroad to garner support for his efforts.138 As these regime actors were 
bandwagoning with belligerents in order to survive, the central regime and other agencies 
were actively working to balance the same insurgents. 
 Narco-traffickers also coerced regime officials into compliance. Escobar’s 
Medellin outfit notoriously harassed, intimidated, and threatened to kill regime actors and 
their families until they agreed to turn a blind eye to trafficking and production (passive 
bandwagoning) or actively aid in the enterprise (active bandwagoning). Throughout the 
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“halcyon days of the 1980s and early 1990s,” the Medellin cartel “intimidated and 
murdered scores of Colombian government officials at all levels to protect its drug 
operations.”139 In a clear example of regime actors bandwagoning to survive, in 1987 a 
“thoroughly intimidated Colombian Supreme Court” ruled that that extradition treaty 
between the U.S. and Colombia was unconstitutional.140 As these judges and other regime 
representatives colluded with drug-lords to save their own lives, the central regime and 
components of the police force were simultaneously devising and implementing strategies 
to balance the narco-traffickers.  
ii. Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self-Interest over National Interest 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, fear for survival or a share in the spoils of 
victory cannot account for all instances of regime bandwagoning during this period. 
Interviews and secondary sources indicate that central and subnational regime actors also 
bandwagoned with narco-traffickers and guerrillas in order to maximize their power or 
influence (mainly financial).141 And analogous to the examples cited above of 
bandwagoning to survive, these forms of passive and active bandwagoning rooted in 
patron-client relations occurred at the same time as other regime actors were actively 
attempting to balance the guerrillas and drug-traffickers.  
In deciding whether to implement alliance strategy and tactics, actors in the capital 
or carrying out activities “in the field” decided to prioritize augmenting their power and 
influence and to take action that benefited the patron-client links necessary to do so. This 
manifested principally in regime representatives accepting financial payment in exchange 
for passively or actively assisting the armed actors. As Mauceri argues with regard to 
insurgents and narco-traffickers and their clientelistic ties to the regime at all levels: “The 
ability of these groups to corrupt state officials and challenge the state’s monopoly on 
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violence has…in many ways co-opted the state itself. Either through support, bribery, or 
intimidation, violent groups have gained influence over mayors, judges, bureaucrats, and 
other state officials, thus reducing and restricting the policy autonomy of state 
institutions.”142 The narco-traffickers in particular, one analyst of the conflict noted, 
“enjoyed enough money, power, resources, and flexibility to efficiently neutralize the 
government’s countermeasures.”143  
Through payoffs to government actors, the narco-traffickers and in some cases the 
FARC “developed a very effective counter-intelligence network that neutralized most state 
action against them.”144 By 1980 narco-traffickers had “put dozens of strategic middle-
level government bureaucrats on their payroll in order to know the regime’s “every 
move.”145 Through the 1990s no agency or level of government was immune from these 
influences and the passive or active bandwagoning they spurred. As Bejarano (2011) 
demonstrates, the narcos had “infiltrated politics in all its electoral and non-electoral forms 
to the point of jeopardizing the stability of the regime” and through payoffs and other 
actions “undermined the key state institutions such as the judiciary, the army, and the 
police.”146 Thereafter and through the 1990s, “traffickers increasingly fueled corruption in 
the justice, police, and political structures of the country.”147  
According to a former U.S. official involved in the alliance, the influence of patron-
client ties “reached the highest levels of government” and made it “easy to bribe 
government, police, and military officials in exchange for turning a blind-eye to their 
activities.”148 Indicative of the degree to which regime actors were bandwagoning through 
the late 1980s, a cartel was able to “hire” a military unit to break into an apartment building 
in Bogota and kill its rival.149 Bandwagoning by regime actors had by 1998 “penetrated all 
 
149 
branches of government, from the national to the local level: dozens of congressmen have 
accepted drug money in return for providing political protection for the mafias…countless 
judges have released traffickers because of bribery or intimidation…military officers 
[have] not been exempt from such temptations.”150 Ambassador to Colombia Curtis 
Kamman said years later that, in his view, 70 percent of Colombia’s Congress was by 1997 
“bent”: corrupt in general and influenced by the drug-trade particularly.151  
Subnational bandwagoning persisted under Pastrana and Uribe as regime elements 
continued to prioritize survival, spoils, or their desire to increase personal influence and 
wealth (patron-client relations) over the national interest and therefore bandwagoned with 
actors generating the threat, rather than balancing them. Representative of regime actors 
continuing to bandwagon because they prioritized maximizing power/influence over 
alliance goals, a May 1999 report indicated that police and army elements would allow the 
FARC to transport trucks filled with military arms for a bribe of $365.152 Like decisions 
by regime actors from 1980-1997, these police and military actions contravened central 
regime guidance and hindered allies’ ability to weaken the internal threat.153  
iii. Circumventing Bandwagoning Regime Actors 
Three specific examples from the Colombian presidential administrations of Barco, 
Gaviria, and Samper further demonstrate that balancing/bandwagoning occur 
simultaneously with internal threat alliances and that such bandwagoning generates actions 
by the allies not found in traditional alliances.  
During the Barco regime, he and U.S. President Reagan worked closely together, 
particularly on devising strategy and tactics to crush the narco-traffickers in general and 
the Medellin cartel particularly. Although the central regime and the great power were able 
to work closely to balance their common threat, the Colombian Judiciary hindered alliance 
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efforts to implement an anti-cartel strategy because it was “in the pocket” of and 
bandwagoning with influential drug-lords.154 The cartels recognized that Barco was 
committed to extradition and dismantling their operations and pushed the Judiciary in 
general and Supreme Court particularly to bandwagon with them out of fear (death threats 
were levied onto family/friends) or patron-client incentives (cartels paid judges large sums 
in exchange for favorable court decisions). Bribes, “violence,” and “threats thereof” were 
used “with the goal of paralyzing the justice system.”155 At least partly due to this 
campaign, Colombia’s Supreme Court deemed the extradition treaty unconstitutional, 
temporarily derailing tactics agreed by the central regime and its great power 
counterpart.156 As one analysis states, it had become increasingly “clear that the Colombian 
judiciary” had become “corrupted.”157 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, a regime agency (the Judiciary) was violating 
alliance strategy by opposing extradition and hindering the allies’ ability to weaken the 
threat. To circumvent this bandwagoning actor and following consultations with 
Washington, Barco used his presidential authority to reinstate extradition of cartel 
members to the U.S. by Executive order.158 
Similar bandwagoning occurred during Gaviria’s tenure. Despite close 
collaboration between Gaviria and U.S. President H.W. Bush on strategy and tactics, 
Colombian Police (and some Military) elements were bandwagoning with the narco-
traffickers either due to death threats (to survive) or in exchange for bribes (patron-client 
motivations).159 This hindered the allies’ ability to weaken the internal threat. In order to 
circumvent these bandwagoning elements, the U.S.-Colombia formed a police unit of 
vetted (non-bandwagoning) staff to destroy the cartels. As Gaviria’s Defense Minister 
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recounted to me in an interview: “The unit can be viewed as an “island of integrity in a sea 
of corruption” where the police and the military had links with the drug-traffickers; by 
creating this special unit, we were able to crush the larger cartels.”160 The implication for 
allies’ ability to achieve their objectives, as Gaviria’s Minister of Interior told me during 
an interview, was that “by creating this unit to get around those actors working with the 
cartels, we killed Escobar.”161 Such efforts to curb balancing/bandwagoning, including 
creating a component within a regime agency that could be relied on to balance (not 
bandwagon), would not be necessary in traditional alliances where agencies implement 
government guidance (balance) to advance the national (not their own) interest.  
Examples from the Barco and Gaviria administrations demonstrate that regime 
agencies may bandwagon, hinder cohesion, and generate actions by allies not found in 
traditional alliances: the great power/central regime pushing these agencies to balance or 
secure their interests by other means. Phenomena during the Samper presidency 
demonstrate that a central regime may bandwagon in order to advances its own interests 
and generate additional actions not found in (nor applicable to understanding) traditional 
alliances: a great power by-passing the central leadership to work directly with a 
(balancing-prone) regime agency. 
The U.S. in 1994 faced another situation not found in traditional alliances: 
determining how to secure its interests vis-à-vis an alliance, within a country, when faced 
with a bandwagoning central regime. As outlined above, Samper was implicated in 
colluding with the narco-traffickers, a core target of the alliances. The U.S. view that 
Samper’s regime was bandwagoning is reflected in testimony on decertification: 
We work with some extremely dedicated Colombian officials who…have continued to 
attack drug syndicates…these efforts have been undercut at every turn, however, by a 




The testimony also indicates that in order to secure its interests the U.S. by-passed 
Samper and worked with specific (balancing-prone) regime actors (“extremely dedicated 
Colombian officials”) outside the central regime; as does the following from a policy-
maker who said decertification had “cut the life line of our allies.”163 And indeed, to secure 
its interests the U.S. side-stepped the (bandwagoning-prone) central regime to work 
directly with regime agencies more prone to balancing (primarily the Police but also the 
Prosecutor General) to weaken the narco-traffickers. While juggling its relations with the 
central regime, the U.S. played into the agencies’ desire for resources to push the Police to 
balance. As Myles Frechette, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia during Samper’s tenure, told 
me in an interview: “We worked closely with [Police Chief] Serrano and simply bypassed 
Samper. This is why all was not lost during this period.” This U.S. confidence in the Police 
was echoed Thomas McNamara, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, who told me that 
Colombia was “able to hold up their end of the bargain because of the Police chief.”164 
Officials within the Ministry of Interior during Samper’s regime echoed this position: “the 
U.S. trusted Serrano, continued to collaborate as a result of this relationship, and despite 
strains in the relationship with Samper.”165 Though U.S. relations with Samper’s central 
regime were “difficult,” its relationship with the Police were “excellent” and U.S. 
assistance “continued to find its way into Colombia” and “almost entirely to support the 
Police.”166 
In the section above I demonstrated that throughout the alliance regime actors 
engaged in simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning. Specific regime elements 
bandwagoned (while others balanced) because they wanted to survive, share in the spoils 
of victory (both found in traditional alliances), or augment their power/influence or their 
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clients’ (distinct to internal threat alliances). Pushed by these three motivations, regime 
elements bandwagoned by enabling forces fomenting violence to continue operating and 
in some cases, as with extortion of subnational officials, provided the FARC with 
alternative sources for capabilities. Such ties led officials and military/police officers to 
bandwagon rather than balance: to avoid specific areas, fight half-heartedly, or simply not 
engage at all. Officials and soldiers within the army and police turned a blind eye to the 
actions of narco-traffickers (passive bandwagoning), or in some cases actively assisted 
their operations through provision of information on Colombian government efforts (active 
bandwagoning). Instead of unswervingly implementing the alliance strategy agreed to with 
the U.S. and carrying out activities accordingly, regime actors colluded with the alliance’s 
primary threat.  
Whereas this subsection focused mainly on regime actors outside the central 
decision-makers and why they bandwagoned (and when), the following section centers on 
decisions and actions by the central regime. 
4. FOURTH CORE DIFFERENCE –  
PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS:  
LEADERS OF THREATENED STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST  
 
The purpose of this fourth sub-section is to evidence the fourth and final difference 
between external and internal threat alliances: that when determining what to do in 
response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make 
decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national 
interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state.  
With traditional (external) alliances, after aligning states work together to decide 
what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, 
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and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more 
“cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, 
the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance 
cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer 
together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the 
states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace 
(increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor 
motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial 
survival.  
Level of threat and resources influences regime/great power ability to work together 
and defeat the internal menace. This is like traditional alliances. The core factor motivating 
the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to advance the 
national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. As such, 
determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to threats 
requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best interests 
of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able to defeat 
the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders will 
continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests.  
This section evidences this core difference by citing examples from 1980 to 2010 
and during the following presidential administrations: Colombia: Turbay [1978-1982], 
Betancur [1982-1986], Barco [1986-1990], Gaviria [1990-1994], Samper [1994-1998], 
Pastrana [1998-2002] and Uribe [2002-2010]; and U.S.: Reagan [1981-1989], H.W. Bush 
[1989-1993], Clinton [1993-2001] and W. Bush [2001-2009]. For the sake of simplicity, it 
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is organized chronologically and demonstrates how regime-specific priorities affected 
decisions related to cohesion—choosing strategy and whether to work closely with the 
United States—and effectiveness—choosing whether and if so how to curb bandwagoning.  
Arguably, the following actions would have increased state security and thus the 
Colombian national interests: weakening the drug-trade, dismantling the cartels, and 
balancing the insurgents. Doing so would have decreased violence, removed the threat that 
imperiled the fabric of the country, and enhanced economic and other opportunities for the 
nation’s people. The following sections demonstrate that instead of and often at the expense 
of these goals, Colombian presidential regimes—when faced with these threats—often 
acted mainly and primarily with their own political interests in mind.  
i. Turbay (1980-1982): Collaboration for Political Survival 
During the Turbay regime the allies worked closely together not only because of a 
surging threat and dependence on each other to balance it (as in traditional alliances) but 
also because, for Turbay’s regime, working with the U.S. to balance the insurgents/narco-
traffickers would help ensure his political survival. A report aired on the CBS “60 minutes” 
television program alleged that Colombian politicians (including Turbay) had links to the 
drug-trafficking industry.167 As a result, Turbay needed to “clear his name” and put forth a 
hardline stance on the drug issue in order to salvage his political mandate. Moreover, he 
needed to maintain crucial export markets for Colombian coffee, and speculation the 
regime was “crooked” could have jeopardized resources from this sector.168 “Accusations 
against Turbay made him play an active role in negotiating the extradition treaty” and 
controlling the drug-trade; this “proactive stance” in turn “inspired” the U.S. to give the 
regime “funding and equipment” needed to balance insurgents/narco-traffickers.169 Turbay 
cooperated mainly because doing so was an asset (not a liability) to his political survival. 
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ii. Betancur (1982-1986): Close Alignment Morphs from Political Liability to Asset 
After Betancur’s election in 1982, a continued threat kept the allies working 
together but their ability to agree on alliance goals, strategy, and tactics deteriorated 
because the regime viewed close collaboration as a political liability. As Thomas Boyatt, 
former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, told me in an interview: “Betancur was more 
nationalistic than Turbay,” and “this put a damper on our relationship.”170 To win and 
remain in office, the regime pursued a foreign policy “independent” from the great 
power.171 This stance and associated political priorities informed how the regime worked 
with the U.S. to dampen internal violence. Where Turbay, like Reagan, advocated a 
military strategy to the guerrillas, 172 Betancur’s regime for reasons tied to political survival 
shifted to peace via negotiation.173 To fulfill campaign pledges, Betancur established 
negotiations with the guerrillas174 and agreed to a ceasefire with the FARC.175 While 
Turbay had worked closely with Reagan (because doing so was a political necessity), 
Betancur jettisoned anti-communist rhetoric and cooperation on anti-belligerent military 
efforts (because doing so would have been a political liability).176  
Regime political priorities also initially hindered cooperation against narco-
trafficking, as working closely with the U.S. against it was at odds with Betancur’s 
campaign platform (to rely on domestic assets) and political interests. Accordingly, he 
eschewed close collaboration in counter-narcotics initiatives, attempted to address the issue 
with domestic means,177 and rejected several extradition requests. Linked to the regime’s 
nationalist stance, it viewed Colombia as less militarily dependent on the U.S. and instead 
sought support from other countries in the region.  
Toward the end of Betancur’s tenure, rising violence morphed collaboration with 
the U.S. to balance (guerrillas and narcos) from a liability to regime political survival to an 
 
157 
asset to salvaging it. A combination of failed negotiations and reports Betancur was 
considering re-introducing extradition made internal violence surge: belligerents seized the 
Palace of Justice (leaving hundreds dead) and the Medellin cartel assassinated Justice 
Minister Rodrigo Lara. Facing calls for greater action, and to survive politically, the regime 
needed to take a harder-line approach to the guerrillas/narcos and adopted a “militarist” 
and “overtly repressive strategy against the insurgency,”178 ended talks with the guerrillas, 
and agreed to extradite narco-traffickers.179 The regime needed to curb surging violence to 
retain office and this “moved Betancur to bend toward the U.S. pressure” in order to “obtain 
resources for the war.”180 The 1985 debt crisis and the regime’s need for U.S. help to 
address it also increased cohesion by pushing Betancur “closer towards the United States 
inasmuch as Washington was crucial for obtaining the $1 billion dollar “jumbo” loan in 
1985.”181 In exchange for U.S. backing with the Banks, the regime cooperated with U.S. 
counter-narcotics efforts.182  
iii. Barco (1986-1990): Political Interests Push Regime/U.S. into “Golden Embrace” 
U.S.-Colombia relations during the Barco regime largely mirrored those under 
Betancur. Initially, the allies were less able to agree on alliance strategy because the regime 
viewed doing so as a political liability. Rising violence and changing political priorities 
thereafter, however, pushed Reagan and Barco into a “golden embrace:” working with the 
U.S. to balance (guerrillas and narcos) changed from liability to regime political survival 
to an asset to salvage it.  
Described as a “pragmatic turn” in Colombian foreign policy, the Barco regime’s 
top priority (and key to its political survival) was to maximize markets for Colombian 
exports (and access to IMF financing) to grow the faltering economy. Despite broad 
agreement between the allies on the internal threat (“We wanted the closest relationship,” 
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his Minister of government told me) regime decisions related to political survival initially 
hindered cohesion.183 In order to maximize avenues to re-start the economy, Barco was 
initially hesitant to work closely (or overtly) with the U.S. to militarily thwart belligerents 
due to its political calculation that doing so would endanger ties important to bolstering 
Colombia’s economy (and regime political standing). The U.S. remained in a Cold war 
paradigm and Barco needed to “de-contaminate” (from external actors) the internal 
conflict.184 Accordingly, it pursued a regime-led negotiated solution (with some military 
actions) to guerrilla violence, while Reagan preferred a military-oriented approach.185  
By contrast, from day one of Barco’s tenure the allies closely collaborated to curb 
narco-trafficking because doing so was in the regime’s interests and in line with its political 
mandate. Narco-trafficking produced violence and commodity distortions that hurt the 
economy (his main political priority) and pushed Barco closer to the U.S. on drugs. The 
“threat” drug-trafficking posed to Colombia, he said, was “a matter of survival of 
democratic institutions and public liberty.”186 Similarly, for Reagan, the “twin evils” of 
“narcotics trafficking and terrorism” were the most “dangerous threat to the hemisphere 
today.”187 To that end, great power/regime agencies worked to eradicate crops and capture 
(albeit low-level) cartel leaders.  
In the second half of Barco’s tenure, rising violence morphed working with the U.S. 
to balance (guerrillas and narcos) from somewhat of a liability to regime political survival 
to an asset to saving it. With cartel/insurgent threats rising, Barco needed to take a more 
firm stance, quell this violence to remain in power, and U.S. resources would help do so. 
The Medellin cartel in 1989 assassinated a presidential candidate,188 violence from 
guerrillas was on the rise,189 and due to their stepped up actions in the Magdalena Metio 
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oil fields “the guerrilla groups were clearly hurting the economy.”190 Facing political 
pressure to take firm action in response to these and other developments191 Barco coupled 
talks with more vigorous military action because, as he said in October 1988, “no one 
believes the empty words of the subversive groups.”192 At this juncture, then, working 
closely to balance insurgents/narco-traffickers was in the regime’s political interests 
(advance the economy; lessen violence) and the great power’s (secure its ally to curb drug 
flows) and pushed them into a “golden embrace”193 and the allies took actions reflecting 
increased ability to devise/implement strategy including: Barco ordering an “all-out 
offensive” against narco-traffickers (per U.S. recommendations);194 Barco via executive 
order increasing military patrols and penalties for drug offenses;195 and Barco accepting 
“more overt and covert military help” from the U.S. to do so.196 The allies devised a 
strategy to dismantle the Medellin cartel197 and (particularly after Bush assumed office) 
U.S. funding/training for Colombia’s military/police escalated.198  
Recognizing that bandwagoning was hindering alliance effectiveness, Barco fired 
the National Police Chief over his connections with drug traffickers and his replacement 
soon thereafter sacked 2,075 officers because of similar links.199 Nonetheless, 
bandwagoning continued: many “high-level” regime elements “were on the payroll of the 
drug groups” and bandwagoning.200 
iv. Gaviria (1990-1994): Cooperation to Quash “Narco-Terrorism Plague” 
Gaviria inherited a country faced with surging violence. FARC attacks had 
increased three-fold and the Medellin cartel attempted to assassinate (then candidate) 
Gaviria. For the regime, this escalation in violence required (from a political standpoint) 
firm action against the belligerents and cartels. For the U.S., it threatened a regime key to 
curbing drug flows onto American streets and201 required shoring up its ally against 
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insurgents and cartels to, per its National Security Policy, balance the “threat” from 
“instability itself” in Colombia.”202 This high level of threat and shared dependence to 
balance it increased cohesion (as with traditional alliances); however, and distinct to 
internal threat alliances, cohesion was high also because collaboration against guerrillas 
and narco-traffickers was an asset to the Gaviria regime’s political prospects.  
Having attempted to negotiate peace (talks with the guerrillas broke down)203 and 
in response to rising belligerent-initiated violence, Gaviria changed regime policy (and its 
political promise to Colombia’s people) to a military victory over the guerrillas.204 To do 
so, he changed the Military’s mandate from external defense to “internal security” and took 
domestic measures to accrue resources (a “war tax,” among others) necessary to quell the 
insurgents. A rise in military spending did not yield “increased efficacy in the field of 
battle,”205 however, and Gaviria needed supplementary military capabilities to augment 
security forces, weaken the belligerents and, by extension, secure regime interests and 
priorities.206  
To offset this shortcoming, fulfill his policy agenda, and in doing so preserve his 
regime’s political interests, Gaviria turned to closer collaboration with the U.S. (and 
increased cohesion) by: Gaviria accepting U.S. assistance to reorganize military 
intelligence gathering against “armed subversion”;207 the U.S. allocating $65 million in 
(emergency) military aid208 to help the regime “regain control” of territory;209 and the U.S. 
allowing its military assets to participate in (as opposed to only advise) counter-narcotics 
military operations including against the FARC [viewed as an extension of the 
traffickers].210 Regime political imperatives also drove it to cooperate more fully with the 
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U.S. to combat “narco-terrorism,” which Gaviria described as “the principal threat to our 
democracy” that “we will confront it without concessions.”211  
Despite a clear escalation in narco-violence, though, the regime was initially 
reticent to assume (in full) the U.S. preferred approach (extradition plus force) to dismantle 
the cartels because formidable political pressure from elites important to the president’s 
political interests had mounted to decrease narco-violence by212 striking a deal with (rather 
than military confronting) the cartels. If Gaviria was truly acting in the national interest, he 
arguably would have stayed true to his hardline stance and campaign promises and directly 
confronted the cartels. Instead, Gaviria relented to the political pressure—because these 
individuals were vital to remaining in power—and agreed (despite U.S. opposition) not to 
extradite drug lords in exchange for their going to prison (including Escobar).213  
The strategy soon unraveled as Escobar escaped and still-free commanders 
employed “violence as a means to money.”214 After the cartels attacked a wealthy 
neighborhood of northern Bogota, political forces that had initially urged Gaviria to 
negotiate with (instead of militarily pursue) the cartels now pushed the regime to militarize 
the conflict with the drug-lords.215 In order to offset the potentially-devastating political 
blow of Escobar’s escape and shore up his political standing with these sectors, Gaviria 
flipped back to a hardline strategy to crush the cartels. To pursue this approach and salvage 
political standing, he needed and sought cooperation with the U.S. and “told the Americans 
as far as he was concerned the door was now open…and would welcome any and all help 
the Americans could give.”216 And the U.S. was ready to assist. Narcotics trafficking 
remained a core national security threat in so far as drugs continued to “severely” damage 
the “social fabric” of U.S. society.217 In order to stop the flow of drugs onto American 
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streets, the U.S. needed to crush the cartels and safeguard its ally, and worked closely with 
the regime to do so.  
Perhaps more so than his predecessors, the central Gaviria regime took proactive 
steps to curb bandwagoning. For example, the central regime tried to curb bandwagoning 
in the Judiciary through reforms including: “anonymous judges” (so cartels could not target 
individuals) and creating the Office of the General Prosecutor. Even during the Gaviria 
regime, though, bandwagoning was widespread. Armed actors used bribes and other 
payoffs to “seduce hundreds of important armed forces officers, police officials, judges 
and political actors.”218 The Commander of the Police anti-drug unit and three Ministers of 
Defense, for example, accepted bribes from the Cali cartel purportedly in exchange for not 
deploying security forces to disrupt their operations 
v. Samper (1994-1998): Central Regime Bandwagons, Sends Alliance into Tailspin 
U.S.-Colombia relations deteriorated with Ernesto Samper’s election due to 
evidence that he bandwagoned with drug cartels. If Samper was acting in the national 
interest, he would have pursued a hard line against narco-trafficking and adhered to 
Colombian campaign finance regulations and eschewed any such monies flowing from 
illegal actors. Instead, he initially waffled on counter-narcotics efforts and accepted $US 
millions from the Cali cartel to bankroll his campaign.  
After determining that Samper’s regime was not sufficiently cooperating in 
counter-narcotics efforts, the U.S. “decertified” Colombia, rendering the regime (in 1996 
and 1997) ineligible to receive U.S. capabilities in this area.219 Facing calls for his 
impeachment, Samper’s political survival depended on looking “hard on drugs” and 
pushed him to accept U.S. preferred strategies. The result was to increase cohesion in so 
far as Samper knew he needed to look firm against narco-trafficking in order to survive 
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politically and that accepting U.S. strategy would help. In order to secure American 
interests, the U.S. exploited Samper’s political vulnerability and pushed him to take firmer 
action against narco-trafficking (to balance).220 The results of Samper’s vulnerability (and 
great power pressure) were his central regime: agreeing to nominate the U.S.-favored 
choice for National Police Chief (General Serrano); ordering agencies to execute an “all-
out war” against drug-traffickers; and passing legislation that re-instated extradition.221 
Further, he took action to curb bandwagoning. The regime decreed a “cleansing” of the 
Police of individuals bandwagoning with criminal elements 222 and authorized its Chief to 
fire police officers with such links.223 
v. Pastrana (1998-2002): Regime Political Agenda Fully Aligns with U.S. Preferred 
Approach 
During Pastrana’s regime, a marked in increase in threat level and shared military 
dependence to balance it drove the allies together and increased cohesion. However, an 
additional factor distinct to internal threat alliances also increased cohesion: for the regime, 
closely working with the U.S. to devise and implement the $1.3 billion Plan Colombia 
directly aligned with the Pastrana’s stated approach to the threat and would help ensure its 
political survival.  
It was in the high level of violence stemming from Samper’s term that, as a 
candidate, Pastrana had campaigned on a “strong peace platform” that included de-
militarizing part of the country for talks with the FARC.224 Worn down by ever-escalating 
violence, the Colombian citizenry wanted a “messiah of peace” and elected Pastrana 
chiefly on his pledge to end the conflict by resuscitating failed negotiations with the 
belligerents, albeit coupled with military pressure. “I assume the leadership to build peace,” 
Pastrana said, “and call on all Colombians to follow and work within the agenda for peace 
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that I am going to direct.”225 Informed by its view on why prior presidents failed to weaken 
the “narco-terrorist” threat, Pastrana’s regime assumed a different approach (and policy 
agenda) to do so, fulfill his mandate, and secure its political interests: negotiate from a 
position of power and, if that fails, have the military means to wipe out the belligerents.226 
In tandem with the aforementioned surge in violence, Colombia was experiencing the worst 
economic crisis in its history,227 forcing Pastrana to sign a $2.7 billion credit deal with the 
IMF. These and other crisis-related adjustments shrunk the pool of resources available to 
implement the regime’s approach to the internal conflict and therefore secure its political 
mandate. Where Pastrana had originally intended to unilaterally drum up resources 
required for Plan Colombia, and was pushing this agenda forward to quell calls from 
politically-important urban elite to dampen violence at their doorsteps, the fiscal austerity 
plan meant “Colombia was not in a financial position to pay for the escalation in the civil 
conflict…and would have to turn to the United States to secure additional military and 
economic assistance.”228 The recession pushed Pastrana’s regime further toward the U.S. 
in so far as doing so would help him amass the capabilities needed to carry out Plan 
Colombia and his political mandate. 
The surge in violence and dependence on each other to balance it (as with 
traditional alliances) had by 1998 driven the allies closer together. Cohesion was high and 
the allies would go on and devise and implement Plan Colombia, however, due to an 
additional factor distinct to internal threat alliances: working with the U.S. to balance 
guerillas and narco-traffickers aligned with and would further the Pastrana regime’s 
interests (political survival). For Pastrana, working closely with the U.S. was a formidable 
asset to his political prospects: the regime needed U.S. resources to implement its counter-
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insurgent approach (negotiations plus military action) and therefore agreed to more close 
collaboration with the great power, specifically on counter-narcotics efforts. As for the 
U.S., it needed Pastrana to dampen drug flows and therefore agreed to help grow 
Colombia’s military and police.229  
Diverging from his predecessors, Pastrana took more proactive and consistent 
efforts to curb bandwagoning rooted in patron-client relations. As part of this effort, 
Pastrana’s central regime consistently attempted to cull the Police and Army of elements 
linked to and bandwagoning with actors threatening the regime. His regime issued a decree 
mandating that officers with these links be dismissed from service and subject to further 
sanction. This led to numerous such expulsions. To assure the Army was run by personnel 
serious about restraining bandwagoning, Pastrana replaced its Head with the more hardline 
Fernando Tapias, who fired dozens of officers and other high-level officials during his time 
in office. In addition, Pastrana fired three generals for purportedly bandwagoning with non-
state actors perpetrating violence.230 Pastrana’s efforts to promote unified balancing, 
however, did not stop with the military or police: in 1999, for example, he prosecuted the 
National Drug Council’s director due to links with actors threatening the regime and231 in 
2000 fired the Intelligence service’s Director and Director of counterintelligence for 
bandwagoning with narco-traffickers.232  
Representing a further shift from prior regimes, Pastrana established two 
mechanisms to identify and prosecute regime elements diverting alliance resources. First, 
Pastrana formed the Presidential Program to Fight Corruption (Programa Presidencial de 
Lucha contra la Corrupcion)233 that established interagency coordination to better identify 
and prosecute bandwagoning elements.234 Additionally, Pastrana established Colombia’s 
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first agency to curb money-laundering and continued the process started under prior 
administrations to further professionalize the Police. High-profile sackings and associated 
decrees diverged from prior administrations, which at most fired a handful of low-level 
officers and did not pass relevant reforms (aside from Gaviria’s reforms to the Judiciary).  
vi. Uribe (2002-2010): Regime Needs Resources to Secure (Unprecedented) Re-
election 
Changes following Uribe’s election to factors that condition internal threat alliance 
cohesion increased even further the allies’ ability to agree on strategy, tactics, and carry 
out associated activities. Primarily, for the Uribe regime closely working with the U.S. was 
vital to obtaining the military resources required to implement his preferred (“mano dura”) 
military campaign to crush the “narco-terrorists” and not only fulfill this initial political 
mandate but obtain sufficient support to be the first Colombian president elected to a 
second term. Coupled with enhanced cohesion, the alliance was more effective during 
Uribe’s tenure partly because its central regime took actions necessary to ensure 
bandwagoning regime elements would not hinder cohesion. 
In the wake of Pastrana’s failed negotiations, the Colombian citizenry elected Uribe 
largely based on the “appeal of a hardline candidate at a critical juncture in Colombia’s 
internal conflict”235 and his promise to take an “iron fist” approach to defeat the “narco-
terrorist” guerrillas.236 Divergent from prior regimes Uribe had essentially written-off a 
political solution to insurgent-initiated violence and turned fully to a military campaign 
aimed at crushing the belligerents. The Uribe regime’s interests extended beyond fulfilling 
this political mandate, however, and to seeking an unprecedented (and not constitutionally 
allowed) second term. Given the single term limit for Colombian presidents, doing so 
required amending the country’s constitution. To that end, and with an eye toward a second 
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term and associated spoils, Uribe soon after taking office began drumming up support for 
and pressing the Constitutional Court to allow re-election (approved in 2005).237  
Fulfilling his political mandate to crush violence and obtaining support sufficient 
to amend the constitution relied on having a military capable of weakening the narco-
terrorists and demonstrating immediate results in crushing the insurgency. Core political 
interests would not back amending the constitution to assure a second term for a regime 
that failed to bring greater stability to the nation. Accordingly, Uribe moved closer to the 
U.S. and strategically agreed (as Pastrana had already begun to do) to cast the narco-
belligerents as narco-terrorists to ensure the U.S. would augment the military resources 
flowing to the regime. And in the Bush administration he found a great power ready to 
assist and secure its interests tied to the regime. 
The surge in violence and dependence on each other to balance it (as with 
traditional alliances) had driven the allies closer together. Cohesion was high and the allies 
would devise and implement Uribe’s new strategy for quelling violence, however, because 
working with the U.S. to balance “narco-terrorists” aligned with and would further the 
Uribe regime’s interests (political survival). Working closely with the U.S. was an asset to 
regime political prospects: it needed U.S. resources to implement its military campaign and 
secure re-election, and therefore agreed to more close collaboration with the great power. 
This extended to publicly backing the U.S. decision to invade Iraq,238 which netted the 
regime an additional $100 million in military aid for its “struggle against terrorism.”239  
Effectiveness increased during Uribe’s administration arguably and at least in part 
because he took actions not seen in prior regimes to ensure bandwagoning regime elements 
would not hinder cohesion. Within his first two weeks in office, Uribe declared a “State of 
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Internal Unrest,” which permitted the central regime (in addition to levying a “war tax”) 
to: use executive decrees to defeat the insurgents; bypass agencies that may decide to refuse 
to implement alliance strategy; authorize the military (without Judiciary approval) to make 
arrests without warrants; and establish subnational areas under military (not civilian) 
rule.”240 And the U.S. fully backed this move.241 Some dubbed this an “authoritarian turn” 
and against Colombia’s national interest; however, it was what Uribe needed to ensure 
unified balancing, crush the insurgents, and therefore secure his regime’s interests.242  
Arguably, this hardline stance and associated actions vis-à-vis the “narco-terrorists” 
were in the national interest—even though warrantless arrests, for example, stretched the 
rule of law they also decreased violence and helped restore the fabric of society by 
enhancing government control of specific areas. At the same time, other actions Uribe took 
in order to ensure passage of the constitutional amendment to allow presidential re-election 
clearly represent decisions that violated the national interest. If Uribe was acting only with 
the national interest in mind, he would have respected the rule of law and deferred to the 
legislature and courts to decide on proposed changes to the constitution. Instead, he ordered 
his internal intelligence service (the DAS) to wire-tap phones of political opponents and 
employ political smear campaigns against the Supreme Court in order to safeguard 
stakeholders vital to his political survival and pressure decision-makers to pass the 
change.243 Even amid the increased cohesion due to alignment of great power and regime 
interests, therefore, the latter was still abusing its power and taking actions that violated 
the Colombian national interest.244 
Uribe continued efforts started under Pastrana to remove bandwagoning regime 
elements. By 2007, for example, Uribe’s Defense Minister had fired more than 100 
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bandwagoning officers and through 2009 purged the Military of elements bandwagoning 
with actors targeted by the alliance.245 The Uribe regime convicted former police General 
Mauricio Santoyo due to bandwagoning with narco-traffickers246 and prosecuted 23 
individuals (including former Director of the Army’s intelligence branch) for 
bandwagoning with narco-traffickers and other actors fomenting violence.247 To prevent 
recurrence of bandwagoning, Uribe passed legislation that prohibited individuals 
prosecuted for bandwagoning from re-entering the regime.248  
Building from Pastrana’s anti-corruption efforts, Uribe established 
“Colombiemos,” a program that enabled citizens to share information on bandwagoning 
regime elements, and formed a nation-wide “citizen informant network” whereby regime 
actors stationed in subnational areas could inform the central regime of collusion between 
local officials and guerrilla forces.249 Pastrana and Uribe proactively purged bandwagoning 
regime elements and established formalized mechanisms to curb such actions. In doing so, 
they made more concerted efforts to shift what had become widespread simultaneous 
balancing/bandwagoning to more unified regime balancing. This represents a marked shift 
in the peripheral regime’s willingness to curb bandwagoning, and arguably helped 
transform the weak state into a more unified and reliable ally.  
In contrast to regimes in office from 1980 to 1997, Pastrana and Uribe increased 
the degree to which the weak state balanced the alliance’s common threat in a unified 
manner. With the necessary capabilities to balance the threat, and with fewer elements of 
the regime bandwagoning as opposed to balancing, the alliance was able to weaken the 
threat to the point where it no longer jeopardized regime survival and associated U.S. 
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interests. The alliance had effectively “turned the tide” from a situation in which the 
peripheral ally was “on the brink of collapse.” 
 Having outlined in this core section the four ways in which internal threat 
alliances are distinct from their external threat counterpart, the following and final section 
provides conclusions.  
III. CASE CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter I used the U.S.-Colombia case to evidence the following four key 
ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from alliances forged to 
balance external enemies. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, 
contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common 
type of alliance today.  
First, I showed that the U.S. and Colombia brought their security policies into close 
cooperation and aggregated capabilities in response to political violence fomented by two 
principal actors (leftist guerrillas and narco-traffickers)  in order to preserve the regime’s 
survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and 
economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its 
existence from belligerents and drug traffickers, while the great power got involved to 
safeguard interests linked to the regime’s stability including: curbing drug flows onto 
American streets, maintaining access to oil reserves, and preserving stability in its 
“backyard,” among others. By the late 1980s, and particularly with the Berlin Wall’s 
collapse, the core factor underlying U.S./Colombia alignment was ensuring the peripheral 
regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is 
different from traditional alliances, where states bring their security policies into close 
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cooperation in response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that 
imperils the state as a whole; and where states are motivated to align in order to secure 
their national interest and territorial survival.  
Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat 
alliances, it demonstrated that Colombia’s internal order was fragmented. Building from 
this, it showed that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire 
apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of 
its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traced Colombia’s political 
trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that 
spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the 
alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as 
opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the 
U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these 
actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of 
internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some 
fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a 
hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act 
to advance the national interest.  
Third, I demonstrated why the motivations for and manifestations of bandwagoning 
in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional 
alliances. Concerning manifestation, it showed that regime elements leveraged their 
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autonomy to act independently, advance their own interests, and contrary to alliance 
strategy and thus bandwagoned while other regime elements were simultaneously 
balancing. Accordingly, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances 
proceeds as follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables 
balancing and bandwagoning to occur simultaneously (whereas states in traditional 
alliances can either balance or bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the 
clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for 
bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the 
spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances 
where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon 
while the allies are together, which has implications for cohesion and effectiveness. 
In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as 
with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to 
alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found 
in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between cooperative central regimes 
and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s presidency) 
or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. during 
Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning central regime and worked with the 
National Police to secure U.S. interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple 
actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital 
communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
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Fourth and finally, I showed that when determining what to do in response to the 
target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on 
their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-
Colombia alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and 
resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the 
common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s 
decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but 
rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. And these regime-specific 
decisions rooted in their desire to survive politically impacted actions related to cohesion 
and effectiveness.  
Cohesion was higher during the Andres Pastrana and Alvaro Uribe regimes partly 
because they viewed close collaboration with the U.S. as an asset to their political survival 
(compared to prior presidents, who oscillated between viewing full collaboration as a 
liability or asset) and they were able to reign in bandwagoning regime actors. With regard 
to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, amassing resources 
sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance weakened the 
internal threat. In addition to the consistently high alliance cohesion [and an increase in 
available U.S. state power for the alliance] that enabled the allies to pool such resources 
sufficient to weaken actors fomenting violence, effectiveness was higher during the 
Pastrana/Uribe regimes due to their consistent efforts to purge civilian and security 
agencies of actors bandwagoning with the narco-guerilla threat.  
In sum, the U.S.-Colombia alliance clearly elucidates the core ways in which 
internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances. Rather 
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than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard territorial integrity, the U.S. and 
Colombia aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s 
survival and American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially 
cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the National Police, for 
example) that act to advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with an extremely 
internally fragmented ally whose relevant actors often acted to advance their own interests 
over alliance goals and the Colombian national interest. Rather than the either/or 
relationship between balancing and bandwagoning present in traditional alliances, in this 
case some Colombian agencies balanced insurgents while others were simultaneously 
colluding with the same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to respond to threats 
various Colombian administrations largely did not do what was best for the Colombian 
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U.S.-AFGHANISTAN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 2001-2012 
 
This chapter will show how the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance was a clear example of 
an internal threat alliance that differed from traditional (external) alliances in the following 
four ways, beginning with the nature of the threat and why great powers/weak regimes 
form internal threat alliances. As the first core difference, it demonstrates that the U.S. and 
Afghanistan brought their security policies into close cooperation in response to violence 
fomented by insurgents (and at times warlords) in order to preserve the Hamid Karzai 
regime’s survival (physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military 
and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its 
existence from insurgents, while the U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use 
Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch attacks (as they did on September 11, 2001) and 
ensure access to natural resources in the region. By 2002 the core factor underlying 
U.S./Afghanistan alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great 
power’s interests associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional 
alliances, where states bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a 
threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; 
and where states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and 
territorial survival.  
Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat 
alliances, it demonstrates that Afghanistan’s internal order was fragmented. Building from 
this, it shows that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire 
apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of 
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its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traces Afghanistan’s political 
trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that 
spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the 
alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as 
opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the 
U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these 
actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of 
internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some 
fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a 
hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act 
to advance the national interest.  
Third, it demonstrates why the motivations for and manifestations of 
bandwagoning in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced 
in traditional alliances. Afghanistan shows that in internal threat alliances, it is simplistic 
to ask whether states balance or bandwagon. Instead, they do both at the same time. As 
will be seen, while some elements of the Afghan army fought against the Taliban, others 
actively cooperated with them. While some warlords resisted Afghan incursions, other 
aligned with the worst of the Afghan leaders. Clearly, the either/or dichotomy of traditional 
alliances concerning whether to resist or appease threats did not apply to Afghanistan. The 
case also shows that clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate 
a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and 
 
187 
to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). Military officials, 
police officers, and central regime representatives bandwagoned due to fear (for survival) 
and because they thought the opposition may win (for profit); however, they also did so to 
consolidate or further patron-client relationships based in ethnicity or financial exchange. 
In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as 
with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising the peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to 
alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found 
in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between a somewhat cooperative 
central regime and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of 
Interior and Defense, and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular 
after Karzai was re-elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to 
balancing/bandwagoning at the same time.  This juggling of relationships between multiple 
actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital 
communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
Fourth and finally, it shows that when determining what to do in response to the 
target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on 
their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-
Afghanistan alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and 
resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the 
common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s 
 
188 
decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but 
rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime.  
And Hamid Karzai’s actions clearly show how internal threat alliances place the 
primary focus on the interests of the leader rather than the national interests of the state. 
Time after time, Karzai worked against the national interest of Afghanistan by subverting 
national institutions, appointing known corrupt officials, and cooperating with the drug 
trade, not because these actions benefited Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but 
because they helped keep him in power. This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated 
by the difference in Karzai’s actions before and after he was re-elected president in 2009.  
Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan 
presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S. 
as an asset to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 
2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that 
U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an 
electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and 
thereby enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion 
declined because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a 
liability to winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-
term. Karzai recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to 
press the Army to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward 
re-election he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance 
strategy) to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively 
bandwagoning). After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying 
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on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work 
with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.  
With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, 
aggregating capabilities sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat (as determined mainly by 
cohesion) influenced whether the alliance weakened the internal threat. However, Karzai’s 
insufficient efforts to curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness. 
Following a brief historical study, I will show in detail how the U.S.-Afghanistan 
alliance differed from traditional alliances in each of these four ways. 
I. U.S.-AFGHANISTAN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE (2001-2012) 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
 
The events that precipitated the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance—the horrific attacks on 
September 11, 2001—have their roots in the war-torn country’s prior decades of conflict 
and strife. This arguably begins with the 1978 Saur Revolution, where the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), with support from the Afghan military, toppled 
President Mohammad Daoud Khan’s government. Seeking to expand its influence and 
acting in the context of the Cold War paradigm, the Soviet Union soon thereafter began 
providing support to the PDPA government and its pursuit of socialist goals. The PDPA 
regime’s policies and persecution of dissenters spurred opposition elements to form militia 
groups (Mujahedeen) and attempt to overthrow the government and reincorporate Islamic 
principles into the state.1 With the mujahedeen increasing in force due largely to support 
from the U.S. and Pakistan, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979 to shore up the 
PDPA government.2 Nine years later, worn down by the mujahedeen’s insurgent campaign 
and abetted by its domestic economic demise, the Soviet Union began withdrawing troops. 
In 1992, the mujahedeen ousted the PDPA and replaced it with an Interim government.3   
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Building on popular resentment of the nascent government, religious leader Mullah 
Omar in 1994 established the Taliban (“religious students”), a politico-religious movement 
comprised of former mujahedeen and religious scholars. Leveraging an increased flow of 
supporters (and government financial support) from Pakistan, the Taliban expanded its goal 
from removing Kandahar province’s governor to overthrowing the central government and 
taking control of the state.4 The Taliban eventually captured Kabul and installed Islamic 
policies.5  
This development had implications for Afghans and regional/global security alike. 
For the people of Afghanistan, it saw the rise of a repressive regime whose strict 
interpretation of Sharia law brought punishing “un-Islamic” behavior with barbaric acts 
(including public stonings) as well as forcing women to wear the burqa (a garb that covers 
the entire body and face) and forbidding them from pursuing education and other basic 
opportunities.6 Given the Taliban regime’s brutal nature, only three states recognized the 
government during its rule, which lasted from 1996 to 2001. In response to the Taliban’s 
ascent to power and in opposition to its repressive rule, regional powerbrokers (“warlords” 
or commanders) affiliated with a particular ethnicity or faction joined remnants of the 
deposed regime in order to reclaim Afghanistan from the Taliban. Commonly referred to 
as the “Northern Alliance,” these militias were led by the ousted government’s Defense 
Minister.7 With follow on effects for regional and global security, the Taliban welcomed 
the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, into Afghanistan. 
With the government’s permission, bin Laden established training camps in Afghanistan8  
from which he extended Al-Qaeda’s “operations around the world.”9  
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Five years after the Taliban came to power, on September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda 
hijacked airplanes in the United States and flew two into the World Trade Center in New 
York City and one into the Pentagon just outside of Washington, DC. The attacks were 
master-minded by bin Laden. In response to the 9/11 attacks U.S. President George W. 
Bush declared a global “war on terrorism.”10 As part of this, he launched Operation 
Enduring Freedom Afghanistan through which the U.S. cooperated with the Northern 
Alliance opposition to remove the Taliban regime and capture or kill bin Laden and his Al-
Qaeda affiliates.11 In October 2001 and as part of this operation the U.S. collaborated with 
NA commanders and other prominent leaders controlling militias (including Hamid 
Karzai) to rout the Taliban and capture/kill bin Laden.12 By December the U.S. and this 
“anti-Taliban front” of “warlords, strongmen, and political factions”13 had defeated the 
Taliban and killed Al-Qaeda operatives or forced them into Pakistan (though bin Laden 
escaped).14 
As the Taliban fell and Al-Qaeda was routed from Afghanistan and across the 
border into Pakistan, a grouping of Afghan and international leaders assembled in Bonn, 
Germany, to develop a transitional political process for Afghanistan (the Bonn Agreement) 
and select an Interim Leader. They chose Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun leader who worked with 
the Northern Alliance opposition to defeat the Taliban. In June 2002 and per the Bonn 
Agreement, a grand council (Loya Jirga) of elders elected Karzai to a two-year term as 
Interim President, marking the official start to his regime.  
With Karzai in office the U.S. began weighing options for safeguarding the regime 
and ensuring Al-Qaeda would not again use territory there to launch attacks. Ultimately, 
the U.S. selected a “light footprint” approach and in 2002 deployed 8,000 troops to 
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Afghanistan with the objective of killing Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters and training the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—comprised of the National Army (ANA) and 
National Police (ANP).15 Other states pledged assistance and the United Nations 
established a Mission (UNAMA).16 
The U.S. soon became increasingly pre-occupied with its pending invasion of Iraq, 
limiting American resources available for Afghanistan. In accordance with its light 
footprint approach, due to competing priorities in Iraq, and in line with the U.S. focus on 
Al-Qaeda (versus Karzai’s preoccupation with a Taliban regrouping in Pakistan), the great 
power devised and pushed Karzai to accept what later became known as the “warlord 
strategy” for balancing threats in the country.17 After the collapse of the Taliban, the 
Northern Alliance commanders and “warlords” the U.S. had worked with to oust the 
repressive regime reclaimed the subnational “fiefdoms” they ruled before the Taliban came 
to power.18 These regional powerbrokers were largely “considered U.S. allies” and by 
paying these individuals “to not fight one another” and “maintain stability in their outlying 
areas” a means by which the U.S. could ensure stability without more American boots on 
the ground. Accordingly, the alliance strategy involved deploying U.S. Special Forces to 
hunt Al Qaeda throughout Afghanistan while “relying on the warlords to keep Pax 
Americana in the countryside”19 
Building from this initial alignment, the allies were able to work together to agree 
on strategy, tactics, and activities. As James Dobbins, U.S. envoy to Afghanistan following 
9/11, told me in an interview: “Once the Karzai interim government had been installed, it 
was fully cooperative and willing to do anything it could, within its capabilities, to advance 
our agenda.20 The U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad, 
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worked closely with Karzai to forge all aspects of alliance strategy, with “no significant 
decision made by Karzai during this period without his involvement.”21  
It soon became clear that the warlords-cum-regime actors were more interested in 
solidifying control over subnational strongholds than balancing threats and securing 
alliance goals. Rather than using alliance capabilities to fight insurgents, for example, the 
warlords fought each other over control of territory and associated spoils.22 These 
purported “extensions” of the central regime “were not reconciled to the Karzai presidency 
and remained potential threats” to his rule.23 By 2003, they “were becoming stronger while 
the Karzai regime lacked the resources to compete.”24  
Due in part to warlord bandwagoning and the flow of insurgents back into 
Afghanistan from havens in Pakistan, the international community’s initial triumphant 
sense of “victory” gave way in 2003 to dire assessments of resurgent attacks throughout 
Afghanistan. Whereas U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney had exultantly declared in October 
2001 that the “Taliban is out of business, permanently,”25 the insurgency was soon 
thereafter clearly back in business and continued to mount attacks that threatened regime 
survival and U.S. interests.26 This wave of violence prompted further concerns in 
Washington that the Karzai regime might collapse, with dire consequences for U.S. 
interests. As Khalizad said at the time in remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations: a “lack of success” to include a “renewed civil war, a narco-state, a successful 
Taliban insurgency, or a failed state” would “undermine efforts in the global war on 
terrorism and could stimulate an increase in Islamic militancy and terrorism.”27  
It was in this context that the allies looked toward holding the 2004 Afghan 
presidential elections. Recognizing that threats were rising and the election was a 
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watershed moment in the Bonn process,28 Bush called for a “Marshall Plan” for 
Afghanistan and in 2003 approved what would become the alliance’s new strategy. This 
“Accelerated Success” strategy diverged from its “warlord” predecessor by adding the 
Taliban and insurgents as principal threats (in addition to Al-Qaeda) and recognizing and 
including tactics to strengthen the regime’s capacity to reclaim “ungoverned spaces” in 
which target actors could operate. The new strategy’s military component consisted mainly 
of U.S. and Afghan Army forces conducting operations against insurgents and training and 
equipment for the Army and Police to grow their size and capacity. And its non-military 
component included strengthening regime capacity to have “a monopoly over the 
legitimate use of physical force throughout the country”29 and included: training/funding 
to agencies relevant to alliance goals, activities to reduce poppy production and drug-
trafficking (to remove a form of insurgent financing),30 and establishing Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in subnational areas31 to work with regime actors “to extend 
its authority” and “develop a stable and secure environment.”32  
Working from this strategy and through the 2005 parliamentary elections, a 
continued threat to the regime and allies’ dependence on each other to balance it pushed 
the U.S. and Karzai together and (by and large) to cooperate on alliance goals and strategy. 
Reflecting this, in 2005 the allies agreed to the “Joint Declaration of Strategic 
Partnership,”33 to “strengthen U.S.-Afghan ties to help ensure Afghanistan’s long-term 
security” so as to facilitate “common efforts to cooperate in the war against international 
terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The allies agreed to “organize, train, 




To be sure, Karzai’s need for the U.S. military to balance rising insurgent violence 
pushed the “mercurial leader” closer toward Bush and facilitated their ability to work 
together (enhanced cohesion). However, Karzai was eager to collaborate also because he 
recognized that the alliance—and U.S. leverage and largesse that came along with it—was 
a key asset to solidifying his political power and influence, both short- and long-term. In 
particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai 
was named Interim President, he recognized that U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 
2004 presidential elections and (2) install an electoral system (options were being weighed 
at the time) that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and 
thereby enhance his power/influence.  
Following Afghanistan’s 2005 Parliamentary elections, the threat remained. 
Insurgent attacks increased by nearly approximately 300 percent through 200635 and a CIA 
assessment that year said the insurgency was a greater threat “than at any point since late 
2001.”36 In response, U.S./Afghan officials began to “openly ask” just “how long the 
regime could survive,”37 recognized that more resources were needed to balance the 
insurgents, and agreed that to do so the Afghan Army should further increase in size and 
effectiveness. As a result and with “few other countries” 38 willing to contribute, the U.S. 
was “compelled to invest substantially more of its own troops and considerably more funds 
to stem the Taliban tide.”39 This included transferring $2 billion in weapons and armaments 
to the Afghan army beginning in 2006. 40  
Karzai’s need for U.S. resources to balance unrelenting violence pushed him to 
collaborate with the great power to implement joint operations against insurgent forces41 
and agree to the “Afghanistan Compact” in 2006. The Compact outlined a strategy to 
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decrease political violence in order to “contribute to national, regional, and global peace 
and security”42 and the allies’ agreement to: increase the Army’s size; allow Afghanistan 
to take more “ownership” of the Army and Police; and to focus efforts on “building lasting 
Afghan capacity” in the security sector. Partly due to mounting U.S. concern about 
(passive) bandwagoning by regime elements, the Compact also included efforts to “combat 
corruption and ensure public transparency and accountability.”43 Even though Karzai’s 
central regime and particular Army elements initially cooperated with the U.S. to 
implement the Compact and military operations to balance insurgents, other regime 
components were at the same time diverting resources and aiding insurgents (passively 
bandwagoning) or turning their weapons on and killing regime forces (actively 
bandwagoning) in “green on blue” attacks.  
In spite of continued military assistance and alliance efforts to quell violence, at the 
end of Bush’s term and as Barack Obama prepared to take office “nearly all indicators of 
progress” were “trending downward,” “al-Qaeda remained active,” the “Taliban were 
spreading their wings,” and  “suicide bombings terrorized Kabul.”44 At this point, Karzai 
recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army 
to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election in 2009 
he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) 
to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively bandwagoning). 
Karzai’s prioritizing his interests and power (over the Afghan national interest) and 
simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning to secure his interests started in the twilight of 
Bush’s second term and metastasized during Obama’s presidency.  
 
197 
Linked to Obama’s campaign pledge that cast Afghanistan as a “war of necessity” 
and responding to an escalating threat, the U.S. conducted two reviews of its Afghanistan 
strategy and associated military tactics.45 These shared a similar conclusion as distilled by 
one of their final reports: “the overall situation is deteriorating” as the insurgency is 
“resilient and growing.”46 The U.S. recognized that it needed to adjust alliance strategy 
accordingly; however, its core policy-makers had two competing views on preferred 
alliance strategy. On one side, members of the U.S. military47 argued the alliance could fail 
unless Taliban momentum was reversed with a “comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) 
strategy” that required a “surge” of 44,000 additional troops48 based on the premise that if 
the U.S. retained its current strategy of “chasing terrorists in remote valleys” the “Taliban 
would continue to seize more territory” and “if insurgents toppled Karzai’s government, it 
would open the door for al Qaeda’s return.”49 Securing U.S. interests required reaching the 
point “where the insurgency no longer threatens the viability of the state.”50 On the other 
side, policy-makers argued the U.S. should secure its objectives through “Counter Terror-
Plus”: Special Forces attacks onto terrorists combined with growing/training the ANA.51 
They would eventually select the former. 
In the midst of and informing this strategy debate, reflecting a decline in cohesion, 
and Karzai’s turn to fully prioritizing his regime’s political prospects over what was best 
for Afghanistan’s national interest, the U.S. was increasingly skeptical if Karzai was 
reliable as an alliance partner and asking: “Could we live with this situation for another 
presidential term? Did the international community have a solid interlocutor in the 
presidential palace?” And in answering these questions, the U.S. “had serious doubts.”52 In 
a 2008 cable to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for example, U.S. Ambassador to 
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Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry listed six reasons why the surge/COIN would not be 
successful including that  “Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner” and “continues to 
shun responsibility for any sovereign burden” including sacking corrupt officials.53 Citing 
further concerns with the Karzai regime, he said in a later cable that a “credible partner in 
Kabul” was required for the COIN strategy but a “variable” he lacked confidence in.54  
In contrast to the Karzai regime’s view before the 2004 elections (close 
collaboration with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime power) in the run-up to the 
2009 presidential election it viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to 
winning and consolidating power for the long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that 
Karzai “combat corruption” within this regime (curb passive bandwagoning) to ensure 
proper use of alliance resources and bolster Afghan state capacity.55 For Karzai, appointing 
(“corrupt”) clients to regime positions, turning a blind-eye to their diversion of alliance 
funds, and himself using regime monies (alliance or non-alliance) as patronage were vital 
to garnering support sufficient to win. Alliance strategy called for the central regime to 
curb these forms of bandwagoning because doing so was in the better interests of 
Afghanistan writ large; however, for Karzai doing so was contrary to what would facilitate 
remaining in power. Consequently, as the election approached the regime violated these 
aspects of alliance strategy in order to grease the wheels of its get out the vote machine and 
in doing so hindered cohesion and effectiveness.56  
As reflected in a classified version of U.S. Afghanistan strategy at the time, 
Karzai’s actions were not lost on the U.S., which viewed him as a liability to securing 
American interests: “The implication is clear: Karzai is not our man in this upcoming 
election.”57 Doubting whether another five years with Karzai as president would best 
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position the U.S. to secure its interests, the U.S. quietly urged other (more pro-U.S.) 
candidates to run against Karzai.58 News of these U.S. actions soon reached and incensed 
Karzai, who accused the U.S. of a “British-American plot” to oust him from office.59 After 
the U.S. recognized that its push to promote alternate candidates was futile, it shifted 
support back to Karzai, who eventually was declared the winner in the 2009 presidential 
contest.60  
The consequences for alliance dynamics of events surrounding the election were 
palpable: “Even as Obama committed far more resources to Afghanistan in his first two 
years in office than Bush did over eight years in two terms, the Afghan leader grew 
convinced that the new U.S. president was out to get him. He began to fear for his political 
survival [emphasis mine].”61 The U.S. no longer viewed Karzai as a reliable ally and Karzai 
no longer viewed the partnership as serving his interests but, instead, as a direct challenge 
to them. 
Reflecting the continued need to preserve Karzai’s regime, however, the COIN 
alliance strategy rolled out in full after the 2009 elections sought to “deny safe haven to al 
Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.”62 
Deploying 30,000 additional troops to fight with and train regime Army/Police to “reverse 
the Taliban momentum,” demonstrated the U.S. continued need to safeguard the regime 
and, as Obama said in 2009, “seize the initiative.”63  
Having secured re-election, however, the Karzai regime’s willingness to work with 
its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly. No longer relying on the 
U.S. to cement long-term political power, “Karzai was finally free to be Karzai,” a former 
U.S. diplomat said, and “it wasn’t long before his behavior toward the coalition would 
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change.”64 Like its position vis-à-vis the 2006 Compact, the Karzai regime viewed aspects 
of the COIN strategy as potential threats to its political interests; specifically, the tactic of 
building “more credible” institutions at the subnational level and in so doing supplanting 
the patron-client power relationships vital to maintaining his power.65 Even though a high 
threat level remained and should arguably have pushed the allies closer (and thus divergent 
from cohesion of traditional alliances) Karzai’s regime “was not a willing partner in 
America’s grand plans”66 and began to openly disagree with alliance strategy and take 
actions contrary to the Afghan national interest. 
The rift between the U.S. and Karzai’s central regime had by November 2012 
grown so wide that the Wall Street Journal editorialized: “Afghanistan is now a two-front 
war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a bitter political rift with the Afghan 
president.”67 This encapsulates alliance dynamics at this juncture and the distinct 
characteristics of internal threat alliances: regime components were working with the U.S. 
in its “military struggle” to balance the insurgents, while other actors in the same regime 
(including Karzai himself) were engaged in bandwagoning to further their 
political/personal agendas. 
Through Obama’s first term and the period examined here, alliance effectiveness 
was moderate to low. In spite of $US billions in resources pooled through its alliance with 
the Karzai regime, the threat from an active insurgency remained. In sum, two factors 
(among others) hindered the allies’ ability to lessen the internal threat. First, the alliance 
did not sufficiently increase the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in size and 
effectiveness. And second, the Karzai regime did not curb bandwagoning by actors within 
his regime; what is more, his central regime itself engaged in bandwagoning. For 
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descriptions of the variation in level of threat and how capabilities did not sufficiently 
strengthen the Afghan security forces, see relevant Appendices at the end of this 
dissertation.  
II. CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT 
ALLIANCES 
 
Having provided an overview of the alliance period, this core section draws specific 
examples from the case to demonstrate the ways in which internal threat alliances differ 
from external threat alliances in the following four areas: (1) the nature of the threat that 
spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates states to align, (2) the 
characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when allies “bandwagon,” 
and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it. Collectively, these represent 
the framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and 
explaining the more common type of alliance today. The core section is divided into four 
sub-sections–one each for these four elements.  
1. FIRST CORE DIFFERENCE - NATURE OF THREAT / WHY STATES ALIGN:  
INTERNAL THREAT / TO ENSURE REGIME SURVIVAL AND GREAT POWER INTERESTS 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the nature of the threat and 
core factor motivating the formation of internal threat alliances is distinct from that in 
traditional alliances. In traditional (external threat alliances), states form alliances in 
response to a threat external in origin (another state or group of states) that imperils the 
state as a whole. Given the nature of this threat, the core factor motivating states to align 




In contrast, internal threat alliances stem from some threat domestic in origin to a 
regime that an outside country cares about. Accordingly, the motivation for alignment is 
distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak regime are motivated to align 
in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns because it needs (military and 
economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its 
existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s 
stability. 
To evidence this core difference, the section shows that the threat spurring the U.S.-
Afghanistan alliance consisted of a high level of political violence including but not limited 
to internal war: both the threat to regime survival (physical and political) posed by non-
state actors including insurgents mounting campaigns and the consequences such conflict 
poses for other actors (namely great powers) in the international system. And to 
demonstrate the distinct motivation underlying internal threat alliances, this section shows 
that the core factor underlying U.S./Afghanistan alignment was ensuring the peripheral 
regime’s survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. It demonstrates that 
particularly by 2002 the great power and the regime had formed an alliance based on a 
common threat from within the weaker state: the Karzai administration needed military and 
economic capabilities to balance threats from insurgents and remain in power, while the 
U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and 
launch attacks. To safeguard these interests, it needed to make sure its ally regime did not 
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A. PROFILE OF THE INTERNAL THREAT: INSURGENTS IMPERILING REGIME SURVIVAL 
AND U.S. INTERESTS  
The threat that spurred the U.S. and Afghanistan to bring their security policies into 
close cooperation and begin pooling resources consisted of political violence from 
insurgents that imperiled regime survival (physical and political) and the consequences 
such instability and regime failure posed to U.S. interests. 
This political violence can be disaggregated into two periods. The first is the period 
of internal war (mid-1990s through 2001) that enabled Al-Qaeda to carry out the 9/11 
attacks (reviewed above in the Historical Overview section) and witnessed the advent of 
insurgent or militia actors that re-merged after the alliance onset and attempted to topple 
Karzai’s regime. The second period and focus of this case includes the continuation of and 
escalation in political violence after Karzai came to power, when insurgent groups returned 
to Afghanistan to topple and replace the regime with a “more Islamic” state.  
In sum, three sets of actors emerged from and through these periods of conflict that 
fomented political violence and imperiled the regime and associated U.S interests: (1) 
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insurgent groups of Afghan and foreign fighters aiming to overthrow the Karzai regime 
and rout foreign forces including the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, and Al-
Qaeda, among others; (2) factional militias controlled by regional “warlords” who used 
violence to control “subnational fiefdoms” and associated power; and (3) narco-criminal 
bands who exploited a weak (and pliable) government to traffic opium in Afghanistan.68 
Militias and narco-criminal elements generated violence but were not the alliance’s main 
focus. For the purpose of this analysis, then, the principal threat to the U.S./Afghanistan is 
what I broadly refer to as “insurgent forces.”  
i. The Insurgent Threat  
After Karzai was named Interim President, various insurgent outfits that had 
regrouped in Pakistan began to re-enter Afghan territory and mount attacks against the 
regime.69 Collectively, the insurgents comprised “a xenophobic, anti-secular, anti-Western, 
ethno-linguistically Pashtun opposition.”70 The belligerents lacked a common command 
structure or unified ideology but “maintained a radical Islamist line” and shared a core 
overlapping objective: to jettison foreign forces from Afghanistan and overthrow the 
Karzai regime in order to replace it with a “more Islamic” regime (the Taliban’s motive) 
or recover “occupied” Muslim territory (Al-Qaeda’s desire).71   
While insurgents attacked the regime, the aforementioned regional powerbrokers 
engaged by the alliance to maintain stability were also churning up violence.72 These 
warlords were concerned primarily with increasing their power/influence rather than 
alliance objectives, and used these resources not to not dampen political violence but 
instead act with “contempt for the government and its international backers”73 and “create 
further mayhem in the countryside.”74  
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Collaborating with belligerents and corrupt regime actors, drug-traffickers 
increased the production and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan and in so doing indirectly 
endangered regime survival by providing insurgents with an additional source of financing. 
The Taliban and others relied on opium-related revenues for 70 percent of operational 
costs, leading the allies to conclude that Afghanistan’s opium trade “fueled the Taliban 
insurgency.”75 
In sum, brazen attacks, assassination attempts, and other forms of violence and 
illicit activity carried out by insurgents and warlord militias (and enabled by drug money) 
endangered the regime’s survival. Lacking the military/economic resources necessary to 
maintain its hold on power, the Karzai regime aligned and then worked with the U.S. to 
obtain capabilities necessary to do so.  
B. WHY THE U.S. AND AFGHANISTAN ALIGNED: TO SAFEGUARD THE REGIME AND U.S. 
INTERESTS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH 
Responding to the threat profile outlined above, the U.S. and Afghanistan brought 
their security policies into close cooperation to balance against the threats each state 
perceived from a surge in Afghanistan’s internal violence. And as demonstrated through 
the discussion below, why the great power and the regime aligned was clear and in 
accordance with the core motivations for formation of internal threat alliances. For the 
Karzai regime, insurgents generated violence that threatened its survival and hold on 
political power. Without sufficient capabilities to balance the threat, the regime sought U.S. 
assistance. For the U.S., these groups threatened their ally’s survival and sowed instability 
that could enable terrorist organizations to again use Afghanistan as a staging ground for 
future attacks as well as imperiled American access to Eurasian energy stores. Therefore, 
the U.S. had an interest in helping amass capabilities to weaken the insurgents and ensure 
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regime survival. For the U.S., insurgents threatened their ally’s survival and sowed 
instability that imperiled two strategic imperatives related to Afghanistan that drove 
alignment.  
First, Afghanistan is located amidst energy-rich polities and is a transit point for 
moving gas and oil stores from Eurasia to the U.S. market.76 Recognizing this, the U.S. has 
since the 1990s sought to construct an oil/gas pipeline across Afghanistan to reduce U.S. 
dependence on Arab oil and forego using Iranian or Russian pipelines in the region. By 
jeopardizing U.S. ability to do so, and making it harder to extract other resources from 
Afghanistan, political violence there hinders its ability to reduce dependence on Gulf oil.  
The second and more primary reason that Afghanistan is strategically important to 
the U.S. is that it served as a staging ground for terrorist organizations (namely Al-Qaeda) 
to attack American interests and territory. Instability within Afghanistan as an enabler for 
attacks onto U.S. interests increasingly became a threat in 1996, when the Taliban 
government allowed Al-Qaeda to establish training camps in its territory.77 From its base 
there and as part of its global jihad, Al-Qaeda recruited and trained members as well as 
implemented attacks against U.S. targets across the globe including Embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya (1998), a U.S. Navy destroyer stationed in Yemen’s port of Aden (2000), and 
the attacks on 9/11.78   
In addition to killing 2,753 U.S. residents, the 9/11 attacks wrought damage and 
destruction that sapped American resources and capabilities including but not limited to: 
$55 billion in physical damage, $123 billion in lost economic opportunities and business 
devaluations, and a six day closure of the New York Stock Exchange.79 As facilitated by 
Afghanistan’s “ungoverned spaces” (and pliable Taliban regime) Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts 
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represented a threat to the U.S. because they killed American civilians and destroyed U.S. 
military installations and strategic assets at home and abroad. Continued instability within 
Afghanistan generated by political violence, then, represented a threat to U.S. interests and 
needed to be balanced.  
Both before and after Karzai was named Interim President—and thus marking the 
start to his regime—political violence as enabling instability that could facilitate terrorism 
represented a threat to the U.S. After Karzai assumed power, however, U.S. ability to 
balance this threat became intimately linked to his regime’s survival. As insurgent attacks 
onto the regime increased from 2003 onward, then, so too did the risk to U.S. interests. As 
discussed below, political violence perpetrated by insurgents endangered the regime’s 
survival and U.S. interests. Due to these strategic considerations, the U.S. had an interest 
in aligning with the regime to weaken the insurgents and ensure its survival. 
i. George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance 
Terrorism 
Statements by U.S. President Bush and his foreign policy team concerning 
America’s engagement in Afghanistan and alignment with the Karzai regime clearly 
demonstrate that the core factor motivating the great power to align was to balance 
perceived threats stemming from instability in the Central Asian state. In order to prevent 
another 9/11 the U.S. needed to make sure Afghanistan was stable and devoid of “safe 
havens” terrorists could use to launch attacks, and preserving the Karzai regime’s survival 
was required to do so. As a senior official serving in the first Bush administration told me 
in an interview: “we knew terrorists could use those mountains/valleys to launch attacks 
and to make sure it didn’t happen, Karzai needed to be able to stand up; we needed to make 
sure he didn’t fall back down.”80  
 
208 
Reflecting this threat perception, Bush on October 7, 2001 explained the motivation 
for U.S. “carefully targeted actions” in Afghanistan as “designed to disrupt the use of 
Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the 
Taliban regime.”81 In doing so, the U.S. would “make it more difficult for the terror 
network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans.”82 Further to this point, Paul 
Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, summarized the threat to the U.S. and the 
strategy it should pursue to balance it as not only “capturing people and holding them 
accountable” but “removing the sanctuaries, the support systems, ending states who 
sponsor terrorism.”83  
Propping up the Karzai regime was crucial to removing safe havens terrorists could 
use to attack the homeland. As the U.S. National Security Strategy for 2002 holds, the U.S. 
was “threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones” and therefore needed to 
make sure the regime sitting atop the Afghan polity did not crumble.84 This core incentive 
for U.S. alignment remained relatively constant through the end of Bush’s two terms. The 
2005 State Department counterterrorism strategy holds, for example, that “denying 
terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate 
effectively” and therefore is why the U.S. in Afghanistan “is helping to build a safe, stable 
society” that “eliminates an environment in which terrorist groups have flourished.”85 
Similarly, the March 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy states that the U.S. “must deny 
the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for 
terror”86 and goes on to state regarding Afghanistan specifically that: 
The terrorists’ goal is to overthrow a rising democracy; claim a strategic country as a haven 
for terror…and strike America…with ever-increasing violence. This is why success in 
Afghanistan is vital, and why we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned 




The continued need to safeguard Karzai’s regime to mitigate future terrorist attacks 
is reflected in Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2008 statement regarding the U.S.-Afghan 
alliance: “All future success will hinge on the defeat of the extremists and the terrorists 
who want to pull this country back to the dark ages…the commitment of the United States 
is firm and unshakable.”88 A senior U.S. official who served in the second Bush 
administration and was involved in Afghanistan policy echoed this statement when he told 
me in an interview that “like it or not, we needed to keep him [Karzai] stable. He was “our 
man” in Kabul, and routing terrorists meant we needed to keep him/his people alive.”89 
Various statements by the Karzai regime demonstrate that it aligned in order to 
obtain capabilities needed to thwart attacks from insurgents and remain in power. When 
asked about the importance of U.S. engagement in 2002, for example, he noted that “the 
cost of the U.S. not staying committed is too high” and that without continued U.S. 
capabilities “Afghanistan could slide back into lawlessness and anarchy.”90 He lacked a 
national army to combat increasingly active insurgents and depended on “international 
security forces in Kabul to stay in power.”91 Absent reliable body guards and with a 
fragmented Defense Ministry (elements of which, discussed below, lusted after his seat), 
in July 2002 Karzai asked the U.S. to replace his Afghan protectors with U.S. Special 
Forces.92 That Karzai relied on the great power’s soldiers for his personal security detail 
“was a stark reminder of this weakness.”93 Without security forces to thwart attacks, the 
regime relied on U.S. capabilities devoted to the alliance to balance the threat. This 
remained relatively constant through 2005 when Karzai said, after being asked what would 
transpire should U.S. forces leave, that his country would “go back immediately to chaos” 
and would “not make it as a sovereign, independent nation able to stand on its own feet.”94  
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And this continued through the end of Bush’s second term. Through 2007 Karzai 
was “heavily” dependent on the U.S. presence “for his safety and consolidation of his 
government”95 and in a 2008 press conference with Bush said his regime needed “to 
continue our cooperation” with the U.S. “until we have defeated terrorism and extremism 
and the threat that emanates from them to us.”96 Afghanistan, he said, would “not allow the 
international community to leave before…we are strong enough to defend our country.” 97 
There was “no way” his regime could “let [the U.S.] go” before “we have taken from 
President Bush and the next administration billions and billions of more dollars.”98 Though 
this statement reportedly drew laughter from the crowd in the Afghan presidential palace, 
it is indicative of how the regime’s survival continued to depend on its great power ally 
and therefore underscores the core factor motivating its decision to align. 
ii. Barack H. Obama (2008-2012) and Hamid Karzai: Regime Survival to Balance 
Terrorism 
“We will prevent the Taliban from turning Afghanistan back into a safe haven from 
which international terrorists can strike at us or our allies.  This would pose a direct threat 
to the American homeland, and that is a threat that we cannot tolerate.” – President Barack 
Obama, December 2009 
The Obama administration’s threat perception and associated motivation for 
(continued) alignment with the Karzai regime was like that of Bush. Soon after assuming 
office, Obama stated that the U.S. objective in Afghanistan remained to “disrupt, dismantle 
and defeat al Qaeda” and to “prevent their return in the future” and that the Karzai regime’s 
survival was vital to achieving this objective: “If the Afghan government falls to the 
Taliban or allows al Qaeda to go unchallenged, that country will again be a base for 
terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”99 This view is 
further evidenced in comments made by James Jones, Obama’s National Security Advisor, 
who said in June 2009 that “If we’re not successful here…you’ll have a staging base for 
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global terrorism all over the world.”100 These core motivations for U.S. alignment are 
formally reflected in the 2009 “Terms Sheet” outlining the Obama administration’s U.S. 
Strategy for Afghanistan: 
The United States goal in Afghanistan is to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban 
the ability to overthrow the Afghan government [emphasis added]. The strategic concept for 
the United States…is to degrade the Taliban insurgency while building sufficient Afghan 
capacity to secure and govern their country…This approach is tied more tightly to the core goal 
of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating Al Qaeda and preventing al Qaeda’s return 
to safe havens in Afghanistan.101  
 
The U.S. need to safeguard Karzai’s regime against overthrow in order to guard 
against safe havens informed Obama’s decision to escalate the total number of U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan through two “surges” in force deployments: 17,000 troops before 
Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential elections and a further 30,000 soon thereafter, bringing the 
total to more than 100,000 by 2010.102 As described by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, safeguarding Karzai’s regime also guided use of non-military alliance 
capabilities devoted to “stabilizing” the country: “The goal of our assistance…is to create 
the conditions for a more stable, democratic government capable of resisting attempts by 
Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups from returning and establishing safe havens from 
which to launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.”103 Insurgents posed direct and indirect 
threats to U.S. national security and needed to be weakened or defeated.  
The Karzai regime’s core motivation for aligning with the U.S. remained analogous 
from the Bush to Obama administrations: to secure capabilities he lacked yet were required 
to ensure his regime’s political survival. Speaking at a press conference with U.S. Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates in 2009, for example, Karzai said there was a “realism on our part 




In this section I demonstrated that the U.S. and Afghanistan aligned in response to 
high levels of political violence and that the core factor underlying this alignment was the 
need to ensure regime survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. This is 
distinct from traditional alliances, where states align to balance threats from other states 
(or disruptions in power) and do so to preserve territorial security and the national interest. 
The following section examines the characteristics of allies who form internal threat 
alliances.    
2. SECOND CORE DIFFERENCE - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEAKER ALLY: 
MAJOR INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING INTERESTS 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that the characteristics of the allies 
involved in internal threat alliances are distinct from states that form traditional military 
alliances. External threat alliances are formed by countries that have some internal 
fragmentation; however, they are essentially between two cohesive actors. By contrast, for 
internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that accompanying alliances will 
generally comprise states of unequal levels of development and internal fragmentation: one 
stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great power) and a weaker, peripheral 
state with major internal fragmentation. Given that the U.S. is a great power, its internal 
cohesiveness can be assumed. Focusing on the weaker ally’s characteristics, then, this sub-
section demonstrates that its major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct 
from great powers in traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities 
and associated actions in the internal threat alliance.  
First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or 
components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the 
weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the 
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specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core 
they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In 
making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational 
level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or 
that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
In sum, the section demonstrates that the U.S. was dealing not with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with 
essentially cohesive states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a fragmented central 
regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components therein, and other 
subnational actors, each with their respective interests.  
A. THE AFGHAN ALLY: FRAGMENTED REGIME, MULTIPLE ACTORS, COMPETING 
INTERESTS 
In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, 
Afghanistan lacks strong institutions, firm control over those agencies that exist, or a writ 
that extends throughout its complex topography. This lower level of development is rooted 
in a state formation process plagued by external intervention and subnational factions 
competing for power. As a result of its geopolitically-advantageous location, for centuries 
Afghanistan was the “playground” for the “Great Game” fought between Russia and 
Britain.105 Through this period Afghanistan became a “rentier state” whose central regime 
relied on largesse from great powers to maintain internal order and balance demands from 
ethnic groups and “elite, patronage-based networks” competing for power and influence. 
Due to this combination of invasion and insufficient attempts (or resources) to standup a 
robust government, Afghanistan’s central state became “defined more in its relation to 
outside players and the negotiation of a complex web of kinship-based patronage than any 
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internally generated sense of national unity among the ethnic, national, and tribal units 
within its borders.”106  
Despite external and internal challenges, Afghanistan’s rulers over the course of 
decades developed central agencies charged with maintaining a monopoly on the use of 
force. In doing so and driven by their core desire to maximize power/influence, rulers 
endeavored to centralize authority in the capital (and executive office) and establish sway 
over outlying areas. However, they were able to “consolidate their power” at the national 
level only by “playing [ethno-regional] groups against each other” and even then control 
over territory remained “precarious.”107 In some respects, the Bonn agreement sought to 
strike a balance between prior attempts108 to consolidate authority by constructing central 
institutions reflecting Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic make-up while devolving some authority 
to subnational (mainly provincial) actors; however, efforts thereafter related to fleshing out 
institutional protocols and funding streams arguably re-balanced authority in favor of the 
center.109 The 2004 constitution further consolidated central (presidential) authority. 
Despite these and other efforts to centralize power, though, deeply imbedded competing 
loyalties and “tribal and religious resistance to central government authority” continued to 
make central control of subnational areas feeble.110 
The products of this stylized synopsis of Afghanistan’s state formation process 
relevant to alliance dynamics would be three-fold—first, bureaucratic agencies that were 
weak, corrupt, and did not always act to advance the regime’s interests, and a central regime 
that could not control their actions; second, a fragmented nation characterized by 
subnational systems of political and economic power, the regime actors in which prioritized 
their interests (patron-client, survival, or a share in the spoils of victory) over the central 
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regime (and eventually alliance strategy); and third, a central regime tightly entangled in 
these elite-based, ethno-regional patronage networks that strongly informed its decisions 
and actions, particularly related to alliance dynamics. In sum, these three products of state 
formation meant that the state under Karzai was “on the whole an empty shell occupied by 
forces which claim to be acting in the name of the state but are in fact pursuing their own 
ends, whether individual, familial, tribal or ethnic.”111 The characteristics of the central 
regime and its component parts are described further below. 
For the period examined, Afghanistan’s central regime was comprised of the 
President and his Cabinet.112 These actors worked with the U.S. to align their security 
polices and agree to alliance strategy and tactics. Analogous to peripheral states needing to 
form internal threat alliances, the central regime can be conceptualized as “neopatrimonial” 
wherein the leader “maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than ideology 
or law and” occupies their office “less to perform public service than to acquire personal 
wealth and status.”113 To remain in power and maximize influence Afghan leaders must 
appease regionally-based ethnic-patron networks and use the spoils of government to do 
so: the “matters and resources of state” are “treated by the ruler as his personal affair.”114 
Since the 2004 constitution, the Executive has been one of the more powerful branches of 
government. In his dual role as head-of-state and commander-in-chief, the president 
formulates (and can quickly alter) foreign and defense policy and appoint (or can remove) 
governors and ministers. As applied to alliance dynamics, the regime’s core motivations 
meant Karzai’s decisions on policy/strategy were linked to the option that would best 
augment his influence; and presidential authority enabled him to change these policies 
quickly and as needed, to secure these interests.  
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The core bureaucratic agencies involved in devising alliance strategy and carrying 
out agreed tactics “in the field” were the Ministries of Interior and Defense—and the 
Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) they oversee, respectively. Provincial 
governors are relevant in so far as they control ANP forces and oversee government 
agencies in their area of authority.115 Technically, Executive authority should include sway 
over agency policies and actions. Analogous to peripheral states and a core factor that 
enables simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning, however, Afghanistan’s level of 
development and political history combined to grant them greater autonomy in terms of 
policy planning and activities. As former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Dr. Robert Finn 
told me in an interview: “Karzai was President and people in and out of government and 
throughout the regions recognized that, but then did what they wanted.”116 In prioritizing 
their interests and instead of unshakably implementing central regime guidance, regime 
agencies “defend[ed] their bureaucratic turf” and aimed “first to preserve the interests of 
stakeholders, which usually center on patron-client relations.”117  
In addition to this de facto autonomy from the central regime, Afghanistan’s 
particular political context further fragments agencies’ internal structures to in essence 
yield Ministries consisting of various component parts. Competing loyalties to ethno-
regional fealties that permeate Afghan society and institutions create factions within regime 
agencies in general and security forces (Army and Police) particularly. These can be 
viewed as sub-components of the key ministries and is particularly pronounced in the 
armed forces: “With ethnic frictions and political factionalism undercutting institutional 
loyalty” the army “remains a fragmented force” that serves “disparate interests.”118 As 
summarized by an Afghan security official, “you do not have a national army or a national 
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police” but rather a “factionalized army and police” that “are fighting for their factions, not 
the country.”119 Rather than pursuing alliance objectives, the security forces (from 
Ministers to lower officers) were “little more than pawns in an elaborate game of chess 
between multiple regional powerbrokers.”120 Leveraging this de facto autonomy from the 
central regime, the Military and Police (and sub-components therein) throughout the 
alliance took actions to pursue their primary interests and not alliance goals: “Despite the 
billions of dollars spent, the army’s expansion is likely to yield diminishing returns because 
of the government’s failure to check ethnic factionalism, with senior military commanders, 
backed by powerbrokers, engaged in dangerous political rivalries.”121 
In sum, the regime’s fragmented character meant that agencies (and components 
therein) leveraged autonomy and made decisions (and used government resources) to 
advance their personal interests—maximize resources flowing into their coffers, solidify 
patronage ties, or to benefit their ethnic kin—over alliance goals. What is more, the further 
intra-fragmentation of regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency 
components (Police unit A, for example) may be balancing the threat, but others (Police 
unit B, for instance) could simultaneously be bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to 
understanding external threat alliances, the great power had to juggle dynamics between 
the central regime and a menagerie of agencies in order to secure its interests. This 
fragmented character enabled various regime actors to influence alliance dynamics in 
general and to simultaneously balance/bandwagon particularly. 
B. CLIENTELISM:  COMPETING LOYALTIES 
 “In Afghanistan, patron-client relationships are key to power and regime actors 
prioritized them over alliance goals.”122 
Various scholars of Central Asian politics have documented patron-client relations 
(clientelism) in Afghanistan and its effect onto the nation’s politics, governance, and 
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economic development.123 A full review of these texts is beyond the scope of this chapter 
and marginal to its central analysis; however, a brief outline of the root causes and main 
manifestations of clientelism (relevant to influencing actions by regime elements) in 
Afghanistan is necessary in order to demonstrate its impact onto alliance dynamics.  
Rather than any sense of or allegiance to a national identity, Afghans’ “primary 
loyalty” has always been to their “own kin, village, tribe, or ethnic group” (“Qawn”), 
ethno-factional “solidarity groups” generally concentrated in a particular subnational 
region.124 These patron-client networks with associated motivations permeated (and 
continue to) agencies and associated actions and “regularly trumped any loyalty to the 
central state or national interest.”125 In so far as regime actors affiliated with (and loyal to) 
an ethno-regional network run the regime’s agencies, these political institutions were and 
“remain deeply rooted in Afghan cultural values and social organizations”;126 and actors 
therein prioritized these fealties over the national interest or other considerations. 
Concurrent with consolidation of subnational power bases rooted in these allegiances, 
attempts by Afghan rulers’ to establish control outside the capitol laid a foundation for 
patronage-based power dynamics between the center (Kabul) and periphery (subnational 
regions) where in the latter “concepts of patriotism, citizenship, or indeed any sense of 
political obligation to the state was almost entirely absent.”127  
During the Soviet occupation, the contours of patron-client relations changed in 
two ways. First, aligning with an outside power “to obtain resources to solidify local power 
bases, only to then contravene that agreement,” was institutionalized.128 Second, the center-
periphery disconnect was solidified and “the collapse of a functioning central government 
led to the formation of parallel power structures at the local level, often headed by local 
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commanders.”129  By the late 1990s such “regional and ethnic power brokers had emerged 
that stood in opposition to Kabul-based elite”130 and acted to advance the power/influence 
of their competing elite networks. This laid a foundation for inter-elite network competition 
that later dominated Afghan politics. As the Soviet-based regime crumbled, Afghanistan 
consisted of a central regime that needed to cement power and to do so employed great 
power-provided patronage to gain favor with and control subnational power brokers; and 
an array of regional powerbrokers who sought not to serve the center but, instead, solidify 
and expand their subnational power bases. After international actors routed the Taliban, 
the scope and manifestation of patron-client relations morphed further.  
The Bonn Agreement altered the power dynamics of clientelism by mandating 
space for representatives of competing networks (and their opposing interests) within 
government/regime positions and agencies relevant to the alliance. As the Interim regime 
took shape, two broad “political constructed ethno-regional” networks “principally defined 
along ethnic lines” emerged to compete for power and influence within the state: a broad 
patchwork assembly of former Northern Alliance commanders and the other headed by 
Hamid Karzai.131 The “distribution of government ministries on the basis of a spectrum of 
political representation” essentially “resulted in the establishment of ethnic fiefdoms in the 
ministries that quickly set up networks of nepotism, bribery and corruption.”132 Instead of 
establishing a viable form of administrative government, then, the Bonn agreement “set 
into motion a fierce internal competition between different elites within the government”133 
with bureaucratic agencies (and parts therein) motivated principally to serve patron-client 
ties based in such elite networks.134 The resources introduced via the U.S.-Karzai alliance 
swelled the revenues and thus patronage (influence) these elite networks could compete for 
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to divert and distribute as patronage to actors in exchange for their support and associated 
influence.135 This influx of alliance monies also enlarged the pool of resources insurgents 
could extort from subnational officials and further incentivized attempting to press regime 
elements to bandwagon.  
The detailed trajectory of Afghanistan’s variant of clientelism aside, this process 
yielded two products that pushed regime actors to choose patron-client relations over 
loyalty to the national interest (and thus subnational bandwagoning over balancing) during 
the alliance and are directly relevant to examining its dynamics. First, it firmly entrenched 
prioritizing increasing power/influence over alliance goals (or the national interest) and 
therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “Rather than thinking of…effective or enabling 
decisive decision-making, Afghans consider all their actions in terms of kinship, patronage 
networks, and the complex society of which they are a part.”136 And second, regionally-
based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing personal power/influence 
via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime (and alliance) or national 
interest. Where in Colombia alternative fealties generated subnational “political 
archipelagoes,” in Afghanistan these created at any given time over the alliance period 
“sub-state political communities” (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009), “micro-societies of tribal 
power” (Sharan 2011), or “de facto states controlled by regional power-holders” (Wilder 
and Listed 2011).”137 These subnational bases of power arguably approximate the 
“subsystems” Rosenau (1964) argued IR scholars must problematize when examining the 
link between political violence and international relations and comprise a mix of the elite-
based networks fused with government positions and the “local leaders and ethnic regional 
strongmen” that are “resistant to the project of building a nation-state” whose power is 
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based on “financial and military strength, as well as personal, factional and historical 
loyalties”138  
In sum, Afghanistan was a fragmented nation characterized by subnational bases of 
political/economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime actors to contravene 
central regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. In line with this distinct 
characteristics of internal threat alliances, and as the following section on bandwagoning 
further demonstrates, it was not two generally cohesive states working together (as in 
traditional alliances), but a great power dealing with multiple actors of a fragmented weak 
regime (agencies, components therein, and powerbrokers within subnational state-lets) that 
each had competing interests. Sometimes they prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; 
other times they agreed to alliance strategy and balanced. 
3. THIRD CORE DIFFERENCE – WHY AND WHEN ALLIES BANDWAGON: 
SIMULTANEOUS WITH BALANCING AND MOTIVATED BY FEAR, PROFIT, AND PATRON-
CLIENT RELATIONS 
 
The purpose of this sub-section is to demonstrate that because of the weaker ally’s 
internal fragmentation “bandwagoning” in internal threat alliances is distinct in 
manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military alliances.  
In traditional alliances, countries either balance (resist threats) or bandwagon 
(appease threats) when faced with an external enemy. Driven by the core motivation to 
preserve the national interest and territorial survival, states bandwagon with the threat 
either to ensure survival or share in the spoils of the winning coalition (“for profit”).  
By contrast, with internal threat alliances the peripheral ally’s weak character 
means its central regime is unable to control all of its component actors. As a result, 
balancing and bandwagoning can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with 
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the great power to implement alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its 
police, military, or other subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors 
fomenting violence. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states generate a 
motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and 
to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances).  
Through the period examined, regime actors in the capital or subnational areas 
including police, military, governors, or central regime actors contravened alliance strategy 
and bandwagoned in order to survive, share in the spoils of victory, or to maximize their 
power/influence (as rooted in patron-client relations). Distinct to internal threat alliances, 
even as the great power and central regime collaborated to balance insurgents and narco-
traffickers, that regime’s agencies (and component parts therein) were simultaneously 
bandwagoning with these actors. The discussion below demonstrates that balancing and 
bandwagoning occur simultaneously in internal threat alliances and provides examples of 
bandwagoning motivated by all three factors.   
i. Bandwagoning to Survive: Defections and Diverting Alliance Resources 
As part of their repertoire of action aimed at toppling the regime, insurgents 
threatened civilian (governors and their staff, for example) and security sector (national 
police officers, in many cases) regime actors to the point where they agreed to collude with 
the insurgents in order to survive. This bandwagoning took many forms yet two 
manifestations (both active) were most prominent: first, Army or Police components 
defected to the insurgents to save their lives or their families’; and second, insurgents 
extorted regime actors by forcing them to give up alliance resources (money, arms, etc.) in 
exchange for living or permission to operate in a given area.   
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Representative of security force defections as a form of bandwagoning to survive, 
in response to “the threat of death” from insurgents in July 2008 various police officers in 
Nuristan and Farayab provinces “defected” to the Taliban in order to save their own lives 
or those of their families’ lives.139 Instances of extortion by insurgents were more 
widespread (or regularly reported) than security force defections to survive and include, 
for example, a Jalalabad provincial official paying the Taliban ($2,000 to $4,000) monthly 
in exchange for the group not killing him and his family. As the official recounted: “We 
pay so they don’t kill us. And the Taliban are happy with the sum and leave us alone.”140 
As a U.S. official who worked in Paktika province told me in an interview: “government 
officials’ survival relied on keeping the Taliban satisfied, and that often meant giving them 
what they wanted—money.”141 Similar bandwagoning to survive occurred in Kandahar, as 
a Senior U.S. official who worked there told me: “Provincial officials were holding money 
and skimming it off of the top. They had to give a cut to who held that territory (Taliban 
or other insurgents) to make sure they survived.”142 Much the same occurred in Kunar 
province, where “insurgents pushed local government officials to give them a cut of 
resources used in their area” under “threat to them and their families.” It was “abundantly 
clear” that “insurgents were extorting government officials.”143 And in Nangahar, regime 
representatives did “what was necessary to stay alive” and this often “was opposite to what 
was agreed at the center and involved colluding with the opposition.”144  
 In addition to threatening and forcing regime representatives to hand over alliance 
monies to survive, insurgents targeted foreign organizations working with (and viewed as 
an extension of) regime actors. As a U.S. military official who worked in Helmand 
province told me, these actors “paid the Taliban in order to prevent attacks on their 
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workforce” and there was “no doubt money was making its way into opposition hands and 
buying weapons for them to use against us.”145 Insurgents pressing actors to bandwagon in 
this manner swelled to the point where the Taliban established an office in Kabul to receive 
such payments in exchange for “clearance” to work in an area.146 In Kandahar, this “fee for 
survival,” as one interviewee dubbed it, ranged from 10 to 20 percent of an alliance activity 
budget.147 A separate investigation concluded that “handing cash out to insurgents to keep 
them from attacking projects was a common practice.”148 “Like their co-conspirators in the 
Afghan government,” another analysis concluded, “the insurgents learned how to score 
U.S. taxpayer money for their own purposes.”149 Regime actors were actively 
bandwagoning by diverting alliance capabilities to insurgents who used said monies to fund 
anti-regime operations. After insurgents extorted funds from regime actors and 
organizations working on a construction project, for example, they used them to purchase 
weapons then used against alliance forces.150 
International and regime representatives corroborated that this form of active 
bandwagoning occurred throughout Afghanistan. As a senior ISAF official who managed 
such funds told me in an interview in Kabul, “we were under the illusion that increasing 
resources would reduce violence in some areas” but instead “the opposite happened and in 
many cases the number of violent attacks actually increased because insurgents were 
extorting funds and then using them against us.”151 Senior U.S. represenatives were also 
aware of this active bandwagoning. A report to the U.S. Congress indicated that funds paid 
to the Taliban for “security” (safe passage through a given area) were “a significant source 
of funding for the insurgents.”152 Secretary of State Clinton said in 2009 testimony to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee that “siphoning off contractual money from the 
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international community” is a “major source of funding for the Taliban.”153 The U.S. 
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan came to a similar conclusion: 
“American and coalition dollars help finance the Taliban. And with more development, 
higher traffic on roads, and more troops, the Taliban would make more money.”154 And the 
UN, as reflected in comments by its Kabul-based Representative, came to analogous 
suppositions: “Money disappears into the hands of wealthy Afghans” and was paid “to the 
Taliban to ensure safe passage”155 
Non-governmental officials and the insurgents themselves also substantiate that 
belligerents pressed regime actors and their foregin organization extensions to divert 
resources and bandwagon to survive. As an NGO worker with more than ten years’ 
experience in Afghanistan told me in an interview, “most people consider aid project taxing 
to be the most important source of revenue for insurgents” after opium.156 And as a former 
Taliban foreign affairs official said, implying the insurgents relied on extorting regime 
elements: “The Americans have been deceiving themselves” by “saying the Taliban has 
been getting all of their money from drugs.”157 
This form of bandwagoning had become so widespread in the alliance’s later years 
that the great power/regime established Task Force 435 to investigate and devise 
mechanisms to stop it. In July 2011 this unit concluded that insurgents had extorted an 
estimated $2.16 billion in alliance capabilities.158 As one journalist covering Afghanistan 
found, it was “an accepted fact” that “the U.S. government funds the very forces American 
forces are fighting.”159 The U.S. and central regime agreed to pool resources and weaken 
insurgents partly through a strategy of “winning hearts and minds”—but instead, as an 
Army captain would tell me, “because these guys were defecting or handing stuff over to 
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the Taliban,” resources were instead used to purchase “bombs and mines” used against 
alliance forces.160 
ii. Bandwagoning for Profit: Switching to the Winning Side to Share in Spoils of 
Victory 
Regime actors also bandwagoned “for profit.” This is in line with Afghanistan’s 
“culture of defection” wherein the “art” of “opportunistic betrayal is as old as Afghanistan 
itself.”161 The “ultimate aim” of Afghans is “to survive in their unstable land by joining the 
winning side.”162 Bandwagoning to share in the spoils of victory manifested in two main 
forms. Examples below should be viewed as distinct from those presented above insofar as 
regime actors contravened alliance strategy because they believed the insurgents may win.  
The first form of bandwagoning for profit included defecting to the insurgency and 
can be seen as a function of the Taliban’s structure of supporters within the population and 
regime, which can be disaggregated into two broad networks: “hard core militants” and 
“networkers.” The former (Talib) fervently supported the insurgency and consistently 
remained “aligned to it” even after the alliance routed the Taliban. The “networkers,” by 
contrast, were “local leaders” and other regime actors “of various kinds” who practiced 
“flexible alignment politics” that were contingent “upon the balance of threats, rewards 
and solidarity factors.”163 Where the Talib unswervingly supported the insurgency after 
initial U.S.-Karzai alignment, the networkers largely defected (at least overtly) from the 
movement and “sat on the fence in the intervening years” until the Taliban returned and 
started to attack the regime.  
As there appeared to be “momentum behind the insurgency” (and victory looked 
probable) “networker” regime elements proceeded to “join the antigovernment forces” 
because there was “something in it for them.”164 Police, Army, and other actors decided to 
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actively aid (and bandwagon with) the Taliban at this juncture not out of fear for survival 
but because they had hedged their bets, decided the insurgents were the most likely winning 
coalition, and sought to share in the spoils of its (at that point) likely victory. In eastern 
Afghanistan in July 2008, for example, “collusion took place” between the National Police 
chief there and governor in a specific district with the insurgents that enabled the 
belligerents to carry out a surprise attack against alliance forces.165 These regime actors 
were to provide actionable information to and work with alliance authorities to balance 
insurgents but instead shared information on planned military operations with the 
insurgents, which then conducted a deadly counter-offensive. As an army assessment 
found: “the district police chief and district governor were complicit in supporting the 
attack.”166 Similarly, regime elements allocated non-military activity budgets to individuals 
known to financially support the Taliban. Kapisa’s governor, for example, allocated 
alliance funds to individuals with proven ties to the insurgency who in turn gave “a part of 
the funds allocated” to “HiG and Taliban commanders in Kapisa province and Sorobi 
District (Kabul province).”167 One year later, the insurgency ballooned in these areas.  
a. “Green-on-Blue” Bandwagoning 
The second form of bandwagoning for profit involved Army or Police elements 
carrying out “green on blue” attacks wherein they (in “green” uniforms) attacked other 
non-regime alliance personnel (in “blue” uniforms”) and in some cases regime security 
forces who were balancing. This is arguably the most conceptually pure form of 
bandwagoning in that it involved regime actors slaying other regime actors (or U.S. 
soldiers) in order to assist the insurgents’ campaign to topple the regime. Since alliance 
actors began tracking this phenomenon in 2008, there have been 80 (reported) incidents of 
green-on-blue bandwagoning and the frequency of such attacks has progressively 
 
228 
increased: by 50 percent from 2008 to 2009; 220 percent from that year to 2011; and by 
175 percent from 2011 to 2012.168 
Regime Army and Police components were most responsible for these incidents of 
active bandwagoning. To cite but a few examples of each, in November 2010 a soldier 
killed two U.S. Marines at a base in Helmand and then “fled to the Taliban.”169 The 
following year, a police representative killed two alliance soldiers in Helmand and a few 
months later a soldier killed two and wounded seven U.S. soldiers in Kandahar. 170 In July 
2011, a soldier killed an ISAF soldier in Helmand while on a joint patrol.171 Though 
concentrated in southern Afghanistan, green-on-blue bandwagoning also occurred 
elsewhere.172 In April 2011, for example, a soldier killed several U.S. soldiers in Kabul 
airport and in 2012 a soldier killed two U.S. soldiers in Nangahar province, other Army 
members assassinated two American advisors inside the Ministry of interior, and a police 
officer in Paktia killed nine officers. This bandwagoning (particularly in the south) 
occurred at the same time as other regime actors were carrying out activities (in the same 
areas) to balance insurgents.173  
iii. Bandwagoning for Power and Patron: Self Interest over National Interest 
“I described this is a Mafia state. We see the Afghan state on one side, and the Taliban 
on the other. But the reality is they work together.” – Peter Galbraith, UN Special 
Representative for Afghanistan.174 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, fear for survival or a share in the spoils of 
victory cannot account for all instances of regime bandwagoning during this period. 
Indeed, central and subnational regime elements also bandwagoned to maximize their 
power or influence (mainly financial).175 Bandwagoning motivated by this priority seems 
to have been the most widespread, yielding “a grand collusion between the insurgents and 
the Afghan authorities” that resulted in a “pattern repeated over and over” where 
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“traditional enemies are working together wherever there’s a chance to make money.”176 
Regime actors bandwagoning in this manner occupied posts at all levels and included 
warlords used to maintain security outside of Kabul, Ministers and their staff, as well as 
Army soldiers/officers and those of similar rank in the Police. 177 
Due to the pervasive nature of bandwagoning across all actors, this section melds 
examples of passive/active bandwagoning rooted in patron-client relations and to 
streamline the summary is organized by regime actor. The primary form of passive 
bandwagoning was diversion of alliance resources from their intended purpose and to 
enhancing one’s personal power and influence.178 And this manifestation of passive 
bandwagoning had tangible implications for the alliance’s ability to achieve its goal: 
“Corruption has become a factor contributing to terrorism, insurgency, and narcotics. It has 
done more damage to Afghanistan than much of the violence.”179  The two main forms of 
active bandwagoning were regime actors: (1) diverting alliance capabilities directly to 
insurgents; and (2) turning a blind eye to (or aiding) the narco-trafficking industry (a source 
of insurgent financing).  
a. Bandwagoning enables Bin Laden’s Escape 
In October 2001 U.S. and Northern Alliance allies had driven a large contingent of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives (including bin Laden) to the mountainous region known 
as Tora Bora.180 The U.S. paid various Afghan commanders presumed to be reliable allies 
to ensure the belligerents could not escape into Pakistan—some of these Afghan 
commanders actively pursued (and balanced) opposition elements, but others were 
simultaneously bandwagoning with al-Qaeda and helping them escape. In exchange for 
payments amounting to a reported $6 million,181 specific Afghan commanders aligned with 
the U.S. helped 800 Al-Qaeda fighters and bin Laden escape into Pakistan. Even as the 
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U.S. and some NA commanders balanced opposition elements, “Bin Laden could count on 
other Afghan helping hands” that guaranteed his escape.182 Capturing bin Laden “was the 
single most important objective” and this simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning prevented 
the allies from achieving it “precisely because the United States’ new Afghan allies refused 
to stand in their way.”183 This bandwagoning enabled Taliban and insurgent actors to flee 
and later return to mount campaigns against Karzai’s regime and was also a sign of further 
balancing/bandwagoning to come.  
b. “Warlords” Bandwagon to Safeguard Subnational Fiefdoms 
“Encouraged by their own ambitions and U.S. support, the warlords refused to 
disband their private armies, and routinely engaged in armed clashes over control 
of territory…The most senior and well known warlords served as provincial 
governors, but refused to accept direction from Karzai’s central government in 
Kabul.”184  
An element of initial strategy was to give arms and cash to regional powerbrokers 
(“warlords”) to dampen political violence in their subnational regions; and viewed as 
extensions of the regime, they were expected to apply these capabilities to carry out alliance 
activities against the internal threat. During this time, some warlords operated according to 
alliance strategy and balanced opposition elements. “We could rely on some of them to 
track down the insurgents,” a former U.S. official told me.185 At the same time and 
particularly by 2002, however, rather than unswervingly implementing agreed strategy 
(and balancing) the warlords were bandwagoning by running “their enclaves like private 
mini-states, often without regard for the central government.”186 Instead of ensuring 
stability per alliance strategy they had instead “stolen peoples’ homes, arbitrarily arrested 
their enemies, and tortured them in private jails.” And rather than actively working with 
U.S. and Afghan forces to track down, kill, or capture actors fomenting violence, the 
warlords had through 2004 “focused much of their efforts on drugs, extortion, and 
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intimidation, using their relationships with U.S. soldiers to frighten local civilians and 
advance their own greed.”187  
Actions by Ismail Khan, the alliance warlord in Herat (2002-2004), are illustrative 
of such bandwagoning. Instead of maintaining stability in his area of influence, Khan 
deployed militia forces to clash with another (Pashtun) warlord. Rather than yielding a 
pacified subnational territory according to alliance strategy, then, Khan’s bandwagoning 
to cement control over more territory meant that “the central government was faced with 
the threat of a major interethnic war.”188 Assumed and intended to serve as an extension of 
the regime and implement strategy (and produce stability), Khan instead prioritized 
increasing his power/influence and acted accordingly (and generated violence).189  
In addition to using alliance resources for their own gain, warlords such as Khan 
directly contravened specific regime requests associated with alliance tactics. In October 
2002, for example, the alliance ordered warlords to hand over their militia forces for 
incorporation into regime forces or disband their militias. Instead, many warlords “defied” 
the central regime and acted to advance their interests: by retaining (instead of dissolving) 
militia forces to guard against the “internecine struggles between and among them” (only 
16 percent of militia forces had disbanded by 2004).190 
Thus, the U.S. and Karzai during these initial years were juggling alliance dynamics 
that included regime elements balancing agreed targets while others (in this case passively) 
were bandwagoning with them. The implications of bandwagoning were clear: “as the 
factional militias have wreaked havoc among the general population, the Taliban have 
started to recover and regroup, especially in the south and east.”191 These forms of 
bandwagoning confounded alliance assumptions at the time arguably rooted in logic 
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underpinning external threat alliances (all forces will balance) yet were in line with internal 
threat alliance dynamics: regime actors are primarily inclined to pursue their own 
objectives, even if doing so violates alliance goals.  
To reign in this behavior and as part of the Bonn political processes, the alliance 
decided to incorporate warlords into government by allocating them positions in the cabinet 
or other agencies.192 Rather than bringing warlords and militias under the central regime’s 
writ, this “created a situation where those with a vested interest in keeping central 
government institutions weak and ineffective, and their own personal power and regional 
fiefdoms strong, were placed in positions of authority over the very institutions that needed 
to be strengthened.”193 Accordingly, instead of implementing alliance strategy and 
following Karzai regime orders, warlords (now in positions of power) chose to “flout his 
authority” by aiding (directly or indirectly) actors within their region generating political 
violence or using new positions to expand their networks’ hold on power. 194  
In some cases they directly challenged Karzai, while in others they used alliance 
resources to cement control over subnational bases of power and the associated spoils.195 
Regarding direct challenges to Karzai, before Fahim Khan (then Defense Minister) was 
sacked (for various reasons) he nearly implemented a plot to forcibly overthrow Karzai and 
“only the presence of international forces in the capital prevented a coup.”196 The warlord-
cum-government officials leveraged their new positions to cement wealth and power by 
engaging in narco-trafficking: “the opium-trading warlords quickly figured out how to use 
the U.S.-backed Afghan government to their advantage” and through their regime positions 
lay “the foundation for the corrupt nexus between drugs and political power that soon 
pervaded Afghanistan.”197 It was not long before “narco-kleptocracy” had “extended its 
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grip around President Karzai,” who by 2003 was “regarded by some as increasingly 
isolated by a cadre of corrupt officials.”198 As Karzai, the U.S., and other regime elements 
sought to curb narco-trafficking and stem the violence it fueled, these warlords and other 
regime elements were simultaneously colluding with the traffickers to amass revenue and 
solidify or expand their respective power bases. 
Rather than steadfastly carrying out this mandate and balancing threats, however, 
many warlords chose to prioritize maximizing their personal influence and solidify their 
power subnationally. They did so and bandwagoned while other warlords or regime actors 
worked with the U.S. to decrease the threat by pursuing al-Qaeda or Taliban insurgents. 
This desire to enhance power and influence (rooted in patron-client ties) also pushed 
agencies (and components therein) to bandwagon.  
c. Ministries of Interior (and Police) and Defense (and Army) Bandwagoning 
“The inflow of billions in international funds has cemented the linkages between 
corrupt members of the Afghan government and violent local commanders – 
insurgent and criminal, alike.”199 
Over the course of the alliance and as one U.S. official told me, Ministry and Police 
elements worked with the U.S. to carry out strategy and balance: “the Ministry and 
National Police had some credible, reliable people and units who helped stabilize areas and 
cut down drug flows.”200 In accordanc with the distinct dynamics of internal threat 
alliances, however, while these regime elements were balancing other components from 
the lowest (Afghan Auxiliary Police) to highest (deputy Minister of Interior) levels were 
(either passively or actively) bandwagoning to advance their patron-client linkages. This 
took two forms. 
First, they accepted bribes in order to aid or turn a blind eye to insurgent activity. 
Instead of implementing agreed alliance policy, for example, Police would “often do the 
 
234 
bidding of whoever paid them the most money.”201 The “deeply corrupt” Ministry of 
Interior was one of the two “fatal weak points” in Afghanistan’s government.”202 The 
implication for the alliance was that “without effective and honest” administrators and 
police the regime “can do little to provide internal security.”203 This assessment was echoed 
by Senior U.S. Representative for Afghanistan Holbrooke, who said that Ministry and 
“Provincial and police chiefs are deeply on the take.”204 Drawing a similar conclusion, 
another analysis indicated that Police elements were so prone to passive bandwagoning 
that they are “almost extensions of militias and cannot be relied on to subdue them.”205 And 
a 2010 analysis indicated that “regular officers as well as the border police, pose even larger 
problems as corruption are rampant in the ranks.”206  
The Afghan National Auxiliary Police, formed to dampen violence at the village 
level, was a component particularly prone to this form of bandwagoning. Rather than 
carrying out its alliance mandate of “effectively combatting the insurgents or protecting 
the local population,” the regime element was “more concerned with extracting revenue 
for themselves and doing their local patrons’ bidding.”207 In addition to passively or 
actively aiding actors fomenting violence, components of the Ministry in specific areas 
“became a center for drug trafficking with police posts in opium-growing regions being 
auctioned to the highest bidder.”208  
And second, Interior Ministry and Police officials passively bandwagoned by 
diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose and to oneself or their 
patronage network. Such bandwagoning “occurred along tribal lines” (motivated by 
patron-client ties) and was “perpetrated by actors serving in government positions.”209 
Where alliance capabilities were amassed with the purpose of “benefiting the populace or 
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calming the insurgency,” they instead “flew out of the country.”210 Capabilities provided 
to the Interior Ministry to balance threats were (in full or part) not used for their intended 
purpose and instead diverted to actors fomenting violence (active bandwagoning) or not 
directly to insurgents but nonetheless contrary to alliance strategy (passive bandwagoning). 
In 2003, for example, regime representatives in Masar-I Sharif were “to ensure the flow of 
resources from the center to the police headquarters” but, instead, “became party to their 
diversion.” As one scholar notes of this example and form of passive bandwagoning more 
broadly: “diversion of resources through corruption in the Afghan government was a major 
constraint” because it reduced capabilities available to balance.211  
The Ministry of Defense and its forces engaged in similar bandwagoning. 
Components of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), for example, were “ostensibly under the 
defense ministry’s control” yet were in actuality “often more loyal” to “a local commander 
than to national priorities,” resulting in “a weak chain of command…plagued by high 
desertion rates and low operational capacity.”212 Rather than balancing insurgents in a 
unified manner, AMF components violated central regime guidance, worked for 
powerbrokers, and diverted alliance resources.213  
 Bandwagoning was not limited to lower level officials or soldiers, however, and 
extended to the highest levels and the Defense Minister himself.214 Rather than focusing on 
coordinating forces to balance insurgents, the Minister used resources to expand his 
subnational “fiefdom” and played “a double game” by “pledging loyalty to Karzai and the 
Americans” but at the same refusing orders to dissolve his militia forces and using regime 
security forces to protect his stake in the drug-trade. This (mainly passive) bandwagoning 
fueled an “escalating rivalry” that threatened “to further destabilize Afghanistan’s shaky 
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government.”215 Similar incentives pushed governors and provincial-level regime 
components to bandwagon.  
d. Powerful Provincial Figures Bandwagon to Expand Power, Influence 
“In much of the country…the government was at best a reluctant partner…Most 
governors…Instead of trying to win over the population, sat in their lavish homes 
and brokered personally enriching deals.”216 
The most prominent form of bandwagoning by provincial officials was their 
diverting alliance capabilities and then using these resources (money, materials, or other) 
as a form of patronage to help solidify control over subnational “fiefdoms.” Part of alliance 
strategy included allocating resources to regime actors to “build government institutions” 
in subnational areas based on the assumption that doing so would reduce violence in 
(“stabilize”) them. The strategy was therefore contingent on the regime actors applying 
resources accordingly. 217 Instead, a “consistent theme” in many provinces “was that a select 
group of tribally affiliated strongmen took advantage to secure government positions and 
gain access to government and development funds” which they used as a form of 
“patronage to reinforce one’s own position and marginalize others” to “consolidate 
political and economic power among their own people.” 218 As one leader in Paktia province 
indicated, this was widespread: “Millions of dollars are stolen. If you increase the amount 
of money it will also be useless because the government will simply steal more.”219 
Governors in five separate provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Paktia, and Ghazni) 
engaged in this form of bandwagoning.  
Rather than employing funds according to alliance strategy to “build institutions” 
and “provide other basic services,” for example, Helmand’s governor (Akhundzada) used 
them and his authority “to reestablish his family’s dominance over the drug trade” and 
“pocketed much of the profit.”220 Due to and reflecting the extent of this bandwagoning, 
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the U.S. viewed the governor as “part of the problem, not the solution” and pressed Karzai 
to replace him. Eventually Karzai sacked the governor, but before this occurred 
Akhundzada sent his militia forces to work with the Taliban. In exchange for accepting and 
paying these men (many were the governor’s clients or linked to politically-important 
actors) the Taliban was able to put “its tentacles into [Akhundzada’s] drug trade” and 
obtain “tens of millions of dollars every year to expand its guerrilla war.”221 Kandahar’s 
governor Agha Shirzai engaged in similar bandwagoning. Rather than applying aggregated 
capabilities per alliance strategy and to stabilize the province, Agha Shirzai employed them 
“to solidify his power at the expense of Hamid Karzai’s central government.”222 Much the 
same occurred in Uruzgan, where the governor leveraged his position “to exert tight control 
over the province” for personal gain and did so by diverting and distributing alliance 
resources as patronage. 223   
The governors of Paktia and Ghazni passively bandwagoned by using alliance 
resources as patronage and actively bandwagoned by diverting funds to insurgents. 
Regarding Paktia, a 2009 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul says the governor’s 
“Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) [insurgent] connections…leadership of a province-wide 
corruption scheme, and suspected contacts with insurgents make him detrimental to the 
future of Afghanistan” and therefore alliance goals.224 While other regime elements were 
balancing target threats, this governor was violating alliance strategy by diverting resources 
(“corruption scheme”) and colluding with insurgents (“HiG connections”). A cable from 
the same year indicates that Ghazni’s governor (Usmani) and his staff engaged in 
comparable bandwagoning: “[they] routinely embezzle government funds and 
international aid money intended for public administration and humanitarian assistance.”225 
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Instead of a unified subnational regime acting in unison to balance the common threat, 
Ghazni’s governor and his regime representatives were a “criminal enterprise 
masquerading as public administration.”226 During the period examined, then, key 
provincial-level regime actors actively and passively bandwagoned with forces fomenting 
violence. They did so while other actors were balancing the common threat and in order to 
solidify control over their subnational area of influence (governors of Helmand and 
Kandahar) and/or actively aid insurgents (governors of Paktia and Ghazni).  
In the section above I demonstrated that throughout the alliances regime actors 
engaged in simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning. Specific regime elements 
bandwagoned (while others balanced) because they wanted to survive, share in the spoils 
of victory (both found in traditional alliances), or augment their power/influence or their 
clients’ (distinct to internal threat alliances). Pushed by these three motivations, regime 
elements bandwagoned by: turning a blind-eye or sending funds to insurgents; carrying out 
“green on blue” attacks and killing alliance personnel; accepting bribes or other financial 
incentives to ignore or aid activities by actors fomenting violence or engaged in drug-
trafficking; and diverting alliance capabilities from their intended purpose and using them 
as a form of patronage (or to insurgents).  
Whereas this subsection focused mainly on regime actors outside the central 
decision-makers and why they bandwagoned (and when), the following section centers on 









4. FOURTH CORE DIFFERENCE –  
PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS:  
LEADERS OF THREATENED STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST  
 
The purpose of this fourth sub-section is to evidence the fourth and final difference 
between external and internal threat alliances: that when determining what to do in 
response to the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make 
decisions focusing on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national 
interest—preserving the territorial integrity and security of the state.  
With traditional (external) alliances, after aligning states work together to decide 
what to do in response to their common threat. This includes agreeing on strategy, tactics, 
and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on such issues, the more 
“cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter their common enemy, 
the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence external threat alliance 
cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push states to work closer 
together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military hardware, for example) the 
states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to defeat/deter the menace 
(increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, however, the core factor 
motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and ensuring territorial 
survival.  
Like traditional alliances, level of threat and resources will influence regime/great 
power ability to work together and defeat the common internal menace. The core factor 
motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—the regime acts not to 
advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. 
As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has formed and in response to 
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threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the country but what is in the best 
interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align with the power that is best able 
to defeat the internal threats to their power that they confront; after aligning, these leaders 
will continue to make decisions and actions that advance their interests.  
This section evidences this core difference by citing examples from 2001 to 2012 
and during the Karzai administration [2001-2012] and U.S. presidential administrations of 
Bush [2001-2008] and Obama [2008-2012]. For the sake of simplicity, it is organized 
chronologically and demonstrates how regime-specific priorities affected decisions related 
to cohesion—choosing strategy and whether to work closely with the United States—and 
effectiveness—choosing whether and if so how to curb bandwagoning.  
Arguably, the following actions would have increased state security and thus the 
Afghan national interest: build up national institutions, install representative forms of 
governance, reduce corruption, lessen the drug trade, and focus on defeating the Taliban 
threat that endangered the fabric of the country. The following sections demonstrate that 
rather than pursuing (and often at the expense of) these goals in the Afghan national 
interest, Karzai acted mainly to advance his own interests—financial and political.  
i. Karzai and Bush, Early Days: Regime Priorities Smooth Path for Strategy 
Agreement 
As Karzai took office as Interim President, political violence had lessened but the 
threat to his regime remained, leading the great power/regime to ultimately agree to the 
“warlord strategy.”227 As with traditional alliances, a high threat level and the Karzai 
regime’s military dependence pushed it to agree to this strategy and (for the moment) put 
aside its view that any strategy needed to take into account Pakistan’s role in enabling 
violence.228 With an “empty treasury and no security force of his own,” Karzai conceded 
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and agreed to rely on warlords to provide stability throughout the country.229 However, 
another factor distinct to internal threat alliance cohesion also pushed Karzai to agree to 
this strategy: recognizing that the U.S. could help advance his primary/core priority of 
consolidating power in his office and maximizing political/financial power and influence. 
Two examples demonstrate the U.S. helping him do so and that it needed to preserve his 
regime.  
First, during the 2002 Loya Jirga, the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan convinced the 
main challenger to Karzai, Zahir Shah, to withdraw and support Karzai.230 After other 
prominent candidates withdrew, delegates selected Karzai as interim leader.231 And second, 
in early 2003 the U.S. helped Karzai ensure that Afghanistan’s constitution being drafted 
at the time would establish a presidential rather than a parliamentary system of government. 
Where the former would maximize Karzai’s authority to make politically-valuable 
appointments and institutionalize other powers in his office, a parliamentary system would 
have diluted central authority and established additional checks on it (such as a Prime 
Minister). Throughout the drafting process, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan 
(Khalizad) actively lobbied for a constitution that enshrined strong presidential powers.232 
Partly due to Khalizad’s back-room dealing, and recommendations from a U.S. advisor 
helping write the constitution, a presidential system was approved in January 2004.233 This 
was a “win-win” for the great power/Karzai regime. For the U.S and reflecting its core 
need to preserve the regime, it “would retain the benefit of having a clearly identifiable 
Afghan partner whom it would know well and indeed preferred.”234 And for Karzai, he 
received the protection he needed while laying the foundation for his regime’s long-term 
political survival and influence.  
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ii. Karzai’s Desire to Consolidate Authority Drives him Closer to Bush (2004-2006) 
In the run up to the 2004 elections, a surge in threat from insurgents and dependence 
on each other to balance it (as in traditional alliances) drove the allies together, pushed 
them to agree to a new strategy (“Accelerated Success”), and maintained cohesion through 
much of Bush’s two terms. However, two regime-specific motivations distinct to internal 
threat alliance cohesion also drove them together during this period: Karzai recognized that 
U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an 
electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and 
thereby enhance his power/influence.  
With regard to the 2004 elections, Karzai recognized U.S. funding and influence 
could help him win. The recently arrived U.S. Ambassador had a $1.4 billion budget and 
was to spend a “significant portion” before the elections on building schools and an array 
of other highly visible public works. The central regime recognized that such projects 
would garner support from the populace and his “core network of patron supporters” and 
help win the election. As a former U.S. official told me in an interview, “Karzai came 
close” and agreed to cooperate across all alliance strategy components “because the money 
we brought in was going to win him key votes.”235 Further, even after receiving credible 
reports that the poll would be flawed (in Karzai’s favor), the U.S. did not send election 
observers or push the UN to do so. The decision was made to avoid criticizing “the election 
of the only candidate who stood any chance of stabilizing the nation” and securing 
American interests.236 With alliance monies funding voter-popular projects, and the U.S. 
deterring checks onto the election’s credibility, Karzai won and did so “buttressed with a 
great show of American support and largesse.”237 The U.S. needed to keep a (thus far) 
reliable ally in office; and Karzai wanted to remain in power and reap associated spoils 
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(“for him and his network of cronies,” as an interviewee described it). 238 This increased 
cohesion. 
Regime-specific motivations to install a pro-center electoral system also drove 
Karzai closer to the U.S. In early 2005 Afghanistan was considering two system options, 
one known to hinder development of viable opposition parties/alliances (Single Non-
Transferable Vote, or SNTV) and the other to encourage their formation (Proportional 
Representation, or PR). Wanting to maximize his authority and minimize checks against 
it, Karzai strongly preferred SNTV239 because it would splinter the opposition and help his 
“strategy to streamline power in the executive branch by fragmenting the parliament and 
weakening the opposition.”240 Accordingly, as applicable Afghan bodies weighed these 
options Karzai actively campaigned against PR and in favor of SNTV because, and 
corresponding to motivations of regimes in internal threat alliances, he was “not so much 
interested in institution-building” (the national interest) “as in the centralization of 
patronage” (and consolidating his power).241  
Where domestic Afghan stakeholders and foreign actors (United Nations and 
European Union) backed the PR option because it was “better for the country and its 
future,”242 the U.S. actively supported Karzai’s campaign for SNTV by: bankrolling and 
widely distributing a report advocating against PR (and for Karzai’s preferred SNTV); and 
Khalizad promoting SNTV in meetings on system options, including declaring that 
President Bush had said “SNTV is the choice. SNTV is going to happen.”243 At least partly 
due to U.S. pressure and Karzai’s back-room dealing, legislators approved an SNTV-based 
system and parliamentary elections soon thereafter (run on the new system) yielded 
Karzai’s desired results: a largely disjointed parliament devoid of any block of 
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individuals/parties to challenge his policy decisions or (politically important) 
appointments. American support again helped consolidate Karzai’s authority and pushed 
him closer to the U.S.   
Like traditional alliances, the allies were largely able to agree on strategy and tactics 
through 2006—in part evidenced by their signing the “Joint Declaration of Strategic 
Partnership in 2005 and the “Afghanistan Compact” in 2006—because a high level of 
threat (and their common need to balance it) pushed allies together. Additionally and not 
found in external threat alliances, however, Karzai’s desire to consolidate power (and U.S. 
help in doing so) pushed him closer to the great power and increased cohesion through 
2007. This is reflected in remarks by each leader that year. Bush said that the U.S. was 
“proud to call you [Karzai] an ally in this war against those who would wreak havoc” and 
the presidents were “working closely together” and weekly spent a “fair amount of time 
talking about our security strategy.”244 For Karzai, he said that his regime would continue 
to “fight terrorism” and was “committed” and hoped U.S. “assistance will continue.”245 
Continued violence against Karzai, Bush then said, made it “in the interests of” the U.S. 
“to tip the scales of freedom your way.”246 
The U.S. might have shifted the “scales of freedom” in favor of Afghanistan but in 
doing so also ensured that the political scales were tilted in Karzai’s favor. American 
support facilitated Karzai’s triumph in the 2002 Loya Jirga, U.S. monies (and inaction vis-
à-vis voter fraud) aided his victory in the 2004 presidential contest, and U.S. backing 
helped Karzai push through an electoral system that hindered opposition alliance 
development and consolidated central regime power. By largely agreeing to and 
implementing U.S. alliance strategy and thus balancing (albeit while other regime 
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components bandwagoned), Karzai achieved many of his core objectives. To this point, 
implementing all alliance tactics (and balancing) was an asset to the Karzai regime’s 
political survival and drive to consolidate authority. With many regime-specific priorities 
secured, however, Karzai began to view comprehensively implementing all alliance tactics 
as less of an asset and more of a liability to safeguarding regime interests. This began to 
manifest in Karzai contravening non-military aspects of alliance strategy and thus 
(passively) bandwagoning; specifically, by diverting alliance resources to important clients 
and refusing to enact desired reforms, among other acts. As former Ambassador to 
Afghanistan Ronald Neumann told me in an interview regarding this juncture, the regime 
“was less concerned with implementing our agreed strategy and more focused on their own 
political/personal survival, based in patron-client relations, and used the assistance 
accordingly.”247  
iii. Karzai Shifts in Full to Simultaneous Balancing/Bandwagoning (2006-2008) 
Following Afghanistan’s 2005 elections, insurgent violence kept alliance cohesion 
relatively high but signs began to emerge that Karzai was becoming less willing to 
cooperate across all alliance areas. He proceeded to (more fully) simultaneously balance 
and bandwagon. Given that Karzai’s central regime relied on the alliance to combat 
insurgents seeking his overthrow, it remained in its interests to work with the U.S. 
(militarily) and balance. At the same time, Karzai had attained most items required to 
consolidate power and influence and therefore began making decisions that would help 
guarantee re-election in 2009 but also violated non-military aspects of the alliance 
(bandwagoned) and were contrary to the Afghan national interest. This included diverting 
(and using as patronage) alliance resources and appointing corrupt officials to bolster 
patron-client links key to re-election: “Political criteria became increasingly evident. 
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Karzai sought to co-opt potential rivals, rebels or critics by appointing them as special 
advisors and distributing positions in the provinces.”248  
As Kai Eide, Senior UN representative for Afghanistan, said regarding this time 
period, the regime “seemed not to listen any more” and “the British and Americans were 
his main targets.”249 As one interviewee told me, Karzai “began to slide off the rails” on 
non-military alliance aspects by refusing to sack corrupt regime elements, firing U.S.-
favored officials, and appointing individuals the U.S. opposed including a person 
previously imprisoned for drug charges to head regime anticorruption efforts.250 Rather 
than using authority to make provincial appointments to promote “civil service reform,” an 
alliance tactic to thwart threats in subnational areas, Karzai “increasingly used” them “as a 
strategy of political survival.”251 These actions hindered allies’ ability to implement tactics. 
And U.S.  praise for Karzai as “indispensable” changed to “disparagement of his weak 
leadership.”252  
Starting from this juncture, then, the U.S. was aligned with a central regime 
cooperating with some alliance tactics (and balancing) but violating others (and 
bandwagoning). Where rising threats to traditional alliances drive allies together to 
preserve the national interest, the Karzai regime’s priorities related to political survival 
(inherent to internal threat alliances) pulled the great power/regime apart. All the while, 
other regime agencies (and components therein) were also bandwagoning. Clearly 
illustrating the distinct dynamics of internal threat alliances, the central Karzai regime itself 
oscillated between balancing/bandwagoning and its security agencies did the same. Karzai 
prioritizing self over alliance and simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning metastasized 
during Obama’s presidency.  
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iv. Karzai and Obama: “Bandwagoning for Ballots” Drives Allies Apart  
“Your enemies will make you laugh and your friends will make you cry.” - Traditional 
Dari and Pashto euphemism/saying. 
After President Obama assumed office and informed by two strategy reviews, his 
administration decided to send a “surge” of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan and fully shift its 
military strategy to COIN. As demonstrated through reservations voiced by senior U.S. 
officials (see Historical Overview section), the great power was increasingly questioning 
the viability of Karzai as an ally.  These reservations informed the strategy review process, 
demonstrate the lower state of alliance cohesion at the time, and illustrate how Karzai was 
increasingly playing a “double game” and simultaneously balancing/bandwagoning. And 
Karzai’s remarks clearly demonstrate his regime’s opposition to the strategy. When asked 
his opinion of COIN, for example, he said in 2008 that “sending more troops to the Afghan 
cities, to the Afghan villages, will not solve anything.” 253 If Karzai was acting in the 
national interest he would have responded to the high threat level and cooperated in order 
to balance an insurgency that remained robust and imperiled the country’s fabric—instead, 
he publicly denounced the alliance and waivered on tackling the insurgents in order to 
secure the regime’s core priority: winning the 2009 presidential elections. Events 
surrounding the election reflect decreased alliance cohesion and show that a regime will 
do what is necessary to remain in power (including contravening alliance agreements). 
In contrast to the Karzai regime’s view before the 2004 elections (close 
collaboration with the U.S. was an asset to cementing regime authority) in the run-up to 
the 2009 contest it viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to winning and 
consolidating power for the long-term; specifically, the 2006 agreement that Karzai 
“combat corruption” (passive bandwagoning) to ensure proper use of alliance resources 
and bolster Afghan state capacity.254 For Karzai, appointing (“corrupt”) clients to regime 
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positions, turning a blind-eye to their diversion of alliance funds, and himself using regime 
monies (alliance or non-alliance) as patronage were vital to garnering support sufficient to 
win. Alliance strategy called for the central regime to curb these forms of bandwagoning—
doing so was in the national interest; however, restraining such bandwagoning was for 
Karzai contrary to what would facilitate his remaining in power. As a result, as the election 
approached the regime violated these aspects of alliance strategy in order to grease the 
wheels of its get out the vote machine, and in doing so hindered alliance cohesion.255  
Arguably, if Karzai was simply looking out for the interests of Afghanistan, he 
would have culled his regime’s ranks of actors known to be siphoning resources or 
colluding with insurgents. Instead, Karzai’s bandwagoning ballooned as he “cut deals” 
with “a number of unsavory Afghan politicians” in order to “ensure his reelection.” He was 
“determined to win reelection” and therefore “looked to the political past to maintain his 
power even at the cost of weakening the state structure.”256 For example, the U.S. asked 
Karzai to deny a warlord’s request to reenter Afghanistan given the likelihood he would 
sow (not dampen) political violence. Rebuffing this demand and to cement his election 
victory, Karzai allowed Dostum’s homecoming in exchange for the warlord’s “assistance 
to have the votes he needed from the Uzbeks in the north.”257 Such “bandwagoning for 
ballots” also included appointing to regime posts (or pardoning) individuals linked to the 
drug-trade, Taliban, or other actors in exchange for support/assets valuable to the 
presidential campaign. For example, Karzai attempted to replace Helmand’s governor with 
“a crony of questionable administrative and anti-corruption credentials”258 and went so far 
as to “release criminals from prison so they can campaign for him.”259 The disconnect on 
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strategy and what was in the Afghan national interests versus Karzai’s personal interest is 
aptly summarized here:  
While some embassies were thinking in terms of gradually building or rebuilding 
institutions and staffing them, or at least were claiming to be doing so, the political instinct 
of Karzai and of most groups in government was to establish their own patronage network 
which they could control and use for their own political purposes, including re-election.260  
The central regime was increasingly “unpredictable” and issuing “decrees pointing 
in a specific direction at one moment and then abruptly turning in the opposite direction 
the next.” This disconnect became so profound that the U.S. worried Karzai “might, 
without Washington’s knowledge, conduct secret negotiations with Taliban leaders on a 
reconciliation formula that might not work.261 Even though the threat remained and Karzai 
should have been cooperating to advance Afghanistan’s interests, he was less willing to 
implement strategy and tactics because doing so, he determined, would imperil re-election 
prospects. The impact on cohesion was to “make coordination with his government 
difficult.”262  
This decline in cohesion due to central regime motivations escalated as the election 
drew closer. Concerned primarily with winning re-election to retain his post atop Afghan’s 
state apparatus and the patronage available for distribution therein, Karzai increasingly 
defied U.S. requests, violated (mainly non-military) alliance tactics, and siphoned off 
alliance resources for use as patronage. In a move to shore up votes but opposed by the 
U.S. (which viewed it as a “serious setback”) and contrary to alliance strategy and the 
Afghan national interest, Karzai selected former Defense Minister Fahim as his Vice 
presidential running mate.263 Rather than selecting a reform-oriented individual devoted to 
advancing alliance objectives, Karzai chose a corrupt powerbroker in “an important tactical 
move to mobilize the votes” he needed to remain in power.264 To be sure, Karzai’s priorities 
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drove him to simultaneously balance/bandwagon and the accompanying decline in 
cohesion. At the same time, U.S. efforts to push candidates to challenge Karzai in the 
election also decreased cohesion. Karzai’s response (outrage) reflect the objectives that 
motivate peripheral regimes in internal threat alliances: stay in power. These events 
arguably thrust Karzai further toward the balance/bandwagon approach he began under 
Bush and would hinder allies’ ability to carry out the new strategy rolled out after the 
election. 
v. U.S. Tries to “Make Nice,” but Karzai Continues to Bandwagon  
“Karzai appeared at times to treat the United States as just one more faction to 
juggle in his balancing of contending Afghan and outside forces, not as a partner providing 
enormous support to him and his country.265 – U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Peter 
Tomsen 
 
Following the 2009 election, the U.S. initiated its new COIN strategy in full. 
Having secured re-election, however, the Karzai regime’s willingness to work with its ally 
and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly. No longer relying on the U.S. to 
cement long-term political power, “Karzai was finally free to be Karzai,” a former U.S. 
diplomat said, and “it wasn’t long before his behavior toward the coalition would 
change.”266 Additionally, the Karzai regime viewed aspects of the COIN strategy as 
potential threats to its political interests; specifically, the tactic of building “more credible” 
institutions at the subnational level that would supplant the patron-client power 
relationships vital to maintaining his power.267 Even though a high threat level remained 
Karzai’s regime “was not a willing partner in America’s grand plans”268 and began to 




Per alliance strategy, Karzai traveled with Commander of U.S. forces to Kandahar 
prior to military operations there because obtaining support from subnational actors for 
such actions was a tactic of the new strategy. Karzai was to “urge elders to support the 
upcoming security operations.”269 Instead of cooperating in the interest of Afghanistan, he 
violated alliance strategy and in remarks to local leaders openly opposed the military 
operations: “We have to demonstrate our sovereignty,” he said, and military operations 
would not occur until elders were “happy and satisfied.”270 Similarly, in April 2010 Karzai 
told elders in Marja he was “opposed” to the operation there.271  
Although the overall threat level continued, and the allies remained dependent on 
each other to balance it, cohesion decreased because elements of the alliance strategy 
threatened the Karzai regime’s interests. Attempts to “build local governance” were a direct 
affront to and “disrupting” the “natural system of self-regulating Pashtun governance”272 
that Karzai relied on for political power. To retain office and ensure political/financial 
influence after 2014 (when he would step down), Karzai needed to preserve (not upend) 
the sub-systems of power the U.S. actively sought to modernize.  
Despite U.S. efforts to “Make Nice with Mr. Karzai,” as the New York Times 
wrote,273 such overtures again gave way to low cohesion and a “shaky and vulnerable” 
partnership.274 Disagreements and associated decreased cohesion extended from tactics 
(Karzai opposed night raids because they incensed local leaders important to his influence) 
to overall alliance approach to the insurgents. Deviating from alliance strategy of 
“reversing the momentum” of the Taliban, for example, Karzai said “he would seek to 
reconcile with top-level Taliban leaders” and intended “to convene a tribal Jirga” to 
“discuss how to bring the Taliban back into Afghan political life.”275 Karzai met 
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representatives of HiG (an insurgent group), which presented a peace plan.276 Reflecting 
that Karzai’s actions contravened alliance strategy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Mike Mullen, called the meetings “premature.” The Karzai regime’s actions vis-
à-vis curbing bandwagoning—and specifically related to effectiveness—also evidence that 
regime priorities trumped the national interest. 
vi. Karzai’s “Pendulum Approach” to Curbing Bandwagoning 
Arguably, it was in Afghanistan’s national interest to cull the government’s ranks 
of individuals known to be corrupt, sack officials colluding with the insurgents, and 
dampen the drug trade through firings and more forceful action. The Karzai regime did not 
entirely ignore such forms of bandwagoning and took some steps to curb them; however, 
these countermeasures throughout the period examined were largely half-hearted and failed 
to ensure unified balancing by regime actors. For example, in 2003 and following U.S. 
pressure, Karzai removed Agha Shirzai (Kandahar’s governor) for contravening strategy 
by using alliance resources to cement control over his subnational fiefdom. Instead of 
jettisoning this bandwagoning-prone actor from the regime entirely, however, Karzai re-
assigned him as the Minister of Urban Affairs. At face value, Karzai firing Shirzai can be 
seen as an attempt to promote unified balancing by replacing a colluding official with a 
(balancing-prone) regime actor who would implement agreed strategy. At the same time, 
Karzai’s decision must be viewed in the context of when it happened (when he needed U.S. 
support to win the 2004 elections) and what transpired thereafter: Karzai replaced Shirzai 
with the warlord’s cousin (allowing Shirzai continued influence in the region) and a mere 
two years later re-appointed Shirzai as governor,277 because the votes Shirzai could rally 
were vital to Karzai’s re-election.  
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In a similar move, Karzai in 2004 sacked Ismail Khan as Herat’s governor.278 On 
paper, this can be viewed as an attempt to promote more unified balancing by replacing a 
governor who passively bandwagoned by diverting alliance resources and regularly using 
militia to “enforce his will” instead of curbing insurgent violence.279 Like Shirzai’s 
dismissal, though, Karzai curbed Khan’s behavior less to advance alliance objectives and 
for Afghanistan’s interest than to secure his own and win the upcoming presidential 
election. Replacing Khan a month before the poll “helped Mr. Karzai in the election by 
opening up the political scene and removing his [Khan’s] political control of the region.”280 
Further, with an eye toward the 2009 contest and needing Khan’s support to win Karzai 
did not remove Khan from the regime but re-shuffled him to the position of Minister of 
Energy and Mines where he would again passively bandwagon, by diverting alliance 
resources (by some estimates $70 million).281  
The central regime’s actions vis-a-vis such warlord-cum-governors can be viewed 
as a “pendulum approach” to curbing bandwagoning that reflects the motivations driving 
weak regime actions: Karzai curbed bandwagoning when doing so was in his interests—to 
get U.S. help for the 2004 elections [Shirzai] or remove an actor that hindered re-election 
[Khan]—only to then swing back and re-instate bandwagoning actors because (even 
though their actions were detrimental to the Afghan national interest) they were important 
to his political survival. 
As the alliance wore on, the U.S. recognized insurgents were obtaining (via direct 
and indirect diversion) capabilities transferred to the alliance to defeat them.282 In addition 
to creating American-led institutions to stop this from occurring, the U.S. pressed Karzai 
to curb diversion of aid capabilities (passive bandwagoning) by regime agencies and actors 
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in his central regime. 283 This phenomenon was fueling escalating violence as well as 
hurting the Afghan national interest, in so far as funds that could be used to improve 
infrastructure or erect institutions (among other areas), were being diverted from these 
purposes. Partly in response to this pressure, and according to alliance strategy (outlined in 
the Afghanistan Compact), Karzai in 2008 created the High Office of Oversight to 
investigate corruption claims; and soon thereafter, he established an inspectors-general 
office in each Ministry to investigate and remove from office regime actors with “illicit” 
links to insurgents, narco-traffickers, or other entities fomenting violence.284 One year later, 
Karzai launched a specialized Task Force in the National Police to pursue organized crime 
within and outside of the Afghan government.  
Initially, it looked promising that these new “anti-bandwagoning” bodies would 
help curb passive collusion. In 2010, for example, the Task Force arrested and jailed a key 
regime official on charges of corruption. The prospects of this anti-bandwagoning body 
making any real difference soon washed away, however, as Karzai took to his “pendulum 
approach” to bandwagoning and secured this individual’s release. Of the dozens of cases 
started, a U.S. official told me in an interview, “very few would yield results, and the spigot 
of resources flowing out because of this and to the bad guys wouldn’t shut off.”285 Another 
analysis of Karzai’s inaction vis-à-vis bandwagoning notes: “Karzai did not support his 
anti-corruption squads when they attempted to arrest corrupt ministers, and he was 
unwilling to remove corrupt governors who were friends.”286 By keeping in office actors 
prone to bandwagoning, and sidestepping efforts to cull ministries of colluding elements,287 
Karzai’s actions went against the Afghan national interest (and alliance goals), hindered 
alliance effectiveness, and are in accordance with the distinct dynamics of internal threat 
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alliances: the regime prioritizes physical and political survival above all else and acts 
accordingly, including by violating alliance strategy when it will advance these goals. As 
aptly encapsulated by Barfield (2010):   
Karzai was not really interested in building an institutionalized state structure. Despite the 
large sums that the international community was investing…Karzai’s model of government 
was patrimonial…personal relationships determined everything from who would amass 
personal wealth to who would be thrown in jail. Karzai…used [the assets of the state] to 
create a patronage network of personal clients bound to him.288  
 
These “personal clients” included regime actors that bandwagoned but also 
represented power and influence that would help Karzai remain in power. Accordingly, it 
was not always in Karzai’s interests to push them to balance (as opposed to bandwagon). 
Reflecting this, in a meeting to decide by how much the U.S. should increase military 
resources to secure alliance objectives, a senior U.S. official argued that it was “premature 
to discuss resources until we have a very clear sense of how we” will “deal with corrupt 
and predatory Afghan governance.”289  
vii. “Feathering his own nest”: Karzai Bandwagons to Bolster Power 
“The regime of Karzai has become a powerful, interlocking criminal enterprise.”290 
Not only did Karzai take insufficient measures to curb bandwagoning and “swing 
back” to undermine some he did, the leader and close central regime associates engaged in 
(mainly passive) bandwagoning. In particular after Karzai had won the 2004 election and 
rammed through institutions to consolidate his power, alliance resources became attractive 
sources of patronage. Karzai “maintained his grip on power” and built a “body of personal 
patronage in support of his rule” by “capitalizing upon his position” as the “distributor of 
American and foreign aid, weapons and cash and the appointer of powerful government 
offices”291 Karzai’s actions were aptly described by U.S. General Brent Scowcroft, who 
helped Obama select his national security staff and told me in an interview that the leader 
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was “more interested in feathering its own nest” than “working closely with the U.S.” for 
the betterment of Afghanistan as a whole.292 The central regime’s attempts to “feather its 
own nest” and bandwagon occurred in two forms that correspond with motivations 
determining actions by regimes in internal threat alliances. While engaged in these forms 
of bandwagoning, Karzai’s central regime was also working with the U.S. to balance 
insurgents seeking its overthrow (because doing remained in its interests).  
First, Karzai abused executive authority in ways that violated alliance objectives 
and went against the Afghan national interest but advanced his own by maintaining or 
expanding patron-client links vital to staying in power. This included appointing (or 
refusing to fire) actors known to bandwagon in order to reap the patron-client benefits 
associated with them. A few weeks after being named Interim Leader, for example, Karzai 
replaced the recently-installed governor of Kandahar with the province’s most powerful 
warlord (Agha Shirzai). Doing so helped Karzai retain influence in the region (benefiting 
prospects for the 2004 election) but hindered alliance effectiveness because Shirzai 
proceeded to bandwagon by ensuring a “high level” Taliban leader’s (and target of a U.S.-
led manhunt)  escape into Pakistan293 and facilitating the departure from Afghanistan of 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s deputy.294 Routing the Taliban/Al-Qaeda were vital to 
improving the lives of Afghans as well as core alliance objectives—yet Shirzai’s 
bandwagoning, enabled by Karzai’s appointment, hindered allies’ ability to realize them.  
Nearly ten years later, Karzai continued to retain actors proven to bandwagon, for 
example by refusing to sack Ismail Khan from his position as Minister of Energy and Water 
due to allegations he was diverting and using as patronage ($US millions) alliance 
resources to maintain his domestic influence. A leaked U.S. memo from 2009 refers to 
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Khan as “known for his corruption and ineffectiveness at the energy ministry.”295 Karzai 
refused to remove Khan despite “repeated interventions directly with Karzai,” the U.S. 
memo says, because of “Karzai’s deeply personal bonds with Khan.” This “personal bond” 
was based in a mutually beneficial patron-client relationship defined mainly by Khan’s 
pivotal role in helping Karzai win the 2009 presidential election (and what he received in 
exchange for this support).296 Warlords-cum-regime actors such as Khan openly “pledged 
support” for Karzai’s bid for re-election and actively drummed up votes in exchange, 
reportedly, for receiving new or retaining existing (as with Khan) lucrative cabinet-level 
posts.297 Such actions led a historian to dub Karzai’s 2009 reelection campaign the “warlord 
reunion tour:” the president “paraded around” and promised these actors positions or 
financial payoffs in exchange for support in a given region.298 By retaining such 
bandwagoning regime actors that would go on to compete fiercely for alliance resources 
and turf, however, Karzai not only facilitated collusion (and corruption) that was not in 
Afghanistan’s better interests but also an increase in violence/threat: the “conflict over the 
state” between elite networks of bandwagoning actors “brought Afghanistan closer to inter-
factional political violence.”299  
In addition to using executive powers to appoint/retain bandwagoning regime 
actors, Karzai leveraged this authority to perform favors for actors who could help him 
remain in power. For example and in violation of a prior agreement with the U.S., Karzai 
facilitated the release of a prominent Taliban commander (Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir) 
in order to appease Sher Momaddem Akhundzada (former governor of Helmand) and 
receive this subnational powerbroker’s support in the upcoming presidential election. 
Akhundzada wanted the commander released (due to his patron-client ties to the operative) 
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and Karzai needed votes in Helmand. Events thereafter clearly demonstrate that Karzai’s 
decision to prioritize patron over alliance objectives hindered effectiveness: Zakir returned 
to Pakistan, became a higher level Taliban military commander, and then returned to 
Afghanistan as the Taliban’s commander in Helmand.300 The decision clearly benefited 
Karzai (he won the election) but hindered alliance effectiveness: “the vast majority of U.S. 
military fatalities and injuries occurred in areas under Zakir’s authority” in 2009.301 Not 
only was the U.S. dealing with components of Afghanistan’s Army/Police who were 
bandwagoning (while others cooperated/balanced) but also a central regime prone to 
bandwagon when it best suited his interests; and to the point where deals beneficial to 
central regime power cost alliance lives. 
Second, Karzai directly and indirectly participated in opium trafficking to swell his 
personal wealth and power. In some provinces, Karzai worked with the U.S. to curtail 
narco-trafficking, known to aid the insurgency endangering Afghanistan’s stability and 
distorting its economy.302 Simultaneously and in other areas, though, his central regime 
frequently “tolerated” the “unchecked activities” of “clients” (including family) “in land, 
narcotics, and other questionable dealing.”303 The President’s brother, Walid Karzai, for 
example, leveraged his power as regime emissary to Pashtuns and provincial councilor to 
grease ethno-regional ties and “own” opium trafficking in Kandahar. Consistent with 
central regime desire to “feather its nest” and protect actors vital to doing so (particularly 
family), Karzai refused to curb Walid’s bandwagoning: “Karzai was involved [in opium 
trafficking] and made sure his government would not impinge on his or his family’s 
involvement in the trade.”304  
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Aside from turning a blind-eye to narco-trafficking, Karzai was involved in the 
trade. As a “Western intelligence official” said in a 2009 interview, and in line with various 
other accounts, Karzai would “systematically install low-level officials up to provincial 
governors to make sure that, from the farm gate, in bulk, the opium is moved unfettered.”305 
The U.S. had aligned with a regime it assumed would implement strategy and curb narco-
trafficking because associated revenues increased insurgent strength and wrought 
consequences dire to Afghanistan’s future and thus national interest. Rather than 
unswervingly carrying out alliance directives and taking action that would better 
Afghanistan as a whole, however, Karzai aimed to swell personal power and influence by 
taking part in (rather than thwarting) opium production.  
Whether internal threat alliances achieve their goal hinges not only on level of 
military resources aggregated, but also the central regime’s ability and willingness to corral 
their regime’s component parts and push them to carry out agreed strategy (and balance). 
In the case of Afghanistan, it seems Karzai was largely unable or (more likely) not willing 
to take these steps. And whether and when he did so was always linked to if these actions 
would advance central regime interests. The implication for alliance effectiveness of 
bandwagoning by regime elements and Karzai’s insufficient attempts to curb it was to 
essentially preclude unified balancing by regime actors against the insurgents. Whether 
active or passive in form, a lack of effort by the Karzai regime to curb this bandwagoning—
and its own involvement in such bandwagoning—benefited the central regime’s interests 
but hindered the alliance’s ability to further Afghanistan’s national interest. As former 
Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani said in 2009, it was not the insurgents who were 
the “largest threat” to Afghanistan but, rather, the “(Karzai) government” itself.306 
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III. CASE CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter I used the U.S.-Afghanistan case to evidence the following four key 
ways in which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from alliances forged to 
balance external enemies. Collectively, these represent the framework of mid-range, 
contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common 
type of alliance today.   
First, I showed that the U.S. and Afghanistan brought their security policies into 
close cooperation and aggregated capabilities in response to violence fomented by 
insurgents (and at times warlords) in order to preserve the Karzai regime’s survival 
(physical and political). The regime aligned because it needed (military and economic) 
capabilities to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from 
insurgents, while the U.S. needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a 
base to plan and launch attacks (as they did on September 11, 2001) and ensure access to 
natural resources in the region. By 2002 the core factor underlying U.S./Afghanistan 
alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s survival and the great power’s interests 
associated with it. Accordingly, this is different from traditional alliances, where states 
bring their security policies into close cooperation in response to a threat external in origin 
(another state or group of states) that imperils the state as a whole; and where states are 
motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival.  
Second, with regard to the characteristics of allies who form internal threat 
alliances, it demonstrated that Afghanistan’s internal order was fragmented. Building from 
this, it showed that the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling its entire 
apparatus but, instead, a fragmented peripheral regime sitting atop but lacking control of 
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its bureaucratic agencies and relevant subnational actors. It traced Afghanistan’s political 
trajectory to demonstrate that clientelism is a factor distinct to internal threat alliances that 
spurs regime actors to—in making decisions related to the alliance—prioritize the 
alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or that of their client) as 
opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, the U.S. was not dealing with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest. Instead, the 
U.S. was dealing with a fragmented regime consisting of various actors. Each of these 
actors had respective interests they sought to pursue. Hence, these characteristics of 
internal threat alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies have some 
fragmentation but are essentially two cohesive actors with political orders structured in a 
hierarchical fashion where the central government controls all component parts, which act 
to advance the national interest.  
Third, I demonstrated why the motivations for and manifestations of bandwagoning 
in internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from that experienced in traditional 
alliances. Concerning manifestation, it showed that regime elements leveraged their 
autonomy to act independently, advance their own interests, and contrary to alliance 
strategy and thus bandwagoned while other regime elements were simultaneously 
balancing. Accordingly, bandwagoning in internal (as opposed to traditional) alliances 
proceeds as follows: the central regime’s inability to control component actors enables 
balancing and bandwagoning to occur simultaneously (whereas states in traditional 
alliances can either balance or bandwagon when combatting an external enemy) and the 
clientelistic relationships inherent to the country’s character generate a motivation for 
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bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for survival and to share in the 
spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In contrast to traditional alliances 
where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the alliance, regime actors bandwagon 
while the allies are together, which has implications for cohesion and effectiveness. 
In this internal threat alliance it was not one state working with another state (as 
with external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritized clientelism and bandwagoned; other times they agreed to 
alliance strategy and balanced. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found 
in traditional alliances) the U.S. juggled relationships between a somewhat cooperative 
central regime and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of 
Interior and Defense, and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular 
after Karzai was re-elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to 
balancing/bandwagoning at the same time.  This juggling of relationships between multiple 
actors is not found in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital 
communication and either do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. 
Fourth and finally, I showed that when determining what to do in response to the 
target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing on 
their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest. With the U.S.-
Afghanistan alliance, and comparable to traditional military alliances, level of threat and 
resources influenced regime/great power ability to work together (cohesion) and defeat the 
common internal menace (effectiveness). The core factor motivating the threatened state’s 
decisions, however, was distinct—the regime acted not to advance the national interest but 
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rather to advance the interests of the leaders of the regime. And these regime-specific 
decisions rooted in their desire to survive politically impacted actions related to cohesion 
and effectiveness.  
Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan 
presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S. 
as an asset to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 
2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that 
U.S. influence could help him win the 2004 presidential elections and install an electoral 
system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and thereby 
enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion declined 
because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a liability to 
winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-term. Karzai 
recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to press the Army 
to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward re-election he 
simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance strategy) to 
curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively bandwagoning). 
After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying on the U.S. to 
cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work with its ally 
and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.  
With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, pooling 
resources sufficient to weaken or defeat the threat influenced whether the alliance 
weakened the internal threat. However, Karzai’s insufficient efforts and “pendulum 
approach” to curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness.  
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In sum, the U.S.-Afghanistan alliance clearly elucidates the core ways in which 
internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances. Rather 
than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard territorial integrity, the U.S. and 
Karzai aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the mercurial leader’s 
survival and American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially 
cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the military, for example) 
that act to advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with an extremely internally 
fragmented ally whose relevant agencies (and parts therein) often acted to advance their 
own interests over alliance goals and the Afghan national interest. Rather than the either/or 
relationship between balancing and bandwagoning found in traditional alliances, some 
Afghan agencies balanced insurgents while others were simultaneously colluding with the 
same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to respond to threats the Karzai regime 
largely did not do what was best for the Afghan national interest but, instead, took those 
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In particular since the Berlin Wall’s collapse, the profile of threats faced by states 
in the international system has shifted—from war between sovereign polities toward 
conflict and high levels of political violence within them. Such political violence and intra-
state conflict are distinct in context and characteristics from inter-state war yet nonetheless 
threaten the survival of the peripheral regimes within whose borders they occur and create 
consequences that imperil great power interests in various ways. Faced with threats 
emanating from within weak polities, and like their response to hazards posed by external 
enemies, states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed 
military alliances (internal threat alliances) to quell the political violence or consequences 
thereof. Examples of these “internal threat alliances” include the cases examined in this 
dissertation—alliances between the U.S. and Colombia and the U.S. and Afghanistan. In 
each instance, the regime needed resources (military and economic) to secure core interests 
and thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power got involved to safeguard 
interests tied to the embattled regime. 
These alliances differ fundamentally from those in which states align to balance a 
threat external to their borders. Even though the nature of alliance-making has thus evolved 
since the end of the Cold War, however, scholars have yet to update IR theory to account 
for and explain the more common form of alliances in the contemporary world. To help fill 
this gap in IR theory, in this dissertation I explained the core differences between traditional 
(external threat) and internal threat alliances and how they affect the behavior of both the 
threatened regime and its prospective alliance partner. The four differences examined were: 
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(1) the nature of the threat that spurs alliance formation and the core factor that motivates 
states to align, (2) the characteristics of allies who form such alliances, (3) why and when 
allies “bandwagon,” and (4) the target threat and what must be done to address it.   
The dissertation is important to theory and policy. Regarding its scholarly 
contribution, it illustrated how the nature of alliance making has changed and—through 
detailing the four core differences—provided a framework of mid-range, contingent 
theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the dynamics of the more 
common type of alliance today. And it is important for guiding policy given that great 
powers will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are 
involved with them today. Given that political violence and associated threats to regimes 
show no signs of abating, the dissertation is likely to remain increasingly relevant for 
theorists seeking to understand internal threat alliances and strategists debating whether to 
form them. Resulting from a complex interplay of factors such as state weakness and 
poverty, among others, peoples across the world are likely to continue to believe they have 
a right to rebel, have confidence in their ability to win, and thus develop or join 
insurgencies, rebel movements, or other illicit non-state actors to push their interests.1 
Consequently, political violence including to the degree of internal war and associated 
threats posed to great powers/peripheral regimes are likely to endure—and therefore so too 
will internal threat alliances continue to be a central aspect of international relations as 
states seek ways in which to secure their interests in the face of such dangers.  
This concluding chapter has three objectives. First, to summarize the dissertation’s 
main arguments and evidence from the cases that substantiates these points. Second, to 
outline future areas of research. And third and finally, to briefly discuss the dissertation’s 
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potential relevance to policy. Accordingly, the chapter proceeds in three core sections—
one each to address these three items. 
I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT:  
 
CORE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES  
 
This section summarizes the dissertation’s core arguments and evidence from the 
two examined cases to demonstrate the four ways in which internal threat alliances are 
fundamentally distinct from traditional military alliances. Collectively, these represent the 
framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and 
explaining the more common type of alliance today. 
1. NATURE OF THREAT AND WHY STATES ALIGN:  INTERNAL TO THE WEAK STATE, TO 
SAVE THE REGIME 
First, internal threat alliances stem from a threat domestic in origin that imperils a 
regime. This is different than traditional alliances, where the threat is external in origin 
(another state or group of states) and imperils the state as a whole. Accordingly, the 
motivation for alignment is distinct in internal threat alliances: the great power and weak 
regime are motivated to align in order to ensure the regime’s survival. The regime aligns 
because it needs (military and economic) capabilities to secure its core interests as well as 
thwart challenges to its existence, while the great power gets involved to safeguard interests 
linked to the regime’s stability. This is different from traditional military alliances, where 
states are motivated to align in order to secure their national interest and territorial survival. 






A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Balancing Narco-Terrorists and 
Insurgents to Safeguard the Regime, Associated U.S. Interests 
In Colombia, the regime aligned because it needed military and economic resources 
to secure its core interests as well as thwart challenges to its existence from guerrillas and 
narco-traffickers, while the U.S. got involved to safeguard interests linked to the regime’s 
stability including: curbing drug flows onto American streets, maintaining access to oil 
reserves, and preserving stability in its “backyard,” among others. And in Afghanistan, the 
Karzai regime aligned because it needed capabilities to safeguard its political and economic 
priorities as well as thwart challenges to its existence from insurgents. As for the U.S., it 
needed to ensure terrorists could not again use Afghanistan as a base to plan and launch 
attacks (as Al-Qaeda did on September 11, 2001) and ensure access to natural resources in 
the region. 
For the Colombia and Afghanistan cases—by the late 1980s in the former and 2002 
in the latter—the core factor underlying alignment was ensuring the peripheral regime’s 
survival and the great power’s interests associated with it. This is distinct from the core 
motivation underlying formation of traditional military alliances: to weaken or defeat an 
external enemy to secure the national interest and preserve territorial survival. 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIES: INTERNALLY FRAGMENTED, MULTIPLE ACTORS, 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
As the second core difference, while external threat alliances are formed by 
countries that have some internal fragmentation, they are essentially between two cohesive 
actors. By contrast, for internal threat alliances the nature of the threat means that 
accompanying alliances will generally comprise states of unequal levels of development 
and internal fragmentation: one stronger and internally cohesive state (generally a great 
power) and a weaker, peripheral state with major internal fragmentation. The peripheral 
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ally’s major internal fragmentation introduces two factors distinct from great powers in 
traditional alliances that are relevant to understanding its priorities and associated actions 
in the internal threat alliance (and therefore need to be accounted for in theory).  
First, the central regime may not necessarily control all bureaucratic agencies (or 
components therein), which may act contrary to stated alliance policy. And second, the 
weaker ally’s internal political order is characterized by patron-client relations. Though the 
specific motivation underlying such relationships varies depending on context, at their core 
they represent a source of power and influence for actors in the peripheral regime. In 
making decisions related to the alliance, then, regime actors at the national or subnational 
level may prioritize the alternative which best enhances their own power and influence (or 
that of their client) as opposed to the national interest or alliance goals. 
Distinct to internal threat alliances, the great power does not deal with a single and 
unified state whose core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with 
traditional alliances). Instead, the great power deals with a fragmented regime that sits atop 
but lacks control of its agencies and other subnational actors.  Each of these actors has 
respective interests they seek pursue. Hence, these characteristics of states in internal threat 
alliances are distinct from traditional alliances where allies are essentially cohesive actors 
with political orders structured in a hierarchical fashion and central governments that 
control all component parts. Combined with the nature and location of the threat, this 
requires expanding the relevant levels of analysis from international (as with traditional 
alliances) to national and subnational. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia 




A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Fragmented Allies, Subnational Bases of 
Power Incentivize Bandwagoning 
In line with the characteristics of weak states in internal threat alliances, both 
Colombia and Afghanistan lacked strong state institutions, firm control over those agencies 
that exist, or a writ that extended throughout their complex topography. In each alliance, 
the U.S. had not aligned with a unified state firmly controlling all its apparatus but, instead, 
a fragmented central regime sitting atop but lacking control of its agencies, components 
therein, and other subnational actors. Throughout each alliance, Colombian and Afghan 
regime agencies and components therein leveraged their autonomy and made decisions and 
used government resources to advance their interests—maximize resources or solidify 
patronage ties—over alliance goals. What is more, the further intra-fragmentation of 
regime Ministries and security forces meant that specific agency components (Police unit 
A, for example) were balancing the threat, but others (Police unit B) were simultaneously 
bandwagoning. Not found in or applicable to understanding external threat alliances, the 
U.S. had to juggle dynamics between the central regime and a menagerie of agencies in 
order to secure its interests.  
And in each case, the weaker ally’s internal political order was characterized by 
patron-client relations. In making decisions related to the alliance, regime actors at the 
national or subnational level prioritized the alternative which best enhanced their own 
power and influence (or that of their domestic client) as opposed to the national interest or 
alliance goals. 
In Colombia, the history and trajectory of clientelism yielded two products that 
made regime actors choose their interests and patron-client relations over loyalty to the 
national interest (and thus subnational bandwagoning, over balancing) during the alliance. 
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First, it firmly entrenched and incentivized prioritizing increasing power/influence over the 
national interest and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “the allegiance…to patron 
was more basic than identification with an amorphous national identity known as 
Colombia.”2 And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and 
maximizing personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the 
central regime (and alliance) or national interest. Referred to as “political archipelagoes” 
(Kline 2007), mini “mafia” states (Vargas 2004), or regional “control systems,” these 
arguably approximate the “subsystems” Rosenau (1964) argued IR scholars must 
problematize when examining the link between political violence and international 
relations.3 These sub-systems based in maximizing personal power/influence over the 
national interest motivated regime agencies to contravene orders from the central regime: 
“It is at the regional and local level that the political archipelagoes are most evident with 
politicians from those areas with different power bases than the national president, hence 
at times likely to oppose (either overtly or covertly) what the chief executive is trying to 
do.”4  
And the history and trajectory of clientelism in Afghanistan had similar effects onto 
alliance dynamics. Particularly, this process yielded two products that pushed regime actors 
to prioritize and act to maximize their personal power/influence (as rooted in fealty to 
patron/client) over loyalty to the national interest or alliance goals.   
First, it imbedded prioritizing increasing power/influence over alliance goals (or 
the national interest) and therefore bandwagoning over balancing: “Rather than thinking 
of…effective or enabling decisive decision-making, Afghans consider all their actions in 
terms of kinship, patronage networks, and the complex society of which they are a part.”5 
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And second, regionally-based power structures emerged where ensuring and maximizing 
personal power/influence via fealty to patron/client trumped loyalty to the central regime 
(and alliance) or national interest. Where in Colombia alternative fealties generated 
subnational “political archipelagoes,” in Afghanistan these created at any given time over 
the alliance period “sub-state political communities” (Chowdhury and Krebs 2009), 
“micro-societies of tribal power” (Sharan 2011), or “de facto states controlled by regional 
power-holders” (Wilder and Listed 2011).”6 And like the Colombia case, these subnational 
bases of power arguably approximate Rosenau’s “subsystems” (1964). They comprise a 
mix of the elite-based networks fused into government positions and the “local leaders and 
ethnic regional strongmen” that are “resistant to the project of building a nation-state” 
whose power is based on “financial and military strength, as well as personal, factional and 
historical loyalties”7  
In sum, despite differences in history and other factors both Colombia and 
Afghanistan were fragmented nations characterized by subnational bases of 
political/economic power; relationships therein incentivized regime actors to contravene 
central regime policy in general or alliance strategy particularly. As a result, in both 
Colombia and Afghanistan the U.S. was dealing not with a single and unified state whose 
core policy-makers work to advance the national interest (as with essentially cohesive 
states party to traditional alliances) but, rather, a fragmented regime comprised of various 
actors each with their respective interests. This fragmented character enabled various 





3. WHY AND WHEN REGIME ACTORS BANDWAGON: SIMULTANEOUS WITH BALANCING 
AND MOTIVATED BY CLIENTELISM (AND SURVIVAL, PROFIT)  
As the third core difference, bandwagoning (appeasing a threat) in internal threat 
alliances is distinct in manifestation and motivation from that found in traditional military 
alliances. The peripheral ally’s weak character means its central regime is unable to control 
all of its component actors. As a result, balancing (resisting a threat) and bandwagoning 
can occur simultaneously: the central regime may work with the great power to implement 
alliance strategy and balance the common threat, while its police, military, or other 
subnational officials, for example, are bandwagoning with actors fomenting violence. This 
contrasts with traditional alliances, where states either balance or bandwagon when faced 
with an external enemy. And the clientelistic relationships inherent to weaker states 
generate a motivation for bandwagoning (patron-client relations) in addition to fear for 
survival and to share in the spoils of victory (both found in external threat alliances). In 
contrast to traditional alliances where bandwagoning represents one ally leaving the 
alliance, regime actors bandwagon while the allies are together.  
In internal threat alliances it is not one state working with another state (as with 
external threat alliances) but, rather, a great power working with (and juggling the 
competing agendas of) the multiple actors comprising a peripheral regime. Sometimes 
regime elements prioritize clientelism and bandwagon; other times they agree to alliance 
strategy and balance. As a result, over the course of the alliance (and not found in traditional 
alliances) the great power will manage relationships between cooperative central regimes 
and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors. On the flip side of the same coin, the great power 
may need to bypass a bandwagoning central regime and work with other regime elements 
to secure its interests. This juggling of relationships between multiple actors is not found 
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in traditional alliances, where states engage in capital-to-capital communication and either 
do or do not work together to secure their respective securities. And evidence from the U.S. 
alliances with Colombia and Afghanistan substantiates this core difference. 
A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Bandwagoning to Survive, for Profit, 
and Patron 
In both the Colombia and Afghanistan alliance cases, regime actors in the capital 
or subnational areas including police, military, governors, or central regime actors 
contravened alliance strategy and bandwagoned in order to survive, “for profit” (share in 
the spoils of victory), or to maximize their power/influence (as rooted in patron-client 
relations). In Colombia and pushed by these three motivations, regime elements 
bandwagoned by enabling forces fomenting violence to continue operating and in some 
cases, as with extortion of subnational officials, provided the FARC with alternative 
sources for capabilities. Such ties led officials and military/police officers to bandwagon 
by: avoiding specific areas, fighting half-heartedly, or simply not engaging at all. Officials 
and soldiers within the army and police turned a blind eye to the actions of narco-traffickers 
(passive bandwagoning), or in some cases actively assisted their operations through 
provision of information on Colombian government efforts (active bandwagoning). 
Similarly, in Afghanistan, regime elements bandwagoned by: turning a blind-eye or 
sending funds to insurgents; carrying out “green on blue” attacks and killing alliance 
personnel; accepting bribes or other financial incentives to ignore or aid activities by actors 
fomenting violence or engaged in drug-trafficking; and diverting alliance capabilities from 
their intended purpose and using them as a form of patronage (or to insurgents).  
In each case, even as the U.S. and the central regime collaborated to balance 
guerrillas and narco-traffickers (in Colombia) or insurgents (in Afghanistan), that regime’s 
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agencies (and components parts therein) were simultaneously bandwagoning with these 
actors. With regard to juggling relationships with multiple actors, over the course of the 
alliance with Colombia the U.S. managed relationships between cooperative central 
regimes and bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the judiciary (during Barco’s 
presidency) or National Police (during Gaviria’s term). On the flip side of the same coin, 
the U.S. during Samper’s presidency bypassed the bandwagoning central regime and 
worked with the National Police to secure U.S. interests. And in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
juggled relationships between an initially somewhat cooperative central regime and 
bandwagoning bureaucratic actors such as the Military, Ministries of Interior and Defense, 
and the Police. On the flip side of the same coin, the U.S. in particular after Karzai was re-
elected in 2009 was dealing with a central regime prone to balancing/bandwagoning at the 
same time. 
4. PRIMARY ALLY MOTIVATION IN RESPONSE TO THREATS: LEADERS OF THREATENED 
STATE ACT IN THEIR INTERESTS, NOT THE NATIONAL INTEREST   
As the fourth and final core difference, when determining what to do in response to 
the target threat leaders of fragmented countries are more likely to make decisions focusing 
on their own political survival rather than what is good for the national interest—preserving 
the territorial integrity and security of the state. After forming an external threat alliance, 
states work together to decide what to do in response to their common threat. This includes 
agreeing on strategy, tactics, and associated activities. The more allies are able to agree on 
such issues, the more “cohesive” the alliance; and the more able they are to defeat/deter 
their common enemy, the more “effective” the alliance. Specific variables influence 
external threat alliance cohesion and effectiveness: a higher threat will generally push 
states to work closer together (increase cohesion) and the more resources (military 
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hardware, for example) the states are able to pool together the more likely they will be to 
defeat/deter the menace (increase effectiveness). In working together on these issues, 
however, the core factor motivating allies’ decisions is advancing the national interest and 
ensuring territorial survival.  
Like traditional alliances, with internal threat alliances level of threat and resources 
will influence regime/great power ability to work together and defeat the common internal 
menace. The core factor motivating the threatened state’s decisions, however, is distinct—
the regime acts not to advance the national interest but rather to advance the interests of 
the leaders of the regime. As such, determining how the regime acts after the alliance has 
formed and in response to threats requires asking not what is in the best interests of the 
country but what is in the best interests of the leaders of that country. Just as leaders align 
with the power that is best able to defeat the internal threats to their power that they 
confront; after aligning, these leaders will continue to make decisions and actions that 
advance their interests. And evidence from the U.S. alliances with Colombia and 
Afghanistan substantiate this core difference. 
A. Colombia and Afghanistan Cases: Regime Interests Trump National 
Interest 
For the U.S.-Colombia alliance, cohesion was higher during the Pastrana (1998-
2002) and Uribe (2002-2010) regimes partly because they viewed close collaboration with 
the U.S. as an asset to their political survival (compared to prior presidents, who oscillated 
between viewing full collaboration as a liability or asset). With regard to effectiveness, an 
increase in allies’ ability to pool resources enhanced their ability to weaken the internal 
threat—this was due to consistently high alliance cohesion from 1998 onward and an 
increase in available U.S. state power for the alliance. However, an additional factor that 
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increased effectiveness during the Pastrana/Uribe regimes was their consistent efforts to 
purge civilian and security agencies of actors’ bandwagoning with the narco-guerilla threat.  
And in the U.S.-Afghanistan case, Hamid Karzai’s actions clearly show how 
internal threat alliances place the primary focus on the interests of the leader rather than 
the national interests of the state. Time after time, Karzai worked against the national 
interest of Afghanistan by subverting national institutions, appointing known corrupt 
officials, and cooperating with the drug trade, not because these actions benefited 
Afghanistan—they most certainly did not—but because they helped keep him in 
power. This pattern of behavior is further demonstrated by the difference in Karzai’s 
actions before and after he was re-elected president, in 2009.  
Cohesion was higher before and immediately following the 2004 Afghan 
presidential elections because the Karzai regime viewed close collaboration with the U.S. 
as an asset to its political survival. In particular after U.S. backroom dealing during the 
2002 Loya Jirga partly assured Karzai was named Interim President, he recognized that 
U.S. influence could (1) help him win the 2004 presidential elections and (2) install an 
electoral system that would consolidate and reduce checks against Executive authority and 
thereby enhance his power/influence. Toward the end of Bush’s second term, cohesion 
declined because the central regime viewed non-military aspects of the strategy as a 
liability to winning the 2009 presidential election and consolidating power for the long-
term. Karzai recognized that his regime remained under siege and therefore continued to 
press the Army to collaborate with the U.S. (and balance); however, with an eye toward 
re-election he simultaneously complied progressively less with U.S. demands (and alliance 
strategy) to curb corruption or enact reforms related to alliance goals (thus passively 
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bandwagoning). After Karzai’s re-election, cohesion declined further—no longer relying 
on the U.S. to cement long-term political power, the central regime’s willingness to work 
with its ally and implement strategy “in the field” declined markedly.  
With regard to effectiveness and much the same as external threat alliances, the 
inability of the U.S. and Afghanistan to amass sufficient resources played a part in their 
being unable to weaken or defeat the insurgents. However, Karzai’s insufficient efforts to 
curb bandwagoning also hindered alliance effectiveness. 
The Argument: A Synopsis 
The cases examined in this dissertation clearly elucidates the four core ways in 
which internal threat alliances are fundamentally distinct from external threat alliances; 
and therefore the mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations regarding the more 
common form of alliance today. Rather than balancing an external enemy in order to 
safeguard state security and territorial integrity, the U.S. and Afghanistan/Colombia 
aligned in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s survival and 
American interests associated therewith. Instead of comprising two essentially cohesive 
actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (military, for example) that act to 
advance core national interests, the U.S. had aligned with two extremely internally 
fragmented allies whose relevant actors/agencies often decided to advance their own 
interests over alliance goals and the national interest. Rather than the either/or relationship 
between balancing and bandwagoning in traditional alliances, some Afghan and 
Colombian agencies balanced insurgents or narco-traffickers while others were 
simultaneously colluding with the same set of actors. And finally, when deciding how to 
respond to threats the Karzai regime and specific Colombian administrations largely did 
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not do what was best for their countries’ national interest but, instead, took those actions 
that would preserve their political and personal power. 
II. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation and the transformation in threat profile within the international 
system point to potential areas of future research. This includes additional studies on 
internal threat alliances as well as careful examination of other less formal modes of 
statecraft great powers may employ in the future in order to balance threats.  
1. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCES 
Just as the academy enriched our understanding of the dynamics of external threat 
alliances—both “peacetime” and “wartime”—more can be done to understand what will 
likely be the more prominent form of alliance moving forward. As a first step and much 
the same as IR theory on traditional military alliances, the academy would benefit from 
stand-alone studies on internal threat alliance formation, bandwagoning, and cohesion. 
With regard to initial alignment, IR scholars could explore in greater depth the precipitating 
conditions that lead to internal threat alliances between great powers/weak regimes. One 
question studies might examine is why great powers select alliances over other forms of 
statecraft. This could take the form of statistical analysis over a large number of cases or, 
like this thesis, in-depth case study analysis of other alliances.  
Similarly, IR theorists could examine in greater detail the various aspects of 
subnational bandwagoning present in internal threat alliances. Among other areas, research 
could problematize whether (and if so how) great powers have sought to curtail this regime 
behavior (or simply allowed it to transpire). Though it would include a more comparative 
politics lens, theorists could also construct a model including threat thresholds to determine 
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at what level regime actors choose to bandwagon (for survival) rather than work with the 
alliance to balance it.  
More can also be done to understand variation in cohesion of internal threat 
alliances. As a starting point, scholars might construct a framework for gauging degree of 
internal fragmentation of weaker states. After developing a scale that assigns value to these 
degrees, they might employ quantitative analysis to determine across a broader set of cases 
the strength of relationship between internal fragmentation and cohesion. This dissertation 
would suggest that as fragmentation increases, cohesion should decline. Additionally, 
scholars might examine the influence of alliance duration on allies’ ability to devise 
strategy and tactics. This variable is referenced—though under examined—within the 
traditional alliance literature yet could provide useful insights for theory and policy alike. 
Whether and if so why allies achieve their goal is equally important to 
understanding why alliances form in the first place; however, effectiveness has not received 
attention comparable to that given to other alliance dynamics. For offensive external and 
internal threat alliances alike, IR theory could benefit from analysis of variables aside from 
capabilities that determine alliance effectiveness. As this dissertation demonstrated, the 
weaker ally’s willingness and ability to promote unified balancing (to curb bandwagoning) 
influences whether the great power/regime are able to weaken the internal threat. 
Examination of other variables is warranted. 
2. TRENDING TOWARD GREAT POWER DISENGAGEMENT IN THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD?  
 
The trajectory of threats within the international system suggests that great powers 
in general and the U.S. particularly will likely continue employing internal threat alliances 
as part of their foreign policy toolkit. Threats emanating from the developing world show 
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no signs of abating—and in specific circumstances, powerful states will choose internal 
threat alliances in order to secure interests in the periphery. The same goes for rulers of 
weaker states in such regions—little if any evidence suggests that such leaders will face 
fewer threats, have more capabilities to thwart those they do, or be less motivated to stay 
in power and reap the associated spoils of government. For all of these reasons, peripheral 
regime leaders will likely continue pursuing alignment with great powers. 
These points notwithstanding, dissertation research and current events suggest that, 
moving forward, such alliances may not have a monopoly on the state craft options great 
powers select when they need to secure interests in the developing world. Specifically, the 
high costs and meager returns associated with such alliances—as well as waning public 
support at home for engagement abroad—suggest that powerful states may turn to less 
formal or visible modes of statecraft. 
With regard to costs, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the U.S. expended tremendous 
blood and treasure for what some would deem inadequate returns—in the former, failure 
to secure a long-term security agreement that would have helped safeguard the U.S. against 
terrorist attacks emanating from the central Asian state; and in Iraq an increasingly unstable 
country ruled by a regime seemingly keen on accepting U.S. arms but less willing to 
cooperate on regional security or grant U.S. companies energy deals. This is not to mention 
the thousands of Iraqi and Afghan lives lost in both locations.  
Coupled with this unfavorable cost/benefit ratio is an American public less eager 
to engage abroad. At the time of this writing, public opinion seems to be shifting against 
employing high cost/visibility engagements in the developing world—consequently, 
elected politicians and those policy-makers they appoint may also be pulled away from 
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such engagements and toward employing other methods to secure American interests in 
these areas. In 2013, the U.S. public was more reluctant than ever before to engage 
overseas: 52 percent of Americans agreed their country should “let other countries get 
along the best they can on their own,” according to Pew.8 This represents the highest 
proportion in favor of the U.S. “minding its own business” since polling on the subject 
began 50 years ago. Americans’ enthusiasm for supporting democracy in Middle East’s 
“Arab Spring” transitions also curbed—63 percent polled said having stable regimes in the 
Middle East and North Africa was more important than democracy taking root there.  
Officials and policy-makers control the purse strings of government; however, 
years expending blood and treasure abroad render domestic stakeholders weary of such 
endeavors, and those they elect (generally) follow suit. As President Barack Obama said in 
a 2011 address to the American people in which he announced 33,000 troops would be 
removed from Afghanistan: “Over the last decade, we have spent $1 trillion on war, at a 
time of rising debt and hard economic times…America, it is time to focus on nation-
building here at home.”9 The Obama administration’s calibration toward “nation building 
at home” tracks prior such statecraft patterns and may suggest that internal threat alliances 
will be rarer moving forward.  
Combined, these trends suggest that great powers, and especially the United States, 
may in the future turn toward less binding/formal modes of statecraft—options perhaps 
deemed less costly and more palatable to public opinion. This could include approaches 
already employed such as raids by highly-trained Special Forces Units to eliminate terrorist 
threats or less comprehensive and more focused assistance to finite weak state bureaucratic 
agencies (the army and police, among others).  
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Reticence to unilaterally bear the burden of alliance costs may push great powers 
to find other means as well—this could include working through sufficiently capable 
regional allies to curb consequences of political violence.  Just as we are seeing a shift to 
“regionalization” of world trade—from the still pending Transatlantic Trade and 
Partnership Initiative (TTIP) to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)—it is not 
unreasonable to think the same may come true for balancing threats and conflict 
management.  In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, should political violence imperil U.S. 
access to oil stores or expatriates living there, the U.S. may opt to work with and through 
a regional power (such as South Africa) or organization (the African Union) rather than 
putting U.S. boots on the ground.  
These preliminary trends/developments suggest that IR scholars should consider 
three potential areas of research in addition to further examining internal threat alliances. 
First, scholars should look for increased use of Special Forces and seek to understand the 
politics of such interventions. For example, they may seek to understand the precipitating 
conditions that lead great powers to select this option rather than more comprehensive 
alliances. Yet, scholars must also examine this issue from the weaker state’s perspective. 
As this dissertation demonstrated, despite being weaker in traditional power measures the 
regimes who rule developing states can influence the trajectory of internal threat alliance 
outcomes.  
Accordingly and as the second area of further inquiry, IR scholars would be well 
served to problematize whether and if so how regime rulers seek to influence great powers’ 
decisions vis-à-vis statecraft—that is, whether countries such as the U.S. and France prefer 
and employ internal threat alliances (and bring the abundance of resources that come along 
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with them) or scaled down versions thereof. This dissertation would suggest that such 
regimes would prefer and therefore push for the former, yet more research is required to 
validate this assumption.  
Third and finally, IR scholars should carefully track the potential “regionalization” 
of threat balancing. Like other areas of inquiry above, scholars could examine why great 
powers decide to work through regional powers rather than go it alone—via an internal 
threat alliance or less visible form of engagement. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
The policy relevance of this dissertation is evidenced at least in part by the 
trajectory of the principal form of mass organized violence in the international system—a 
transition from inter-state conflict and toward greater intra-state political violence. To be 
sure, future wars between states cannot be ruled out. The diffusion of power and 
accompanying “rise” of China and other “emerging” powers may point—in the long-
term—to greater competition over resources and interests. And as some analysis in the field 
of power transition suggests, a reigning hegemon (such as the U.S. now) may choose to 
engage in preventative war to curb the ascent of a rising challenger.10 Just as states formed 
alliances to balance external threats before, they may do so again. And this points to the 
continued policy-relevance of the extant literature on traditional military alliances. 
At the same time, the threats states face today come more from within the borders 
of weak polities than from other states. And these menaces pose core challenges to states’ 
interests that will continue to drive them to form alliances to balance such threats. Moving 
forward, then, the generalizable insights this dissertation presented should help great power 
policy-makers as they navigate alliances with other weaker states—both alliances already 
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formed and as they debate whether to form such alliances anew. Four potential areas of 
policy relevance stand out. 
First, the dissertation suggests that great power policy makers should alter 
expectations/assumptions that weaker allies will balance in a unified manner, as is the case 
when two states come together to deter or defeat a common external enemy. With internal 
threat alliances, the major internal fragmentation of the peripheral ally—and the 
clientelistic relationships that undergird power dynamics (financial and political) therein—
mean that the unified balancing commonplace with traditional alliances cannot be assumed. 
Instead, the great power should assume that some ally actors will balance the target threat 
while others bandwagon with it. Simultaneous balancing/bandwagoning—instead of 
unified balancing—is the norm for internal threat alliances. And great power policy makers 
should devise their strategies accordingly.  
Second, the dissertation suggests that in specific circumstances great powers might 
be better off opting for a form of statecraft other than an alliance in order to secure their 
interests. In the event a state’s internal fragmentation is so deep so as to suggest no possible 
way to facilitate sufficient unified balancing, the great power should question the utility of 
forming an alliance with that regime. This suggests that policy-makers would be well suited 
to perform in-depth analysis and intelligence gathering on their potential regime ally’s 
internal make-up—particularly, whether its core bureaucratic agencies have intra-
fragmentation that could lead to factions contravening agreed strategy by bandwagoning 
with the target threat as opposed to balancing it. In hindsight, the Afghanistan case points 
to this insight. 
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Third, my findings suggests that policy-makers should carefully weigh the 
interests—short and long-term—of their central regime ally. Particularly, they must 
recognize that such leaders align not to thwart threats in general or advance their country’s 
national interest in particular—but rather to consolidate their authority and remain in 
power. Again, the Afghanistan case points to this peril, for the period examined and 
thereafter. At the time of this writing, Hamid Karzai continues to prioritize his survival 
over the Afghan national interest and in so doing hinder alliance ability to achieve its goals. 
Most recently, this manifested as Karzai rejecting a bi-lateral security agreement (BSA) 
with the U.S. that would have allowed a long-term presence of American troops to stabilize 
the country. In spite of formal Afghan institutions (a Loya Jirga) approving the agreement 
(because it was in the Afghan national interest)—and Afghan Army officials publicly 
calling for Karzai to sign such a BSA—Karzai refused to sign because doing so went 
against his own priorities.11 A few months later, Karzai released some 50 Taliban 
prisoners—despite concerns from the U.S. and his own national security apparatus 
regarding the implications of just such a release for renewed violence there.12 In such cases, 
the less formal or visible modes of engagement discussed above—from smaller scale 
Special Forces operations to working through sufficiently powerful regional allies—might 
be more appropriate than full alignment and the transfer of resources associated therewith.   
Fourth and finally, the dissertation suggests that (for internal threat alliances) 
capabilities alone are not sufficient to shift the balance in favor of the threatened regime 
and secure great power interests. A core assumption underlying great power strategies as 
it relates to traditional military alliances has been that should states A and B pool sufficient 
resources to shift the balance in favor of alliance A-B and against threat T, then A-B should 
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prove victorious. In other words, capabilities are the recipe for a highly effective traditional 
alliance. With internal threat alliances, however, this assumption does not hold. The 
peripheral regime’s actors may—or may not—apply alliances resources against the target 
threat. As a result, great powers would be well served to devote more attention to pushing 
regime actors to balance rather than performing force ratio calculations. 
Final Thoughts 
Political violence and state responses to such threats are issues relevant to IR theory 
and human well-being more broadly. As we continue into an age where the principal threat 
to states will likely be political violence and consequences emanating from within polities, 
as opposed to state-on-state violence in the territories or sea lanes of the international 
system, this dissertation will hopefully provide theorists and policy-makers a mechanism 
via which to make predictions regarding and understand the dynamics of state responses to 
these threats. Alliance making has been a core tenet of statecraft for centuries. This 
dissertation aimed to help understand what is likely to be the more common form of 
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U.S.-COLOMBIA INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 1980-2010 
 
APPENDIX 1.1 –DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL 
APPENDIX 1.2–DESCRIPTION OF HOW ALLIANCE RESOURCES ENABLED REGIME TO 
WEAKEN GUERRILLAS AND NARCO-TRAFFICKERS 
 
APPENDIX 1.3 – TABLES –THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES 
APPENDIX 1.1  
 
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL 
 
A. Demonstrating the Continued Threat to Regime Survival, U.S. Interests – 1980 - 
1997 
The purpose of this Annex and the discussion below is to briefly summarize 
information provided in the tables in Annex 1.3, indicating that the threat level remained 
high through the end of Ernesto Samper’s presidency (1994-1998) and therefore that 
alliance effectiveness was low. 
The number of insurgent forces aiming to topple the regime swelled through 1998: 
the FARC from a few hundred adherents to 17,000 soldiers and the ELN from a few dozen 
to 4,500.1 Insurgents leveraged their increased size to seize and take control of more 
territory, reflecting an increased threat to the regime. In the late 1970s the FARC controlled 
select key areas amounting to a few hundred hectares; by the late 1990s, it occupied 40-50 
                                                 
1 BBC News “Colombia Seizes 'key Farc Data'” September 23, 2008; and Government Accountability Office, 
Report Number 09-71 (Plan Colombia) to Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 2008. The 




percent2 of all Colombian territory.3 Reflecting the proximity of threat to the regime, by 
1998 the FARC was active in 70 percent of municipalities in the department of 
Cundinamarca, which surrounds the capital.4 Partly due to their increased territorial reach, 
the FARC increased drug-linked revenues to $551 annually by 1998.5 Intensity of the 
conflict reflected in total annual deaths is also indicative of the threat to the regime and 
U.S. interests. From 1988 to 1999 fatalities never fell below 1,200 and rose from 1,236 
(1989) to 1,582 (1996) and then 2,710 (1999). 6 By 1999 Colombia was in a state of “hyper-
violence” with 30,000 murders per year.”7   
The efficiency and brazen nature of insurgent attacks also evidence that the 
proximity and intensity of threat to the regime remained high through 1998: “most 
observers in Colombia and the United States considered the security situation grave.”8 This 
“grave” scenario and associated threat level is reflected in a FARC attack in El Billar in 
Caqueta department (260 miles from Bogota) where 500 insurgents killed 62 soldiers from 
one of Colombia’s most elite brigades.9 In August 1998 alone, the FARC completed 55 
raids onto key regime targets across 18 departments including a U.S.-funded police outpost 
250 miles from Bogota where 600 FARC destroyed the base. A few months later, more 
than 1,000 FARC soldiers crushed a contingent of 150 police and held a town (Mitu) for 
                                                 
2 James Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist 
Expansion,” Monthly Review , Vol. 57 (2005), 4. 
3 Interview by author, via telephone, Anonymous official from Ministeria de Defensa, February 20, 2010; 
See also Colombian Ministry of Defense Report, “Logros de la Política de Consolidacíon de la Seguridad 
Democratica, February 2009,” February 2009. 
4 Brittain, “The FARC-EP in Colombia,” (2005), 4.  
5 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth,  The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability,” RAND Corporation Report (2001), p. 32 
6 Restrepo and Vargas, “The Severity of the Colombian Conflict,” (2004). See tables in Annex. 
7 Downes, “Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare,” (1999), 2. 
8 Ramsey III, “From El Billar,” (2009), 1. 
9 John Otis, “Colombian Army Suffers One of its Worst Defeats in Fight with Rebels,” Houston Chronicle, 
March 8, 1998.; and Douglas Farah, “Colombian Army Fighting Legacy of Abuses,” The Washington Post, 




nearly three days.10 Combined, these statistics indicate that the alliance between the U.S. 
and Colombia was by 1998 largely unable to weaken the internal threat to the point it no 
longer represented a threat to the regime and U.S. interests.  
2. Demonstrating the Decreased Threat to Regime Survival, U.S. Interests – 1998-
2010 
This discussion briefly summarizes information provided in the tables in Annex 1.3 
for Chapter three, indicating that the threat level decreased by the end of Alvaro Uribe’s 
second term (2010) and therefore that alliance effectiveness was moderate to high by the 
end of the period examined. 
Representing a decreased threat to the Colombian regime, the FARC’s size declined 
from an all-time high in 1998 to fewer than 8,000 in 2009 due to deaths (by the Military 
and Police)11 and defections (which increased by 2,000 percent).12 Coupled with this 
decline in force size, the FARC lost several high level commanders to alliance operations 
including its second-in-command, Raul Reyes (2007),13 and three members of its central 
committee (2008).14 The ELN decreased in size by more than half through 2009.15  
The number of opposition attacks also decreased consistently through 2009. FARC 
attacks declined by 86 percent from 2002 to 2009 and ELN-initiated attacks decreased by 
90 percent during the same period.16 Other forms of violence belligerents used to fund 
                                                 
10 El Tiempo, November 4, 1998.. 
11 Due to defections (2,000 For these statistics see table on Level of Threat in the Annex. 
12 From 529 in 2002 to 1,300 in 2004 to 1,558 in 2006 and, finally, 11,615 in 2009.  Statistics compiled by 
the Programa de Atencion Humanitaria al Desmovilisado, at www.mindefensa.gov.com. Accessed 31 
October 2011. 
13 BBC News, “Top Farc leader killed by troops,” March 1, 2008. 
14 This data according to a security analyst based in Bogota and the Colombian Ministry of defense. 
15 BBC News “Colombia Seizes ‘key Farc Data’” September 23, 2008; see also Government Accountability 
Office, Report Number 09-71 (Plan Colombia) to Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 
2008. 




operations also declined including acts of “terrorism” [from 1,645 (2000) to 46 (2009)]17 
and kidnappings [849 (2000) to less than 120 (2006)].18 Protecting oil interests was a core 
factor motivating U.S. alignment, and attacks onto oil pipelines decreased from 110 in 2000 
to 17 in 2005.19  
The opposition’s control of territory also declined and by 2008 the government 
controlled 90 percent of territory, up from 70 percent (2007) and 50-60 percent (early 
1990s).20 Significantly, by 2009 the regime controlled the Department of Macarena, once 
the primary FARC stronghold.21 FARC-controlled municipalities also decreased from 54 
(1998) to 15 (2001) and then to two (2008) and nine (2009). Municipalities with some 
presence or under some threat (not under opposition control) decreased by more than half 
through 2009.22 Reflecting a decline in the proximity of threat to the Colombian regime, 
by 2009 the FARC had no presence (aside from intermittent attacks) in urban areas and 
was operational mainly in remote border locations.23 In 2003 the Colombian military 
“ended the threat to Bogota” in the “largest, most complex, and most successful operation 
conducted by Colombian forces.”24 The number of municipalities under ELN control 
                                                 
17 Colombian Ministry of Defense, Vice Minister of Strategy and Planning, Sectorial Studies – “Public Forces 
Operational Results – Violence and Criminality – Terrorism.” www.mindefensa.gov.co. 
18 Fundación Pais Libre (FPL), Estadisticas Secuestro, 1996-2006; FPL’s statistics are largely mirrored in the 
Colombian Ministry of Defense Report, “Logros de la Política de Consolidacíon de la Seguridad 
Democratica, February 2009,” February 2009. The number of kidnappings declined from 2000 to 2001, and 
then from 2002 to 2008. However, kidnapping slightly increased between 2001 and 2002 before decreasing 
again. 
19 T. Christian Miller, “US Troops Answered Oil Firm Pleas,” Los Angeles Times, December 30, 2004. 
20 Interview by author, via telephone, Anonymous official from Ministeria de Defensa, February 20, 2010; 
See also Colombian Ministry of Defense Report, “Logros de la Política de Consolidacíon de la Seguridad 
Democratica, February 2009,” February 2009. 
21 John Otis, “After dominating southern Colombia for years, numerous setbacks deal serious blows to FARC;  
Putting rebels on the run,” Houston Chronicle (South America Bureau), June 15, 2008. 
22 Interview, Colombian Ministry of Defense official, Bogota, Colombia, October 2012. 
23 Meta, Huila, Caqueta, Narino, and Cauca. Interview, Colombian Ministry of Defense official, Bogota, 
Colombia, October 2012. 




declined as well: from 13 (1998), to 8 (2000) and then two (2009). FARC profits from 
cocaine also declined.25 Combined, these statistics indicate that by the time Uribe stepped 
down the alliance was largely able to weaken the threat to the point it no longer imperiled 




















                                                 






DESCRIPTION OF HOW ALLIANCE RESOURCES ENABLED REGIME TO WEAKEN 
GUERRILLAS AND NARCO-TRAFFICKERS 
 
The purpose of this Annex and the below discussion is to briefly summarize how 
the increase in capabilities aggregated by the allies – particularly though Plan Colombia – 
enabled Colombia to weaken the internal threat. Further details on the amount of resources 
amassed through the alliance can be found in the tables provided in Annex 1.3. 
By the end of the 1990s, the alliance had not pooled resources sufficient to weaken 
actors threatening regime survival because those agencies charged with balancing the threat 
lacked the size and material to do so. “The irregular guerrilla war that the military was 
fighting” was “difficult to win” without creating “mobile ground forces” supported “by an 
effective air force and navy.”26 Neither of the allies “was willing to assume these costs.”27  
Though Colombia’s Army had 146,000 soldiers it was, according to a former U.S. 
ambassador to Colombia, “basically a barracks military,” not “organized to go after the 
guerrillas,” and essentially “a reaction force, and not a very mobile one at that.”28 
Colombia’s Air Force was similarly ill-equipped, making it a “fair-weather, daytime” 
force.”29 The National Police was better equipped, with 87,000 members, 56 helicopters, 
and 17 fixed-wing aircraft but, even so, unable to deploy to the majority of Colombian 
municipalities.30 As a Ministry of Defense official noted, “we simply didn’t have the 
manpower” and this enabled “the FARC and other actors to expand their control of and 
                                                 
26 Richani, Systems of Violence (2002), 59. 
27 Richani, Systems of Violence (2002), 59. 
28 Quote from Ambassador Myles Frechette in Larry Rohter, “Armed Forces in Colombia Hoping to Get 
Fighting Fit,” New York Times, December 5, 1999. 
29 Ramsey III, “From El Billar,” (2009), 17. 




activities in vast expanses of territory.”31 While the regime was “starved of revenues” due 
to the recession and “sharp reduction” of aid, belligerents “captured hundreds of millions 
of dollars in funding from drugs.”32 The threat remained. 
Beginning with Pastrana’s election, Colombia and the U.S. were able to 
consistently work together on all facets of the alliance. For the Pastrana and Uribe regimes, 
core interests fully aligned with balancing the narco-traffickers and belligerents and doing 
so required obtaining capabilities from the U.S. In contrast to the fragmented cohesion 
across prior presidential regimes, during this period cohesion was consistently high and 
enabled the allies to steadily work together to amass resources and implement strategy. In 
part due to these resources, higher than those amassed from 1980-1997 (see Annex 1.3 for 
summary), the regime’s military forces increased in size, effectiveness, and mobility: “the 
security forces that had been not up to the task of confronting and defeating the insurgents 
in 1998 dominated the country-side; attacked an enemy reduced in strength by combat 
actions, desertions, and government programs; and conducted successful hostage rescues 
and high-value target attacks that demonstrated skillful, professional planning and 
execution based on actionable intelligence, capable units, and rapid reaction.”33 In turn, 
these actors were able to weaken the sources of violence to the point they no longer posed 
a core threat to Colombia’s survival and U.S. interests. These capabilities seemed to have 
tipped the balance in favor of the alliance due to three factors.  
First, alliance resources enabled the Colombian government to drastically increase 
the number of professional soldiers and mobile units trained in tactics specific to balancing 
                                                 
31 Anonymous interview, Official from Colombian Ministry of Defense, via Skype, 28 February 2010. 
32 Tom Long, Convincing the Colossus: Latin American Leaders Face the United States (Washington, DC: 
American University School of International Service – Ph.D. Dissertation, June 2013), 312. 




the internal threat (the police and military doubled to a combined 500,000 members)34 and, 
as a result, to augment the strength, frequency, and success rate of operations.35 With such 
capabilities the regime was able to carry out Plan Patriota and, with more helicopters, 
deploy more forces with greater frequency and geographic spread to engage and defeat the 
guerrillas. 
Second, military hardware and intelligence gathering technology transferred to 
Colombia enhanced the security forces’ effectiveness. Military capabilities (and their 
impact) include: transfer of logistics and communications equipment (Army more able to 
coordinate activities and raids); provision of a real-time intelligence through an established 
satellite-enabled surveillance system (security forces more able to track and target the 
internal threat); transfer of radar systems to the military (Army more able to track guerrilla 
force movements); training and armaments for Army units targeting guerrillas (skills 
enhanced battlefield effectiveness).36   
Third and finally, alliance resources to the National Police enabled the regime to 
increase state presence throughout the country. The aforementioned decline in guerrilla 
presence and increase in government control (Annex 1.1) should be viewed in the context 
of increase capacity and presence of the National Police beginning in 2002 and then 2004, 
the first time the Police had presence in all Colombian municipalities.37 
 
                                                 
34 For information on increases in size of Colombia’s armed forces, see “The effectiveness of the Colombian 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy,” Presidency of the Republic-Ministry of Defense, Republic of 
Colombia.www.mindefensa.gov; AND “Presupuesto Defensa de Colombia de Este Año Será de 3.600 
Millones de Dólares,” Agencia EFE news (Spain), February 20, 2003, and  “Recursos para seguridad y 
defensa superarán por primera vez los de educación,” El Espectador (Colombia), October 21, 2009. 
35 For an overview of this assistance, see  “Ramsey III, “From El Billar,” (2009).160. 
36 On these intelligence gathering capabilities, see: Spencer, et al, Colombia’s Road to Recovery (2011), 29. 
37 Connie Veillette, “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 































APPENDIX 1.3  
 
TABLES –THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES 
 
Table 3.1: Level of Threat to Colombia and the U.S.: Force Size, Number of Attacks, 
and Control of Territory 
 
Table 3.1. Level of Threat to Colombia and the U.S.: Force Size, Number of Attacks, and 
Control of Territory 






 FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN FARC ELN 
1980 980 70 11 3  -  - 
1981 1,200 80 11 3  -  - 
1982 1,300 100 15 4  -  - 
1983 1,570 150 25 5  -  - 
1984 1,640 350 27 4  -  - 
1985 2,590 700 30 7 95 56 7 6 
1986 3,650 1,000 32 11 152 162 - - 
1987 4,280 1,200 39 14 237 197 1 1 
1988 4,700 1,700 40 16 209 357 5 5 
1989 4,750 2,000 45 20 150 314 - - 
1990 4,800 2,200 46 23 280 385 12 9 
1991 4,900 2,300 49 25 668 316 18 8 
1992 5,300 2,400 50 27 423 426 22 10 
1993 5,900 2,500 55 29 350 327 5 3 
1994 6,200 2,700 58 30 389 310 18 3 
1995 6,400 3,000 60 32 521 425 12 1 
1996 6,500(7,000) 3,300 (3,000) 62 32 609 462 34 4 
1997 6,600 (7,000) 4,000(3,000) 63 33 706 460 33 6 
1998 6,700(8-12,000) 4,500 (3-
5,000) 










- 40 888 579 39 8 
2001 17,000(9-12,000) Est. 5,000(3-
5,000) 
- - 1032 540 15 - 
2002 17,000(9-12,000) Est. 3,500(3-
5,000) 
64 - 1873 420 14 3 




- - 780 230-
240 
4 - 




140 1 1 




~100 6 - 
2006 12,000+(15,000) 3,000(3,000) - - 520 ~100 1 - 
2007 12,000+(9-12,000) 3,000(3,000) - 75 640-
660 
~90 3 - 
2008 12,000+(9-12,000) 3,000(2,000) 64 - 400 60-80 2 - 
2009 10-11,000 (9-
12,000) 




2010 8,000 (8 -9,000) 3,000(2,000) 61 - 220-
230 
20   
Table 3.1:  Table provides data that reflects the level of threat to the allies—both intensity and proximity. For specific years 
and as reflected by ‘-‘ data were available for specific years. Due to the political nature of the conflict and associated reporting 
on these indicators—in particular the number of FARC and ELN troops and ‘fronts’—where possible data from multiple 
sources are included. The sources used for the measure are as follows. “Est.” reflects those years for which numbers for 
specific measures vary and therefore the author was required to derive an estimate. Numbers of FARC and ELN troops 
and Fronts (1980-1998) provided by: (1980-1998) Velez Maria Alejandra. “FARC-ELN Evolución y Expansión Territorial. 
Revista de Desarrollo y Sociedad.No.47.March2001. 
http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/investigaciones_y_publicaciones/CEDE/Publicaciones/Revista_Desarrollo_y_Sociedad
/Ediciones/revista_desarrollo_y_sociedad_no_47/farc_eln_evolucion_y_expansion_territorial; (1999-2010) International 
Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance. Vols. 1999/2000-2010.  (1996-2010) Dept. of State. International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs Reports 1996-2012. Numbers from State Dept. in parenthesis. All Fronts after 1998 found in 
annual reports on Colombia by the International Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-
caribbean/andes/colombia.aspx; Number of Armed Actions for FARC and ELN troops: (1985-2002) Lopez, Mauricio 
Uribe. El Conflicto, Callejon con Salida. Informe Nacional de Desarollo Humano Colombia 2003: Capitulo 2.  United Nations 
Development Program: Bogota, Colombia. Sept. 2003. http://pnud.org.co/indh2003(2003-2010) Centro de Investigacion y 
Educacion Popular.Conflicto Armada en Colombia Durante 2011. June 2012. 
http://issuu.com/cinepppp/docs/informe_especial_cinep_ppp_junio_2012. Accessed January 2, 2012. Number of attacks 
are based on numbers from the former Observatorio de Derechos Humanos (now known as the programa presidencial de 
los Derechos Humanas y Derecho International de la Vicepresidencia de la Republica) which includes attacks on the 
population, attacks on military installations, infrastructure, etc.; Number of  Municipal Capitals Under  FARC and ELN 


































Table 3.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to 
Alliance with Colombia for Use to Balance Internal Threat 
 
 
Table 3.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance 
with Colombia for Use to Balance Internal Threat ($US Dollars) 
 
Year 
Total Military Capabilities  
Aggregated  
Total Economic Capabilities  
Aggregated 
1980 610,000 50,015,948 
1981 530,000 9,515,296 
1982 20,830,000 6,112,298 
1983 1,150,000 7,590,975 
1984 46,980,000 15,253,348 
1985 1,390,000 20,329,524 
1986 1,760,000 20,325,531 
1987 2,350,000 20,572,770 
1988 7,000,000 17,106,059 
1989 96,720,000 17,704,140 
1990 140,360,000 32,558,192 
1991 81,170,000 31,187,718 
1992 84,530,000 35,246,128 
1993 43,320,000 72,130,824 
1994 12,020,000 30,258,387 
1995 14,400,000 23,786,621 
1996 5,830,000 22,677,899 
1997 90,990,000 46,331,466 
1998 88,740,000 61,186,479 
1999 140,450,000 287,662,921 
2000 164,690,000 1,298,176,792 
2001 237,460,000 82,258,130 
2002 144,750,000 470,555,985 
2003 231,580,000 569,539,041 
2004 324,796,176 545,732,793 
2005 291,534,799 624,870,938 
2006 254,425,513 1,196,315,027 
2007 231,002,592 288,209,154 
2008 179,032,143 727,179,899 
2009 190,256,208 712,022,247 
2010 190,778,031 672,269,751 
Table 3.2:  Table lists the total military and economic capabilities the U.S. aggregated as part of its alliance with 
Colombia for the period 1980 to 2010.  Data obtained from following sources: U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 





Table 3.3: Military Capabilities Aggregated by Colombia to Alliance with Colombia 
for Use to Balance Internal Threat 
 
Table 3: Table summarizes those capabilities aggregate by Colombia to the alliance with the U.S. for use to balance the 
common internal threat. All Military Expenditure figures in constant US 2010 dollars, calculated using BLS inflation calculator 
(http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm). Sources for data are as follows: (1980-1987) U.S World Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers Report.  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185658.pdf); (1988-2010) Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. Military Expenditures and Percentage of GDP for Colombia 1988-2010. 
(http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4). Figures tracked by the World Bank with the first recording in 1988. Armed Forces 
numbers and equipment: International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance. Vols. 1979/80-2010. World Bank 
Indicators of Governance as calculated by a surveying number of worldwide indicators and estimates. Earliest estimates go 
back only to 1996.  Range from -2.5 indicating weak governance to 2.5 indicating strong governance. World Bank. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicator Project. Updated 2012. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. Accessed 
December 30, 2012. Approval of the Presidents’ Handling of Corruption 1995-2009; survey conducted only in urban centers 
 
Table 3.3. Military Capabilities Aggregated by Colombia to Alliance with U.S.  























1980 921,160,000 - 67,500 50,000 158 51 - 
1981 877,980,000 - 70,000 50,000 154 57 57 
1982 741,250,000 - 67,800 50,000 132 31 59 
1983 754,370,000 - 69,700 50,000 - - - 
1984 854,860,000 - 70,000 50,000 215 116 313 
1985 965,210,000 - 66,200 50,000 209 87 348 
1986 947,560,000 - 66,200 50,000 317 111 323 
1987 1,038,780,000 - 66,200 55,000 187 110 323 
1988 2,177,000,000 1.5 76,000 55,000 193 96 323 
1989 2,439,000,000 1.6 86,300 55,000 233 136 323 
1990 2,505,000,000 1.6 130,400 80,000 273 200 278 
1991 2,480,000,000 1.6 134,000 80,000 261 159 278 
1992 2,832,000,000 1.8 139,000 85,000 277 160 292 
1993 3,648,000,000 2.2 140,000 85,000 305 174 292 
1994 3,811,000,000 2.1 146,400 79,000 212 148 292 
1995 4,449,000,000 2.4 146,000 87,000 213 154 300 
1996 6,897,000,000 3.7 146,300 87,000 214 152 300 
1997 4,434,000,000 2.3 146,300 87,000 226 176 304 
1998 5,297,000,000 2.9 146,300 87,000 232 191 304 
1999 5,636,000,000 3.2 155,000 87,000 - - - 
2000 5,720,000,000 3 144,000 87,000 146 129 122 
2001 6,291,000,000 3.3 153,000 95,000 134 124 357 
2002 6,606,000,000 3.4 158,000 104,600 111 194 351 
2003 6,939,000,000 3.5 158,000 104,600 113 202 371 
2004 7,406,000,000 3.5 207,000 121,000 117 209 363 
2005 7,541,000,000 3.4 207,000 121,000 152 183 437 
2006 7,973,000,000 3.3 207,000 121,000 250 254 437 
2007 8,458,000,000 3.3 208,600 121,000 263 271 538 
2008 9,997,000,000 3.7 254,259 136,097 342 259 421 
2009 10,503,000,000 3.8 267,231 136,097 346 243 362 




(Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Baranquilla). Gallup. “Opinion Briefing: Mexico’s War on Drug Traffickers. Feb, 18, 2009. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/115210/opinion-briefing-mexico-war-drug-traffickers.aspx (accessed January 4, 2013). Military 
Expenditures from 1980-1988 may understate the actual amount spent by the Colombian government. As detailed in the 
Department of State’s 1996 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer Report, reporting standards changed in the mid- 










Table 3.4: Breakdown of Military Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Colombia for Use to Balance Internal Threat 
 

























1980 0 610,000 0 0 0 0 0 610,000 
1981 0 530,000 0 0 0 0 0 530,000 
1982 0 690,000 0 0 20,140,000 0 0 20,830,000 
1983 0 1,150,000 0 0 0 0 0 1,150,000 
1984 0 1,400,000 0 0 45,580,000 0 0 46,980,000 
1985 0 1,390,000 0 0 0 0 0 1,390,000 
1986 0 1,760,000 0 0 0 0 0 1,760,000 
1987 0 2,350,000 0 0 0 0 0 2,350,000 
1988 5,060,000 1,940,000 0 0 0 0 0 7,000,000 
1989 94,320,000 2,400,000 0 0 0 0 0 96,720,000 
1990 27,280,000 2,380,000 110,700,000 0 0 0 0 140,360,000 
1991 7,170,000 4,110,000 40,230,000 0 29,660,000 0 0 81,170,000 
1992 13,070,000 3,350,000 68,110,000 0 0 0 0 84,530,000 
1993 1,300,000 3,740,000 38,280,000 0 0 0 0 43,320,000 
1994 0 1,250,000 10,690,000 80,000 0 0 0 12,020,000 
1995 0 800,000 13,600,000 0 0 0 0 14,400,000 
1996 5,120,000 130,000 0 580,000 0 0 0 5,830,000 
1997 33,520,000 0 0 120,000 0 0 57,350,000 90,990,000 
1998 35,300,000 1,140,000 0 0 0 0 52,300,000 88,740,000 




2000 0 1,130,000 0 2,660,000 0 0 160,900,000 164,690,000 
2001 0 1,270,000 0 3,590,000 0 0 232,600,000 237,460,000 
2002 0 1,420,000 0 0 0 0 143,330,000 144,750,000 
2003 0 1,370,000 20,150,000 4,000,000 0 0 206,060,000 231,580,000 
2004 0 1,900,000 113,120,000 320,000 0 86,176 209,370,000 324,796,176 
2005 0 1,890,000 110,380,000 0 0 5,694,799 173,570,000 291,534,799 
2006 0 1,770,000 95,860,000 0 0 5,605,513 151,190,000 254,425,513 
2007 0 1,670,000 89,300,000 520,000 0 4,362,592 135,150,000 231,002,592 
2008 0 1,450,000 53,670,000 0 0 1,532,143 122,380,000 179,032,143 
2009 0 1,410,000 55,900,000 400,000 0 3,706,208 128,840,000 190,256,208 
2010 0 1,690,000 55,000,000 0 0 4,938,031 129,150,000 190,778,031 
         
Table 3.4:  Table lists the breakdown by funding category of military capabilities the U.S. aggregated as part of its alliance with Colombia for the period 1980 to 2010.  
Data obtained from following sources: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 












U.S.-AFGHANISTAN INTERNAL THREAT ALLIANCE – 2001-2012 
 
APPENDIX 2.1 –DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN THREAT LEVEL 
APPENDIX 2.2–DESCRIPTION OF HOW INCREASED CAPABILITIES ENABLED REGIME TO 
WEAKEN GUERRILLAS AND NARCO-TRAFFICKERS 
 
APPENDIX 2.3 – TABLES –THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES 
APPENDIX 2.1  
 
DESCRIPTION OF THREAT LEVEL 
 
A. Demonstrating the Continued Threat to Regime Survival, U.S. Interests 
The purpose of this Annex and the discussion below is to briefly summarize 
information provided in the tables in Annex 2.3 for Chapter four, indicating that the threat 
level remained moderate to high through the period examined and therefore that alliance 
effectiveness was low. 
The number of insurgent forces aiming to topple the regime increased by 800% 
from 2002 to 2009 and reached 36,000 in 2010.1 In tandem with this growth, the 
“organizational capabilities and operational reach” of the insurgents were “qualitatively 
and geographically expanding.”2 The insurgency had capacity sufficient to “sustain itself 
indefinitely” and retained access to a multiplicity of reliable sources for funding.3 In 
                                                 
1 See table on Level of Threat to Afghanistan regime in the Index. These numbers are further corroborated 
by U.S. government sources. Two illustrative examples are: (1) In 2009 and soon after beginning his 60-day 
Afghanistan review, as requested by Obama, McChrystal himself said that there “are 25,000” Taliban in 
Afghanistan and that this figure was “higher than anything” he had previously estimated the number to be. 
As quoted in Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (2010), 133.; and (2) A U.S. estimate published in 2009 put the 
number of insurgents in Afghanistan at 25,000, the highest number since initial engagement in 2001. Jonathan 
S. Landay and Hal Bernton, “While U.S. Debates Afghanistan Policy, Taliban Beefs Up,” McClatchy 
Newspapers Report, October 16, 2009. 
2 ISAF Briefing, “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives,” December 22, 2009. 
Unclassified, slide 16. 




tandem with this increase in size, the insurgent attacks onto regime and U.S. targets 
escalated: by 400% (2002 to 2006),4 51 percent (2007 to 2008),5 with all but two provinces 
experiencing a rise in attacks over this period,6 and a further 300 percent through 2009.7 
Weekly attacks in 2010 were the highest since the beginning of the alliance,8 average 
monthly attacks escalated by 41 percent over the next two years (and never below 1,500).9 
Through the period examined attacks occurred with “much greater frequency” and in more 
“varied locations” 10  
Beginning around 2003 insurgents steadily increased presence in and control of 
territory, representing an escalation in threat to Karzai’s regime—centrally and 
subnationally. In 2004, the UN designated 33 percent of the country as “high risk” for their 
staff. Northern provinces remained relatively stable but the “situation in the south and 
southeast” was “more complex,”11 with insurgents “operating openly” in Zabul and 
                                                 
4 These figures are summarized in Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency,”(2008), 7.  
5 Figures from Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghan Index – 2009 - Tracking Variables of   
Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 21, 
2009). Accessed  November 16, 2011. 
6 Some provinces experienced a decrease in insurgent activity, but they were either relatively inactive 
previously (Sari Pul province, which decreased from 15 to 2 attacks) or experienced what we might consider 
rather marginal decreases (Balk province, where the total number of attacks decreased only by three from 44 
to 41).These figures are drawn from Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghan Index – 2009,” 
Brookings (2009).   
7 ISAF Briefing, “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives,” December 22, 2009. 
Unclassified version.  
8 This number was 1,100. These figures are drawn from Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, “Afghan 
Index – March 2012” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 21, 2009). Accessed March 2012. 
9 Author’s calculation based on figures provided in Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghan Index 
– July 15, 2013 -,” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, July 15, 2013). The Brookings Institution for 
this Index collects data via open source news, the U.S. government and private firms it contracts to collect 
information. The Afghan Index and descriptions of its methodology is available at the following link: 
www.brookings.edu/Afghanindex. Accessed  July 19, 2013. 
10 ISAF Briefing, “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions and Objectives,” December 22, 2009. 
Unclassified, slide 16. 
11 Barbara J. Stapleton, “The Failure to Bridge the Security Gap: the PRT Plan, 2002-2004,” in Wolfgang 
Danspeckgruber and Robert Finn, eds. Building State and Security in Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: 




Uruzgan provinces, among others.12 On the heels of the insurgency’s further spread, in 
2007 the regime controlled “a very small portion of Afghanistan” (Kabul and some 
southern/western areas) and “much of the country” was under the influence of either 
“armed local leaders” or insurgent forces. 13 The same year, the UN designated 84 percent 
of territory as “high risk” and14 insurgents functioned “fairly freely” in Helmand, Uruzgan, 
Zabul, Paktia, and Kunar provinces, among others.15 Challenging the regime’s authority 
(national and subnational) the Taliban sought to establish alternative governments in 
Afghanistan’s provinces; and these “shadow governors” increased by 200 percent from 
2005 to 2009 (11/34 to 33/34 provinces). 16 Territory with a “permanent” insurgent 
presence also increased from 54 percent (2007) to 72 percent (2008) and then again in 2009 
to 80 percent.17 Early in 2010, the Taliban was active in more than one-third of 
Afghanistan’s 400 districts, up from 2001 when they had a “negligible presence in the 
country.”18 Regime control over southern provinces (particularly Helmand and Kandahar) 
remained particularly tenuous19 and the Taliban had “gained de facto control over many 
                                                 
12 Stapleton, “The Failure to Bridge the Security Gap,” (2007), 173. 
13 These “insurgent forces” included mainly the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-I Islami. Abdulkader H. Sino, 
Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 262. 
14 As another reflection of the change in threat level through 2007—where the UN agencies were able to 
operate freely throughout approximately 60-70 percent of the territory comprising Southern Afghanistan 
from 2004-2005, in 2006 they were able to operate ‘freely’ in only 6 (of 50) of the same region’s districts. 
What is more, Taliban-initiated attacks and riots in the capital increased the proximity of threat to the regime 
in 2006. As quoted in Hafeez Malik, U.S. Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 31. 
15 Sino, Organizations at War, (2008), 262. 
16 “ISAF Briefing, “State of the Insurgency,” (2009). 
17 See table on Level of Threat to Afghanistan regime in the Index 
18 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 78. 
19 An analysis in 2012 based on extensive fieldwork, for example, concluded it had “become increasingly 
clear that ISAF is unable to dislodge the Taliban from its strongholds in the south and east.” “Afghanistan: 




outlying areas in Kandahar,” leaving “Afghanistan’s second-largest city…cut off from 
Kabul.”20 
Afghanistan’s seat of government and Karzai himself also remained under duress, 
as attacks and assassination attempts in Kabul occurred regularly through 2012. Illustrating 
the proximity of threat to the central regime, by 2008 the insurgency had fronts in areas of 
provinces that are within a 60-minute drive of the presidential palace.21 By 2009 at least 80 
districts had to be secured “in order to weaken the insurgency enough that it would no 
longer pose a threat to the central government [emphasis mine].”22 Insurgents continued 
reaping revenue from the opium trade that (by 2006) provided more than 70 percent of 
Taliban funding and (through 2010) roughly $150 million annually to insurgents.23  
The efficiency and brazen nature of insurgent attacks also evidence that the threat 
to the regime remained high. According to a 2006 CIA assessment, the insurgency was a 
greater threat “than at any point since late 2001.”24 The Taliban’s response to “Operation 
Medusa” (2006 in Kandahar) and the military assets uncovered thereafter bring to life this 
dire assessment. Over several days of fighting where more than 500 Taliban were killed 
and 160 captured, the insurgents discharged 4,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 RPGs, and 
1,000 mortars. After the fighting stopped, ally forces uncovered 1 million rounds of 
ammunition, a fully-stocked field hospital, and a facility for training suicide bombers.25 
Nearly ten years after the alliance began, insurgent forces could execute sophisticated and 
effective attacks in Kabul. In 2010, for example, insurgents battled Afghan forces for five 
                                                 
Williams, Afghanistan Declassified, (2012), 103. 
21 Isby, Afghanistan - Graveyard of Empires, (2010), 145. 
22 Chandrasekaran, The War Within the War for Afghanistan, (2012), 74. 
23 See table in Annex on Level of threat. 
24 As quoted in Walter Pincus, “Growing Threat Seen in Afghan Insurgency: Defense Intelligence Agency 
Chief Cites Surging Violence in Homeland,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2006. 




hours a mere 200 yards from the presidential palace26 in “one of the most dramatic attacks 
on Kabul” since the Taliban’s demise” in 2001.27 In September 2011, the Taliban staged a 
20-hour siege on regime buildings in Kabul—located near the U.S. embassy—and soon 
thereafter orchestrated the elaborate assassination of the Chairman of the Afghan High 
Peace Council.28 The week before this author visited Afghanistan, insurgents infiltrated the 
Ministry of Interior and assassinated top level officials.  
These statistics and examples indicate that by the end of the period examined the 
alliance was largely unable to weaken the threat to the point that it no longer endangered 











                                                 
26 “Multiple Taliban attacks in Afghanistan,” PRI – The World, January 18, 2010. 
27 Lynne O'Donnell, “Kabul on high alert after brazen Taliban strikes,” AFP,  January 18, 2010 






DESCRIPTION OF HOW INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES ENABLED INSURGENTS TO CONTINUE  
OPERATING 
 
“Afghanistan was a mission that in past years was poorly defined and under-resourced.”29 
U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry 
 
The purpose of this Annex and the below discussion is to briefly summarize how 
the insufficient capabilities pooled through the alliance contributed to the allies’ inability 
to weaken the internal threat.  Further details on the amount of resources amassed via the 
alliance can be found in the tables provided in Annex 2.3. 
By the end of Obama’s first term, the alliance had not aggregated capabilities 
sufficient to weaken actors threatening the regime’s survival because those agencies and 
armed forces charged with balancing the internal threat lacked the force size and material 
to do so. Specifically, the alliance did not enhance the capacity of Afghan Army and Police 
forces to independently and consistently weaken actors threatening the regime’s survival.30  
Despite obtaining one alliance strategy objective and growing the Afghan National 
Army’s (ANA) troops by more than 2,000 percent, by 2010 the ANA remained unable to 
consistently thwart insurgent challenges due to “chronic shortfalls in training personnel, 
faulty equipment, slow infrastructural development, poor logistics, and the crippling army 
attrition rates.”31 Not a single Army unit was assessed as “capable of conducting its 
mission” without U.S. assistance as of September 2010. The proportion of Army units 
                                                 
29 Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, December 
8, 2009, 2. 
30 Other assessments fault the U.S. for not deploying sufficient troops; and others argue that the 
(counterinsurgency) strategy was flawed from the beginning. 




capable of conducting “independent actions”32 increased in 2012, though only to 7 percent 
of the total force. And according to a separate analysis “the majority” of Army units were 
by 2012 “unable to meet even the most basic operational benchmarks, particularly in the 
crucial areas of supply, logistics and air support.”33 Capacity shortcomings in turn 
“limit[ed]” the Army’s ability to “project force” beyond “large urban areas and logistical 
hubs.”34 Looking ahead, an assessment concluded it “highly improbable” the ANA would 
be able to alone safeguard the regime and balance insurgent threats.35  
Like the Army, the Afghan National Police (ANP) increased in size but most 
assessments concluded that it remained too small to extend control across Afghanistan and 
ineffective to consistently balance threats.36 By 2008, for example, not a single unit 
received a score/assessment of “fully capable” of ensuring stability and thwarting threats37 
and roughly 60 percent of units received the lowest possible score.38 Toward the end of 
this period the Afghan Minister of Interior bluntly said: “the Police is supposed to get to 
grips with terrorism, criminality, and narcotics” but is simply “not up to the job.”39 The 
picture remained largely the same through 2012, when nine percent of Police were deemed 
                                                 
32 Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: United States Plan for Sustaining the 
Afghanistan National Security Forces”, U.S. Department of Defense, April 2012. Allen testimony, U.S. 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 12 March 2012.   
33 “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition,” Crisis Group (2012), 18. 
34 The assessment lists the following improvements: According to an assessment performed by the U.S. 
Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, by 2012 the security forces had “proven more capable and better 
coordinated in responding to sustained high-profile attacks in Kabul…and improved their capability to secure 
roads and critical transportation corridors in the country’s north.” 
35 “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition,” Crisis Group (2012), 18. 
36 For these figures and annual breakdowns see Table in Annex - Size of Afghanistan’s Security Forces and 
Annual Expenditures 
37 The score if achieved reflects ability to independently operate and comply with police standards and 
protocols. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security: US Programs to Further Reform 
Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” 
(Washington, DC: GAO, March 2009).  
38 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan Security” (2009).  
39 Mohamed Hanif Atmar, Minister of Interior, speech delivered at the Brookings Institution, Washington, 




capable of “independent actions.”40 Collectively, capabilities aggregated were insufficient 
to shift the balance in favor of the regime and weaken the threat to the point it no longer 

























                                                 




APPENDIX 2.3  
 
TABLES - THREAT LEVEL INDICATORS, ALLIANCE RESOURCES 
 
Table 4.1: Level of Threat to Afghanistan and the U.S.:  Force Size, Number of Attacks, 
and Control of Territory 
 
Table 4.1: Level of Threat to Afghanistan and the U.S.:  
Force Size, Number of Attacks, and Control of Territory 
 






















2000 - - - - - 
2001 - - - - - 
2002 (4000) - - - - 
2003 1000 (7000/0 - - - - 




5,475 $90-$160m - - 
2006 4,000(17,000) 7,665 $90-$160m - - 
2007 - 9,125 
 
$90-$160m 54% 38% 
2008 16,000 12,775 
 
$100-$500m 72% 21% 
2009 25,000 31,025 
 
$100-$150m 80% 7% 
2010 36,000 32,850 
 
- - - 
Table 4.1: Table provides data that reflects the level of threat to the allies—both intensity and proximity. For specific years 
and as reflected by ‘-‘ data were available for specific years. Due to the political nature of the conflict and associated reporting 
on these indicators—in particular the number of insurgent troops and attacks—where possible data from multiple sources 
are included. The sources used for the measure are as follows. Number of Insurgent Forces: The figures provided are 
drawn from the following sources and refer mainly to the Taliban yet also include other insurgent forces. Antonio Giustozzi,. 
Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. Columbia University Press: New York. 2008. 
Parentheses indicate estimates by author.  In addition to the Taliban, the two other insurgency groups in Afghanistan that are 
commonly cited by experts are Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network. Regarding Hezb-i-Islami the numbers are listed as 
“unknown” by the START program at the University of Maryland. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism. “Data: Hizb-I-Islam.” University of Maryland. (Accessed March 20, 2013); The Washington post 
lists both Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network as approximately containing 1,000 members each. (Tyson, Ann Scott. “A 
Sober Assessment of Afghanistan.” The Washington Post. June 15, 2008. However, Reuters lists their numbers as closer to 
4,000. (Ferris, Rotman, Amie. “Haqqani Network Behind Afghan Attacks: U.S. Envoy.” Reuters. April 19, 2012.Number of 
Armed Actions: These data reflect the annual number of “enemy-initiated” attacks against Afghan- or non-Afghan forces 
including direct and indirect fire, IED attacks, kidnapping, and any other such attacks. Data for this factor varies widely 
depending on the source. The annual totals listed reflect the middle point between the range of total number of attacks 
provided by sources. United States Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional 
Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. Washington. Government Printing Office. Jan 2011 Characterized as ”Enemy 
initiated attacks “ without breakdown as to type (kidnapping, explosions, etc.);  Territory with Permanent or Substantial 
Insurgent Presence: Permanent presence is defined as areas that have had an average of at least one insurgent attack a week- 
this include both lethal and non-lethal; Substantial presence is defined as areas that have had an average of at least one 
insurgent attack a month- also both lethal and non-lethal. Sources for this data include:   International Council on Security 
and Development: “ICOS Maps.” (accessed January 28, 2013).  Presence data determined based on public reports of level of 
daily insurgent activity/attacks. Gaps in the data exist between 2001 and 2006. This may be attributable to many things, 




stability in Afghanistan have deteriorated in the past 3 years. In the first several years of the war, Afghanistan was relatively 
stable and secure and attacks by Taliban insurgency on U.S. soldiers were rare. However, since 2006, the insurgency has 
reasserted itself, resulting in an escalation of violence, especially against U.S. and coalition forces.”  (Government 
Accountability Office. Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in 
U.S. Strategies.”( Washington, D.C. March 25, 2009), 11. According to Jane’s Defense and Security: “While initially offering 
only low-level opposition to the new government of President Hamid Karzai, since 2006 there has been a significant escalation 
in Taliban operations, with the group carrying out an intensifying asymmetric insurgency.” (Jane’s Defense and Security. 














































Table 4.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to 
Alliance with Afghanistan for Use to Balance Internal Threat 
 
Table  4.2: Totals for Military and Economic Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance 










2001 3,420,000 25,360,000 28,780,000 
2002 70,310,000 3,964,428,000 4,034,738,000 
2003 417,920,000 618,750,000 1,036,670,000 
2004 627,260,000 1,512,233,000 2,139,493,000 
2005 823,840,000 1,569,780,000 2,393,620,000 
2006 2,050,720,000 1,838,330,000 3,889,050,000 
2007 4,082,703,000 1,838,980,000 5,921,683,000 
2008 6,375,880,000 2,409,610,000 8,785,490,000 
2009 6,113,560,000 2,673,950,000 8,787,510,000 
2010 6,868,130,000 4,253,160,000 11,121,290,000 
Total 27,433,743,000 20,704,581,000 48,138,324,000 
Table 4.2:  Table lists the total military and economic capabilities the U.S. aggregated as part of its alliance with Afghanistan 
for the period 2001 2010.  Data obtained from following sources: (1) Military: Total amounts obtained from U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 
30, 2010: Custom Report Afghanistan 2000-2010. Washington D.C. http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do (accessed January 
29, 2013); (2) Non-military:: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations 
and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2010: Custom Report Afghanistan 2001-2010. Washington D.C.  
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/(accessed January 29, 2013). All numbers are reported by recipient countries. Civilian forces 
deployed by U.S. Government to Afghanistan: Livingston, Ian S. and Michael O’Hanlon.  Afghanistan Index. Brookings 


























Table 4.3: Military Capabilities Aggregated by Afghanistan to Alliance for Use to 
Balance Internal Threat 
 




AFG Spending as 






Min. of Interior 
Forces 





2001     - 
2002     - 
2003 186,000,000 2.1% 6,000 0 6,000 
2004 191,000,000 2.2% 24,000 33,000 57,000 
2005 173,000,000 1.8% 26,000 40,000 66,000 
2006 188,000,000 1.8% 36,000 49,700 85,700 
2007 275,000,000 2.4% 50,000 75,000 125,000 
2008 242,000,000 2.2% 57,800 79,910 137,710 
2009 305,000,000 2% 100,131 94,958 195,089 
2010 576,000,000 3.8% 149,533 116,856 266,389 
Table 4.3. Lists expenditures by government of Afghanistan on its military as well as the force size of its Army and police 
over the course of the alliance. Data on military expenditures obtained from the following sources: (1) Military Expenditures, 
Percent of GDP: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Military Expenditures and Percentage of GDP for Afghanistan 
2001-2010. (http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4). Figures tracked by the World Bank. (1) Afghan security force numbers 
(as of November/December of given year), Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index. Brookings Institute. 
May 16, 2012.  Two notes: (1) Ministry of Defense Forces: refers to all forces under the control of this Ministry, which oversees 
the readiness and capabilities of the Afghanistan National Army. The operational arm of the ANA is divided into 5 corps, 
which is then further divided into several brigades. This arm comprises about seventy percent of ANA personnel and holds 
responsibility for different regions of Afghanistan. In support of these endeavors there are many institutions that sustain and 
support the Ministry of Defense including in the fields of logistics, communications support, regional military intelligence 
offices, training and recruitment, and Headquarters Support and Security Brigade. The figure provided seeks to capture all of 
these forces.  (2) Ministry of Interior Forces: refers to all forces under the control of this Ministry, which oversees the protection 
of Afghan internal borders and enforces the rule of law. These forces include several police units all of which to some extent 
combat internal threats: Afghan Uniformed Police, assigned to police districts, provinces and regions, Afghan Border Police, 
providing law enforcement capabilities at international borders and entry points, Afghan National Civil Order Police, 
responsible with providing counter civil unrest and lawlessness, Criminal Investigative Division, leads investigations of 
national interest such as white collar crime, Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan, charged with reducing production and 




















Table 4.4. Breakdown of Military Capabilities Aggregated by U.S. to Alliance with Afghanistan 
 



































2001 3,420,000        3,420,000  
2002 8,420,000 60,150,000  1,490,000 - 250,000   70,310,000 2500 
2003 13,320,000 225,090,000 460,000 171,470,000 - 270,000 7,310,000  417,920,000 9700 
2004 9,580,000 475,780,000 430,000 51,710,000 - 85,100,000 4,660,000  627,260,000 13,100 
2005 36,680,000 441,520,000 1,050,000  17,250,000 243,540,000  83,800,000 823,840,000 16,700 
2006 24,030,000  1,050,000   82,560,000  1,943,080,000 2,050,720,000 17,800 
2007 28,100,000  1,193,000   250,760,000  3,802,650,000 4,082,703,000 22,100 
2008 29,500,000  1,680,000   208,410,000  6,136,290,000 6,375,880,000 24,700 
2009 34,740,000  1,410,000   264,530,000  5,812,880,000 6,113,560,000 31,800 
2010 69,600,000  1,760,000   325,340,000 30,000 6,471,400,000 6,868,130,000 67,400 
Table 4.4:  Table lists the breakdown by funding category of military capabilities the U.S. aggregated as part of its alliance with Afghanistan for the period 2001 to 2012.  Data obtained 
from following sources:  Total amounts obtained from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-
September 30, 2010: Custom Report Afghanistan 2000-2010. Washington D.C. http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do (accessed January 29, 2013). All numbers are reported by recipient 
countries. The following are brief explanations of the purpose of each specific funding source. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR): Funding used to support 
a broad range of security related programs to reduce threats by targeting four arrears: nonproliferation, antiterrorism, regional stability and humanitarian assistance; Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) Programs: Program provides grants to recipient countries for the purposes of funding the transfer of U.S. defense equipment and services and trainings. Though the 
program primarily funds arms transfers, it does include a significant amount of military training; International Military Education and Training: U.S program to provide training and 
education on grant basis to military students at U.S. military training institutions. Military Assistance Programs (MAP) Grants: Refer to the former system of grant aid distribution that 
allocated funds to country to allow them to obtain defense articles and services in support of U.S. National Security Policy without requiring repayment to the United States. Around FY 
1982 these grant funds and programs and funds became part of the Foreign Military Financing program; Peacekeeping Operations: Funding to provide support for international 
peacekeeping operations and to promote increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution; Drug-Interdiction: Refers to all Counter-narcotics initiatives with a non-
development component. It funds training of military and law enforcement to support drug interdiction operations; Transfer from Excess Stock: Refers to the sale of US defense articles 
no longer needed by U.S. forces; Afghan Security Forces Fund: an account under DOD appropriations, funds are to enhance to the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
to combat terror and support US operations in Afghanistan. Assistance given under this account include equipment procurement, training, supplies and services. Other sources are as 
follows: (1) Number of Students Trained: Department of State and Department of Defense. Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011; Executive Summary. 
(accessed January 26, 2013) The Foreign Military Training Reports, is a Joint Report by the Department of State and Department of Defense as required by the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 as amended, and the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act; as started in 2000. (3) U.S. Forces in Afghanistan: Ian S. Livingston and 
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